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Introduction
This thesis is comprised of five self-contained essays. In the following, I mo-
tivate the choice of research questions and underline the main contributions
of my work. Last, I describe the main features of the five essays.
Motivation
The health sector constitutes an important and considerable part of the eco-
nomic activity in a number of countries. Expenditures on health amounted
to an average of 8,4 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in the OECD
countries in 2001, with the United States (US) at the upper end with expen-
ditures amounting to 13.9 percent of GDP.1 In Norway, health expenditures
constitutes about 8,3 percent of GDP. The public sector plays, moreover, an
important part in the financing of health care services. This may take the
form of specific arrangements for specific groups, e.g., the poor and elderly
people, or more general schemes that provide for the whole population. The
public share of total health expenditures in the OECD countries is indeed
substantial: on average 72 percent of total health spending was publicly
financed (ranging from 44 percent in the US to more than 80 percent in the
Nordic countries}.' Moreover, about 90 percent or more of the population in
most OECD countries is covered through public programmes (though only
about 25 percent in the US).l
In terms of economic significance, there is thus little doubt that issues
related to the financing of and the demand for health care are highly rele-
vant. These are important issues also at the individuallevel. In particular,
individuals' may suffer a loss in their level of health, and, consequently,
encounter substantial expenditures on health care. Risk averse individu-
IOECD Health Data 2003. Available at: http://www.oecd.org
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als wish to dispose of this risk, hence, the availability and the design of
insurance schemes are important to their well-being.
Purpose of Study
My ambition is to contribute to the theoretical literature on health eco-
nomics, in particular, on issues related to the financing of health care ser-
vices. Indeed, the topics of the essays included in this thesis all revolve
around health insurance. I study both actuarially fair insurance and redis-
tributive tax-financed insurance. The importance of insurance in the case
of health care is supported by the empirical fact that there is little 'out of
pocket' payment for health care.
Initially, my research questions came about after reading contributions
to the literature on public provision of private goods as a means for redis-
tribution in a world of asymmetric information. There, in-kind provision
( i. e., financing and supply) of private goods is typically considered to bet-
ter facilitate the needs of low-income individuals (or, the target group in
question), than those of high-income individuals (those outside the target
group). In particular, the good in question is assumed to be a substitute
for leisure. Health care is often mentioned as an example of such a private
good. However, is it really so that public provision of health care better
facilitates the needs of low-income individuals, or could it be the other way
around? Maybe high-income individuals derive more utility from public
provision than do low-income individuals?
This basic question gave rise to the following queries: how do individuals
wish to be compensated if ill, and how is their choice of compensation in-
fluenced by their level of earnings ability? Moreover, do individuals always
choose to restore health when possible? Empirically, we observe that an
increasing number of individuals in the working age population are living
from disability payments. Typically, these are characterized as low-income
earners prior to entering the disability scheme. I do not pursue to give the
answer to why this is sa. Rather, I wish to study how individuals' level
of inherent ability may influence their decision on whether or not to re-
store health if sick: will they trade off health for consumption? In order
to shed light on these challenging questions, I expand the concept of health
insurance so as to include not only compensation of medical expenditures,
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but also compensation of income loss due to (permanent) reduced health,
and, thus, earnings ability. I argue that these are two types of financial
loss arising from the same fundamental risk, namely the risk of falling ill.
Thus, I integrate what is traditionally considered two types of insurance,
namely medical insurance and disability insurance. To my knowledge, this
constitutes a new approach to the problems of health insurance. As will be
readily apparent, this approach allows for a number of interesting studies.
My co-authors and I construct an innovating and rich model that provides
the foundation of the essays included in this thesis. In this model, an indi-
vidual's health if ill is endogenous. Moreover, non-monetary losses in utility
if health is not fully restored, are acknowledged. In what may be considered
the traditional approach in health economics, it is assumed that health can
be fully restored by means of medical treatment. In the literature on disabil-
ity insurance, health is assumed not to be fully restorable, or, alternatively,
not to be replaceable. Our approach thus provides a link between the two.
Generally, in the case of medical insurance, compensation is usually de-
pendent on (verifiable) consumption of certain goods and services, e.g., visits
to a physician, hospital stays, etc. Thus, unconditional cash payments are
rare. This is mainly so because of moral hazard problems. Moreover, in
the literature on insurance, the use of deductibles (co-payments) to mitigate
problems of adverse selection is well established. Typically, deductibles are
defined in monetary terms. Taking into account that compensation if ill is
dependent upon the consumption of health care, I find it natural to allow
for deductibles defined also in physical terms. Hence, individuals may be
constrained also in the quantity (and quality) of treatment made available
if ill.
Based on the significant role of the public sector in the financing and
supply of health care, it seems natural to raise the question: What will be
the implications of introducing this expanded concept of health insurance
to the analysis of public provision of health care? As is often the case in the
literature on public provision of private goods, I do not aim to justify pub-
lic provision (although I elaborate somewhat on this in Essay 1). Rather,
I take public provision as given and study how the government can use
this as an instrument for redistribution of income when there is asymmetric
information. As is often the case in studies of information-constrained re-
distribution, I assume that information about individual earnings ability is
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private and unobservable by the government. Returning to my initial query
regarding who is benefitting the most from a public supply, I show that
more redistribution can be carried out if the level of treatment available to
low-income individuals is constrained, i.e., health care is 'under-provided'.
Moreover, I show that public provision of health care improves redistribu-
tion also when preferences are separable in consumption and leisure. This
is so because health care improves individual's productivity in the labour
market.
Basic problem As will be readily apparent from Essay l, this the-
sis encompasses themes from different fields of economics. However, the
fundamental problem in Essays 3 - 5 is that of asymmetric information, in
particular: adverse selection. Typically, I study situations in which infor-
mation about individuals' characteristics (e.g., their inherent ability and/or
risk of illness) is private and, thus, not observable by others. These are
characteristics that influence the outcome of the contractual relationship
between informed and uninformed agents (e.g., insurers' profits or a govern-
ment's redistributional achievements). The design of efficient contracts are
thus at issue. Self-selection constraints place restrictions on the range of in-
struments available, as well as on the design of contracts. (The uninformed
agent may in the case of designing redistributional schemes be the govern-
ment or, in the case of designing competitive insurance schemes; private
insurers.) I derive information constrained Pareto-efficient contracts facili-
tating efficient allocation of risks (in Essay 3) and efficient redistribution of
income (in Essay 4 and 5). The uninformed agents offer a menu of contracts
that provides the informed agents with incentives to truthfully reveal their
characteristics, and, at the same time, promoting the uninformed agents'
objectives. As is standard in the literature on insurance, I do not consider
the problem of adverse selection and moral hazard simultaneously.
I consider two kinds of uncertainty in these essays. First, individuals
face exogenous uncertainty with respect to their health, that is, whether
they will be in good or in poor health (and thus in need of health care).
This is the issue of Essay 2. Second, in a world of asymmetric information,
uninformed agents (e.g., insurers and the government) face uncertainty in
that they are not able to observe important characteristics of individuals.
The latter uncertainty may thus be considered 'endogenous' in the sense
that the outcome of the schemes designed by the uninformed agents are
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influenced by the behaviour of the informed agents: Individuals may indeed
choose not to reveal their private characteristics if it is not in their interest
to do so, i.e., if it is not incentive-compatible. This kind of uncertainty is at
issue in Essays 3-5.
Outline of Essays
The five essays included in this thesis are briefly outlined in the following.
Essay 1. In this essay, I provide an overview of the theoreticallitera-
ture from which I have profited in writing this thesis. This overview provides
a setting against which my contributions can be viewed.
Essay 2. This essay provides a theoretical analysis of individuals'
demand for health insurance, taking explicitly into account that the insuree
wishes to hedge against both medical expenditures and loss in income due
to reduced health. Hence, disability and medical insurance are integrated.
Assuming symmetric information, i.e., a 'first-best' situation, my co-authors
and I characterize the optimal choice of insurance compensation and level
of compensation when insurance is offered at an actuarially fair premium.
We show that individuals with a sufficiently low level of inherent ability
choose to restore health only partly, and to hold a contract entitling them
to a cash transfer (i. e., disability payment) if ill. Thus, they trade off health
for consumption. Individuals with a sufficiently high level of ability, on the
other hand, choose to restore their health fully. The findings in this essay
provides a benchmark against which the findings of the other essay may be
compared.
Essay 3. In this essay, individuals are assumed to differ along two
dimensions: inherent ability and risk of illness. My co-authors and I study
a competitive insurance market where information about the probability of
illness is asymmetrically distributed. As is standard when there is problems
of adverse selection, we show that those facing a low probability of falling ill
are constrained in their level of insurance coverage, (i. e., they face a strictly
positive deductible. Since we allow individuals to differ also with respect to
income (ability), the intriguing question is then whether the deductible will
be in the form of reduced consumption or reduced medical treatment, or
both. We show that individuals with a high ability and a low risk of falling
ill will have a deductible in the form of reduced consumption only (i. e., in
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pay, whereas individuals with a low ability and a low risk of falling ill will
have a deductible partly in the form of reduced consumption, i.e., pay, and
partly in the form of reduced treatment, i.e., pain.
Essay 4. This essay studies the role of redistributive in-kind trans-
fers. The government is assumed to be unable to observe any individual
characteristics, hence, individualized lump-sum transfers are not feasible. I
derive a scheme in which the government offers a menu of different combi-
nations of health care and contributions. The benefits from treatment are
increasing in ability, thus, the government can offer different combinations
of medical treatment combined with different payments in order to separate
high-ability individuals from low-ability individuals. Redistribution is hence
carried out by means of different levels of medical treatment associated with
different lump-sum redistributive payments. I show that if self-selection is a
problem, then low-ability individuals are offered partial treatment against a
low (or negative) payment, whereas high-ability individuals are offered com-
plete treatment against a high payment. My analysis takes place ex ante
hence the derived scheme provides individuals with a (partial or complete)
hedge against the potential consequences of illness.
Essay 5. In this essay, I characterize a public tax/provision scheme
in which nonlinear income taxation does not only provide an instrument for
redistribution, but also provides individuals with insurance against potential
loss in health, and, thus, earnings. Individuals' level of inherent ability
( i. e., productivity) and labour supply are assumed non-observable by the
government. I derive contracts in five dimensions: pre- and post-tax income
if in good health, and pre- and post- tax income, as well as medical treatment,
if in poor health. The information constrained Pareto-efficient scheme is
shown to imply a downward distortion in low-ability individuals' labour
supply in both health states, and a downward distortion in their level of
treatment if sick.
Informational assumptions. As follows from the above, all but one
essay deals with problems of asymmetric information and contract design.
The informational assumptions made in the different essays vary. When
analyzing the outcome of a competitive insurance market in Essay 2 and
3, I assume that information on risk of illness is asymmetric. This is a
standard assumption in the literature on insurance. When analyzing public
provision of health care in Essay 4 and 5, I assume that information on
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inherent ability is asymmetric. This is standard in the literature on income
taxation. Moreover, in order to simplifythe analysis, I assume in these essays
that information on risk is symmetric. Naturally, a more realistic situation
would be one in which information on both ability and risk of illness are
asymmetrically distributed, and possibly also correlated. Extension of the
analysis to include also these questions, will be subject to future research.
Note that the contents of Essay 3 and 4 are identical to their published
versions.
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Essay 1
Theoretical Foundations: An
Overview
1.1 Introduction
We provide an overview of the existing literature in the area of this thesis.
Focus is placed on issues central to the essays comprised in the thesis, hence
we by no means do justice to the substantialliterature available within the
larger area of the economics of health and health insurance. The paper is
organized as follows. In Section 1.2 we discuss issues related to individuals'
demand for health and health care. In Section 1.3 we elaborate somewhat on
problems of uncertainty and the demand for insurance. Problems of asym-
metric information is the subject of Section 1.4, and the role of government
is discussed in Section 1.5. Last, we synthesize the main issues in Section
1.6.
1.2 Demand for Health
Health is not everything in life, but without health, life is
nothing."
To be in good health is a major aspiration for most individuals.f While
some may argue that being in good health is the most important objective
lproverb, as cited in Zweifel and Breyer (1992).
2Health is defined in the Encyclopedia Britannica as: "the extent of an individual's
continuing physical, emotional, mental, and social ability to cope with his environment."
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(implying that individuals' ordering of preferences is lexicographic), it is
indeed an empirical fact that individuals do trade-off the health objective
for other objectives, e.g., when speeding, smoking, etc. Thus, being in good
health is but one objective in life. Health is, moreover, important not only
in its own right: it enables individuals to participate in, and take pleasure
from, a number of activities such as consumption, production, leisure activi-
ties, etc.3 Consequently, health enters individuals' utility functions not only
directly, but also indirectly through its effect on utility from other goods
and services. Health is indeed an important determinant of individuals'
productivity, both in market and household production. In particular, it
constitutes an important part of their innate human capitaZ4, often referred
to as 'ability' (Fallon and Verry, 1988).
Individuals are endowed with an initial level of health. This inherent
level of health constitutes an important determinant of their future health.f
Changes in health is to some (others would argue large) extent endogenous
to individuals; their choice of consumption and leisure activities are impor-
tant determinants of health. Indeed, health may be considered a capital
stock in which individuals can invest. Thus, health may constitute both a
consumption and investment good." Socioeconomic factors such as sanitary
living and working condition are, of course, also important determinants of
health. In addition, the distribution of income in the society has an im-
pact on individual health. The influence of absolute and relative income
inequalities on health and health inequalities, provides an important and in-
teresting field of study. For instance, Dardanoni and Wagstaff (1987) show
that inequality in health may stem more from inequalities in wealth than
from inequalities in access to medical care.
3For instance, as mentioned by Zweifel and Breyer (1997), individuals suffering from a
mental illness like depression, takes little pleasure from most types of activities.
"Traditionally, innate human capital such as inherent ability and health, is distin-
guished from acquired human capital such as education and skills.
5According to Currie and Madrian (1999): "there is growing evidence that poor health
in childhood can have profound effects on future outcomes, both because of effects on
adult health, and because of effects on the accumulation of other forms of human capital
such as education." (p. 3351).
6In particular, one can describe a health production function as well as a health demand
function. For more on this in an inter-temporal framework, see Grossman (1972, 2000).
For a text-book exposition, see Zweifel and Breyer (1997).
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Interpersonal exchange of health is difficult, thus health per se does
not have a value in exchange. Health care, i.e., goods and services that
are inputs in the production of health, are however, exchangeable. Health
care is supplied by health personnel and may take the form of information
(diagnosing), treatment, prescription of drugs or remedies, care, etc. Health
care is mainly a private good and is normally requested when individuals are
suffering from an illness. It is, moreover, consumed under the assumption
that it has a positive effect on the more fundamental good: health. The
demand for health care may thus be considered to be derived from the
demand for health.
In the literature on health economics, a distinction is drawn between
individuals' need for care and their demand for care. Whereas 'need' de-
pends on individuals' ability to benefit from care, 'demand' depends on
their preferences and ability to pay for care (Hurley, 2000). We focus on
the latter. Individuals' demand Jar health care may be analyzed according
to standard microeconomic theory; when allocating income, individuals will
have to choose between spending income on health improving products and
other consumption goods. Hence, we fall into the group of economists who
believe that health care is not so different from other commodities."
Cullis and West (1979) classify benefits Jrom health care into four groups:
(i) temporary relief from pain and suffering during treatment and care (or,
alternatively, disutility from treatment), (ii) future relief from pain and suf-
fering, (iii) improved productivity, and more labour hours due to improved
state of health, and (iv) improved productivity in, and time available for,
non-market production. Whereas (i) and (ii) typically are non-monetary
benefits from treatment, (iii) is a monetary benefit, and (iv) is a non-market
pecuniary gain. Benefits from health care are to some extent uncertain:
"Even physicians and epidemiologists have a hard time specify-
ing the production function for health. The commodity is pro-
duced probabilistically, substantially through the lifestyle choices
of individuals." Fuchs and Zeckhauser, 1987 (p. 265).
Health care may in some cases be considered a 'bad' in that it causes
pain and suffering to those undergoing it (e.g., treatment like chemotherapy,
7According to Hurley (2000), we thus form part of the 'narrows' (as opposed to 'broads'
who consider health as distinctly different from other commodities), a typology used on
health economists .
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surgery, etc.). In the theoretical literature it is, however, usually assumed
that the ultimate effect on health is positive, and that health care thus
is a 'good'." Non-monetary losses such as pain and suffering associated
with medical treatment, may be taken into account by indexing the utility
function before and after health care is undertaken. In this case, even if
health should be fully restored after treatment, individuals place a differ-
ent value on the restored health than the (identical) pre-illness health. In
other words, health may be considered an irreplaceable good, see Cook and
Graham (1977) and Schlesinger (1984) for more on this.
Health may be subject to considerable negative shocks; individuals may
fall ill from communicable diseases, such as the recent Severe Acute Res-
piratory Syndrome (SARS), suffer severe injuries due to accidents, or fall
ill from illnesses that strongly affect their health (e.g., AIDS, Parkinson's
disease, etc.) Indeed, changes in health and, consequently, expenditures on
health care and loss in earnings, are unpredictable and stochastic. The eco-
nomics of uncertainty thus constitutes an important ingredient in the study
of health care demand.
1.3 Choice under Uncertainty
"...nothing is more obvious than the universality of risks in
the economic system." Arrow, 1971 (p. 46).
Uncertainty is an inevitable fact oflife: individuals face uncertainty with
respect to what are the choices available, and what are the consequences of
their decisions. As regards health, individuals face uncertainty with respect
to their need for health care, expenditures on treatment, effectiveness of
treatment, loss in productivity (temporarily and permanently), as well as
loss in earnings. These are all important determinants of individual well-
being. Consequently, individuals have to make choices under uncertainty.
In the literature on choice under uncertainty, a distinction is made be-
tween (i) the 'expected-utility' approach and (ii) the 'state-preference' ap-
proach. In the following, we elaborate somewhat on these alternative ap-
8The effect of health care may, obviously, be open to discussion. Whereas for certain
illnesses efficient treatment is available, there are others for which no appropriate treat-
ment exists. Indeed, one may even argue that treatment in some cases may reduce health:
"Some remedies are worse than the disease," Publilius Syrus.
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proaches to individuals' choice under uncertainty.
(i) The expected utility approach
Individuals' preferences over uncertain outcomes may be described by a
von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) expected utility function:
n
E(U) = I>iU(Xi)
i=l
where O < 'lTi ::; 1 gives the probability of state i and U(Xi) gives the vNM
utility function of outcome x in state i = 1, ...n. The (additive) probabilities
are well-defined and sum to unity: L'lTi = 1. Outcomes are measured
i
in cardinal terms. The vNM utility function u is derived through what
Hirshleifer and Riley (1992) call 'the assignment of cardinal utilities'. The
utility function U(Xi) is, thus, a cardinal function and can be subject to a
positive affine transformation only, i.e., v(u) = au + b, where a > O.
According to the expected utility model, individuals evaluate an action
based on the expected utility derived from it, i.e., E(U) = L 'lTiU(Xi), and
not on the basis of the expected outcome of the action, i.e., E(x) = L 'lTiXi
(Machina, 1987). Individuals hence maximize expected utility, not expected
outcome. This finding is accredited Daniel Bernoulli, the utility function
U(Xi) is, however, traditionally referred to as a von Neumann-Morgenstern
(vNM) expected utility function.
The vNM linear expected utility model is dominating in the literature
on individuals' decision under uncertainty. Indeed, it is fundamental in the
standard theory of demand for health insurance. Underlying the vNM utility
function is axioms of: (i) independence between outcomes, (ii) weak order,
and (iii) continuity (Dionne and Harrington, 1990). Individuals are assumed
to have preferences over uncertain contingencies and to know the relevant
choices, as well as the consequences of these choices. Moreover, they can
assign numerical probabilities reflecting their beliefs as to the likelihood that
the different outcomes will take place, and, finally, they are able to assess the
utility from the different consequences (McGuire et al., 1988).9 Probabilities
may be objective or subjective. 10
9The behavioural assumptions underlying the expected utility model, are being criti-
cized for being to restrictive, and are being challenged, see, e.g., Machina (1987).
IOWhereas objective probabilities are observable and verifiable, subjective probabilities
are based on individuals' available information, prior beliefs and experiences. Thus,objec-
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Expected utility functions may be categorized into three types according
to the sign of its second-order derivative: negative, zero or positive. A stan-
dard assumption in the expected utility model is that individuals' marginal
utility is decreasing, i.e., their utility function is strictly concave: u" (x) < 0,
where u" (x) denotes the second-order derivative of the utility function. A
concave utility function implies that individuals are risk averse. Hence, indi-
viduals prefer a certain outcome to any risky outcome whose (mathematical)
expectation equals that of the certain outcome, i.e., u(I: 1riXi) > I:1riU(Xi).
If, however, they prefer the risky outcome to the certain one, then they are
said to be risk-seeking, and if they are indifferent between the two, they are
risk-neutral (Hirshleifer and Riley, 1992).
Indeed, the curvature of the expected utility function provides a measure
of individuals' risk attitudes. Individuals' (absolute) risk aversion is given by
the Arrow-Pratt measure: r(x) = -u"(x)/u'(x). Hence, the more concave
the utility function, the more risk averse is the individual.
(ii) The state-preference approach
This is a more general approach to individuals' choice under uncertainty
and is accredited Arrow (1953) and Debreu (1959). Uncertainty is repre-
sented by a set of exhaustive, mutually exclusive, and exogenous states of
the world. Commodities (or claims) are defined in terms of their physical
characteristics, as well as the location, date and state of nature in which
they are made available. Receipts and deliveries are at each date dependent
on the state of nature and it is assumed that a market exist for delivery
of each commodity, at each date, conditional on each state of nature. In
particular, all contingent consumption claims are separately tradable at a
market price.
Individuals' utility functions reflect their preferences for the contingent
consumption claims, their (subjective or objective) appraisal of the likeli-
hood that the different states will occur, and their preferences for risk (De-
breu, 1959). Probability beliefs thus form an integral part of individuals'
preferences, implying that no specification of probabilities is required when
studying individuals' choice under uncertainty.
tive probabilities are uniform across individuals (e.g., different persons assess the likelihood
that tossing a fair coin will come up head as 50 percent), while subjective probabilities are
unique to each individual (eg., different persons' apprehension about their future health
varies substantially).
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1.4 Demand for Insurance
Risk averse individuals wish to hedge against the uncertainty facing them.
In a market for insurance, risk are transferred from risk-averse individuals
to those willing to take on risk for a given payment. There exists a num-
ber of excellent papers that provide a thorough review of the development
of insurance economics, see, e.g., Dionne and Harrington (1990) and Lou-
berge (2000). Here, we briefly describe risk-averse individuals' demand for
insurance in a basic two-state model.
An individual has a level of income Y if in good health. If ill, she suffers
a loss L in income, hence, income if ill is given by Y-L. The probability
of falling ill is given by: O :s: 7r :s: 1. The individual can hedge against
the loss in income by buying insurance. Insurers offer coverage f3L, where
O:S:13 :s: 1, at a premium p = "(7rf3L, where "( ;::::1 denotes loading factor (e.
g., to cover administrative costs). The individual's expected income if not
insured is given by: Y = Y - 7rL, while her income if insured is given by:
yi = Y-p. (Thus, for 13 = 1 and "(= O,then Y = yi). Her preferences are
assumed to be represented by a vNM expected utility function u, satisfying
u' > O, u" < O. Thus, her expected utility when not insured is given by:
uni = (1 - 7r)u(Y) + 7ru(Y - L), whereas her utility if insured is given
by: ui = (1 - 7r)u(Y - p) + 7ru(Y - L(1 - 13(1 - "(7r)). Now, if "( = 1,
then premium is actuarially fair, and the individual would choose complete
insurance coverage, i. e., 13 = 1 . It then followsthat uni < ui, since u" < O.
The difference ui - uni gives the risk premium. Hence, her willingness to
pay for insurance exceeds the actuarially fair premium.l! Moreover, defining
1 == uni_ui, then for 1< "(< 1,she would choosepartial insurance coverage,
i. e., O< 13 < 1. Indeed, 13 measures rate of coinsurance.
From this it follows that if insurance markets are complete and per-
fectly competitive, then risk-averse individuals will choose to insure fully
at an actuarially fair premium. If, however, individuals have state depen-
dent preferences, then their insurance coverage may fall short of the loss in
income, that is: individuals choose to insure partly.
JlThe risk premium is depending on individuals' risk aversion (as measured by: r =
-u" jul) and the (statistical) variance of the outcomes.
7
1.4.1 Markets for Insurance
The general equilibrium model of competitive markets formalized by Arrow
and Debreu (1954) constitutes an important part of economic theory. This
model, often referred to as the 'Arrow-Debreu' model, is extended so as
to include uncertainty about availability of resources, and about consump-
tion and production possibilities. In particular, in his seminal paper, Arrow
(1953) analyses optimal allocation of resources under subjective uncertainty
and shows that Pareto-optimal allocation of risk is achieved in a complete,
competitive financial market.12 His analysis was later extended and gen-
eralized by Debreu (1959). Their approach is that of state-preferences as
described in the above.
In the Arrow-Debreu model, assuming symmetric information, perfect
competition and a complete set of markets, unregulated competitive mar-
kets are shown to ensure efficiency in the allocation and use of resources.
Moreover, in equilibrium, demand equals supply at every date and in every
state. In addition, there is one market clearing price only, referred to as the
Law of One Price, and this market price conveys all relevant information to
market participants.
The optimality of a competitive equilibrium under uncertainty is, how-
ever, limited to the special case of an economy possessing a complete set of
future markets in all commodities. For most commodities, future markets do
not exists. This may be due to differences in information, transaction costs,
lack of product uniformity among producers, indivisibility in production and
increasing returns to scale. In the following, we discuss the implications of
abolishing the assumption of symmetric information.
1.5 Information
"...the fact of differential information as between contracting
parties will prevent some efficient contracts from being made."
Arrow, 1973.
In the economic literature it is now well established that imperfect and
asymmetric information has quite dramatic consequences for the function-
ing and outcome of an unregulated market. Indeed, many of the traditional
12The assumption that markets are complete, makes the Arrow-Debreu model under
uncertainty equivalent to a model with certainty, Radner (1982).
8
'dictums' of economics no longer hold. If the assumption of symmetric in-
formation is abolished in the general equilibrium model, the existence and
optimality of a competitive equilibrium is shown to be non-robust (Stiglitz,
1985). Indeed, asymmetric information can be shown to lead to an equi-
librium in which there is no market clearing, and no single market price
(Stiglitz, 1985). Market prices will, moreover, not convey all relevant infor-
mation about scarcity, characteristics of goods and services, or on behavioral
implications. Decentralization through the price system will consequently
not ensure a Pareto optimum (Stiglitz, 1985, 2000).13 What is more, an
equilibrium may not exist.14 Hence, the assumption of complete contingent
markets in the Arrow-Debreu model does not hold.15
Following Stiglitz (1985), this may be explained by the following ex-
ample. A price may reflect non-observable aspects of quality. Indeed, an
increase in insurance premium may aggravate the risk-composition (quality)
of the pool of insurees, since low-risk individuals as a consequence of higher
premium will self-select out of the market. An insurer may thus be reluc-
tant to offering insurance to an individual willing to pay a high premium
since the insurer would think that she is a high-risk individual. Thus, the
demand for insurance may not equal the supply of insurance. Moreover, if
there exists an equilibrium in which markets do clear, then this would not
be robust to competition: Another insurance firm mayenter the market
and offer lower insurance coverage at a lower premium and, thereby, attract
low-risk individuals from the other firm. As a consequence, the initial firm
suffers a loss since its risk-composition is worsen.
13StigJitz (1985) refers to this as the fundamental non-decentraJizability theorem (p.
27).
14Non-existence of complete contingent claims markets may not only be due to differ-
ences in information, but also due to transaction costs, lack of product uniformity among
producers, etc.
15The Arrow-Debreu model has over the years been extended by others so as to in-
corporate also informational aspects when evaluating the efficiency of the market under
uncertainty. Account has been taken of asyrnrnetric information, the 'production' of in-
formation, and the incompleteness.of markets. Radner (1968) extends the Arrow-Debreu
model to allow for asymmetr ic information. He concludes that if economic decision makers
have unlimited computational capacity for choice among strategies, then even if there is
uncertainty about the environment, and different agents have different information and
different beliefs about the environment, one can apply the standard theorems on the ex-
istence and optimality of competitive equilibrium.
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1.5.1 Asymmetric Information
"The exchange process is intertwined with the process of se-
lection over hidden characteristics and the process of providing
incentives for hidden behaviors." Stiglitz, 2000 (p. 1447).
Information, i. e., knowledge, forms an integral part of individuals' decision-
making process.l'' In economic theory, it is fundamental that agents have
adequate information about the state of the world, characteristics of goods
and services, consequences of behaviour, and choices available. Tradition-
ally, it is assumed that individuals do indeed possess (and is able to compre-
hend) this information. If they do not, then they are equally badly informed.
Evidently, information is not perfect and symmetrically distributed. The is-
sue of health care easily demonstrates this: sick individuals may not know
what is the appropriate treatment to undertake, what are the treatment
options available, what is the efficiency of treatment, and sometimes even:
whether indeed they are sick (e.g., hypochondriacs). Since the 1970s, issues
of imperfect information and in particular asymmetric information, have
become central to most economic studies. Indeed, the 2001 Nobel Prize in
Economics was rewarded three of the pioneers in the study of asymmetric
information; George Akerlof, Michael Spence and Joseph Stiglitz. In what
is often referred to as the economics of information, focus is placed on how
to improve or acquire new information, information costs, etc. 17
Here, the point at issue is that of contracting between two types of agents,
one of which has more information (knowledge) than the other. We will refer
to the more and less informed agents as informed and uninformed agents,
respectively. The interesting question is how to design contracts in order
to mitigate informational constraints regarding individuals' (i) behaviour,
and (ii) characteristics. Problem (i) is usually referred to as a problem of
hidden behaviour, whereas problem (ii) is referred to as a problem of hidden
information. \Ve will elaborate somewhat on the two types of asymmetric
information in the next subsections.
16Hirschleifer and Riley (1992) distinguish between knowledge which refers to objective
facts, and beliefs which refers to subjective knowledge. Individuals' decisions are based
upon their beliefs, which, naturally, are updated when knowledge improves.
17For a textbook exposition on the economics of information, see Hirschleifer and Riley
(1992).
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Hidden Behaviour
Unobservable behaviour gives rise to problems of moral hazard. According to
Dionne and Harrington (1990), the concept of moral hazard was introduced
by, among others, Arrow (1963) and Pauly (1968).
When information about individuals' behaviour is private and not ver-
ifiable, then behaviour cannot be contractually enforced. Generally, it is
distinguished between behaviour that affects the likelihood that an insured
against event will occur (e.g., the probability of injury), and behaviour that,
after the insured-against event is realized, affects the consequences of the
event (e. g., costs associated with recovery from illness). The former is re-
ferred to as ex ante moral hazard, while the latter is referred to as ex post
moral hazard.
Ex ante moral hazard exists because insurance per se reduces individu-
als' incentives to take precautionary actions so as to reduce the likelihood
that uncertain outcomes will occur. The fundamental problem is that the
uninformed agents (e. g., insurers) cannot separate endogenous risk from ex-
ogenous risk. For instance, it is more likely that a person will take less care
of her belongings if she knows that her insurance will cover the potential
loss. If indeed she is deprived of her belongings, then the insurer will not be
able to tell whether this occurred just by accident (i.e., just 'bad luck'), or
if it was because the insuree did not behave in a precautionary manner.
Ex post moral hazard is particularly prevalent in the case of health in-
surance and refers to the situation where risk is resolved. The fundamental
problem is that the size of the loss itself may be endogenous to the insured.
In the case of health insurance, the existence and severity of illness may not
be easily verifiable, especially prior to treatment (Pauly, 1968). Insurance
changes the relative prices facing the insured, hence, they will change their
behaviour relative to a situation without insurance. For instance, a sick
individual holding insurance against medical expenditures faces a low (or
zero) price on treatment. If her demand for treatment is price elastic, then
she will rationally respond to the low(er) price by increasing her demand for
treatment. Suppliers of medical treatment acting on behalf of patients may
indeed recommend this high level of treatment as long as the benefits from
treatment are positive (since they may not face the true costs of the services
providedj.P' Consequently, the more extensive insurance coverage, the less
18This gives rise to what is called 'third-party payment' problems.
II
incentives to economize both in the supply of, and demand for, health care.
It follows that the ex post moral hazard problem is not that individuals'
behaviour is immoral, but that individuals increase their demand to a level
at which the marginal production cost of treatment exceeds marginal util-
ity from treatment, Pauly (1968). The more price elastic the demand for
health care, the higher is the efficiency loss associated with an more generous
insurance coverage.
Efficiency us. Incentives The problems of moral hazard may be re-
duced if the appropriate incentives are incorporated in the contracts offered.
There is, though, a trade-off between the goal of risk spreading, i. e., effi-
ciency, and the goal of appropriate incentives; on the one hand, the risk of
suffering a loss should be allocated efficiently and on the other hand, in-
centives to behave optimally should be ensured. The conflict between risk
prevention and moral hazard is by Fuchs (1996) referred to as the Funda-
mental Problem of Health Economics.
In the case of insurance, the moral hazard problem gives rise to partial
insurance coverage only, since this will provide insurees with incentives to
undertake preventive measures ex ante, and to behave in a cost-effective
manner ex post. Usually, this takes the form of positive cost sharing, e.q., in
the form of coinsurance where the insured pays a certain percentage of the
costs (or in the form of deductibles, i.e., a fixed co-payment), Pauly (1968).
Monitoring and regulation also form integral parts of an incentive scheme.
For instance, individuals may be rationed in the level of treatment available
if ill, Arrow (1968).19
Hidden Information
Asymmetric information on particulars of commodities (e.g., medical treat-
ment) and individuals (e.g., proneness to illness), gives rise to problems
of adverse selection. Information asymmetries exists in a number of mar-
kets and situations. For instance, a government may face adverse selection
problems when allocating goods and services towards specific groups of in-
dividuals that are not easily identified. In the market for insurance, insurer
and insuree typically have unequal information about the probability that
19Empirically, we observe for example that insurance companies inspects private homes
and offers subsidized life vests, children-seats for cars, etc. The purpose of these efforts is,
of course, to prevent accidents from occurring and to reduce their consequences.
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the insured-against event will occur. 20
Adverse selection have important implications for the functioning of mar-
kets. Kenneth Arrow notes in his seminal article "Uncertainty and the Wel-
fare Economics of Medical Care" (1963) that the equilibrium allocation of
risk bearing is inefficient relative to a situation where information is equally
available to the insurer and the insured. Moreover, George Akerlof explains
in his path-breaking article on "The market for lemons" (1970) why markets
may fail to exist. He shows that in a situation where potential buyers can-
not observe the quality of the traded goods, then profitable trade may not
take place due to problems of adverse selection. Applied to the market for
insurance, adverse selection hence reduces the welfare of those who would
like to transfer risk and of those who would be willing to take on the risk.
Furthermore, it reduces consumers' desire to consume services that have
uncertain outcomes (Arrow, 1963).
"... adverse selection tends to come about when (a) the insurance
pool contains a relatively wide range of risks (all of whom must
be charged the same premium per unit of coverage, owing to
the insurer's inability to distinguish among them), and (b) risk-
aversion is relatively mild. Conversely, a narrow range of risks
and a high degree of risk-aversion tend to retain the better risks
in the insurance pool and therefore to prevent adverse selection."
Hirshleifer and Riley, 1992 (p. 312).
Selection problem There are, however, ways of mitigating the prob-
lems of adverse selection. In the literature, a distinction is made between
studies in which the informed agents have incentives to signal their private
information, and studies in which the uninformed agents design systems that
screen (informed) individuals. In the first case, the informed agents 'move'
first, while in the latter, the uninformed agents 'move' first. The article by
Michael Spence in 1973 on "Job market signaling" is fundamental to the
understanding of signaling when there are problems of adverse selection:
Informed agents signal their unobservable characteristics by undertaking
20 It is usually assumed that insurees know their true probability of encountering an
accident, whereas insurers do not. The reverse may, however, also be true. Insurers may
for instance have access to information which reveals (or improves the estimates of) the
'objective' probability of, e.g., a certain illness, while insurees do not. Hence, insurees'
'subjective' probability (or probability beliefs) may be incorrect.
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costly and observable behaviour, e.g., education, in order to convince the
uninformed agents about their quality (Nilssen, 2001).21
The uninformed agents may mitigate the effects of hidden information
by designing a set of contracts that induce the informed agents to reveal
their private information, and to behave in a preferred way. In particular,
they offer a 'menu' of contracts from which the informed agents can choose.
The menu of contracts is designed so that individuals have incentives to
choose the contract intended for them, i.e., to self-select.
The intriguing question is of course how to design such a set of con-
tracts. The influential paper by James Mirrlees in 1971 on "An exploration
in the theory of optimal income taxation" is considered to be the first con-
tribution in this respect. He studies the design of an optimal tax scheme
when information about ability (productivity) is private and, consequently,
individualized lump sum taxes not feasible.
Shortly after, Michael Rothschild and Joseph Stiglitz published their
highly influential article on "Equilibrium in competitive insurance markets:
An essay on the economics of imperfect information" in 1976. They show
how uninformed agents can induce the better informed agents to reveal
important information (e.g., risk) by offering insurance contracts defining
different price-quantity combinations (i. e., bundles of premiums and de-
ductibles). Hence, screening takes place by means of deductibles, i.e., co-
payments. In equilibrium, if existent, low-risk individuals buy partial cover-
age at a low insurance premium while high-risk individuals buy full coverage
at a high premium. Hence, low-risk individuals suffer a loss in welfare rel-
atively to a situation with symmetric information. They summarize their
analysis of competitive insurance markets with adverse selection by stating
that:
"...the structure of the equilibrium as well as its existence
depended on a number of assumptions that, with perfect infor-
mation, were inconsequential; and finally, and in some ways most
disturbing, under quite plausible conditions equilibrium did not
exist." Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976 (p. 648).
Thus, asymmetric information may hamper efficient allocation of risks and,
indeed, make a competitive insurance market non-existent. If an equilib-
21Riley (2001) provides an extensive overview of the literature on screening and signal-
ing.
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rium exists, then a Pareto improvement can be achieved through revelation
and symmetric distribution of relevant information (Rothschild and Stiglitz,
1975). Their model is later extended by, among others, Wilson (1977) and
Spence (1978) who show that a separating equilibrium may indeed exists if
insurers anticipate competitors' reaction to their behaviour. For more on
this, see Dionne and Doherty (1992).
1.6 The Role of Government
Governments are in a number of countries involved III the financing and
supply of health care. We will in the following discuss efficiency and eq-
uity arguments in favour of public interventions in the market for health
insurance.F
'First- Best'
Economic theory emphasizes the role of private markets in the efficient sup-
ply of goods. In a 'first-best' situation with perfect information, perfect com-
petition and absence of market failures, an unregulated competitive market
will ensure efficiency in the allocation and use of (scarce) resources. Thus,
resources cannot be reallocated so as to improve the situation of one indi-
vidual without making the situation for another individual worse. This is
referred to as The First Fundamental Welfare Theorem, and implies that
public interventions aiming at improving efficiency are futile. If the income
distribution is considered undesirable by the society, then a government
may alter the distribution by means of individualized lump-sum transfers
and taxes. Indeed, any Pareto-efficient allocation is attainable in a perfectly
competitive market when the appropriate redistribution of initial wealth is
implemented. This is The Second Fundamental Welfare Theorem. Individu-
alized lump-sum taxes and transfers thus allow the government to pursue its
distributional ambitions without causing any price distortions and efficiency
losses.
However, as we have shown in the above, the conditions on which these
argument are based are quite strong, and are often not met. What will be
the implications of asymmetric information for the role of the government?
This is discussed below.
22Historically, though, the main motivation for public involvement in the financing and
supply of health care in the Nordic countries is paternalism, Lundholm (1991).
15
'Second-Best'
Studies of public interventions when the informational assumption of the
Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium model is abolished, are often referred to
as studies of 'second best'. There is some dispute whether indeed it is appro-
priate to refer to the outcome of a model in which information is assumed
not to be costly, and to be symmetrically distributed, as a 'first-best', see,
e.g., Stiglitz (1985). Still, such a theoretical first-best provides a useful ref-
erence point when discussing the implications of asymmetric information
among market participants. In the following, we will thus use the terms
first-best and second-best when suitable.
According to Boadway (1994), the concept of the theory of second-best
was formalized by Lipsey and Lancaster in the mid 1950s. The theory
initially revolved about problems of market failures causing the First Fun-
damental Theorem ofWelfare Economics not to hold (Boadway, 1994). This
implies that the economy cannot operate on its first-best utility possibilities
frontier (up!). Public interventions may, thus, be Pareto-improving. How-
ever, the government may face the same inforrnational restrictions as does
the private market. The resulting allocation is thus referred to as constrained
Pareto efficient. Geometrically, this amounts to moving from a point inside
a hypothetical first-best up! to a point closer to it.
More recent contributions to the literature on second-best focus on re-
distributive policies when the Second Fundamental Welfare Theorem is vi-
olated. Private information about characteristics on which to condition the
redistributional policy (e.g., risk and ability) precludes non-distortionary
distribution. Redistribution can thus only take place by use of instruments
affecting the efficiency of the markets. Consequently, efficiency and equity
considerations cannot be separated, in particular: there will be a trade-off
between efficiency and equity.
In the following, we will briefly provide efficiency and equity arguments
in favour of a public supply of health insurance in a world of asymmetric
information.
1.6.1 Efficiency Arguments
A private market for health insurance may be incomplete or non-existent.
Moral hazard and adverse selection cause individuals to be restrained in their
level of insurance coverage, e.g., because of a strictly positive co-payment or
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co-insurance. Risk is thus only partially covered. Moreover, certain types
of individuals may be excluded from the market, e.g., because of congenital
(high-cost) medical conditions such as HIV and heart failure, or because of
revealed health risks (e.g., smoking, BASE-jumping, etc. ).23
Inefficient allocation of risks in the private insurance market provides an
efficiency argument for government interventions (Barr, 1989). Of course,
governments will face many of the same informational constraints as do the
private agents, e.g., about individuals' private health risk. Still, the govern-
ment is able to impose and enforce compulsory insurance, thereby reducing
the problem of adverse selection. A compulsory public insurance may in-
deed be more successful in reducing adverse selection than is a compulsory
and competitive private insurance market. This is so since the latter would
(still) seek to improve its risk pool by 'cream-skimming' potential insurees.24
Also, it allows for provision of long-term contracts, thus avoiding problems
associated with contract re-writing. Consequently, public interventions in
the market of insurance may improve the allocation of risk and ensure all
individuals access to (some) health care if sick.
While the problem of adverse selection may provide an argument for
public supply of health insurance, it is not obvious whether the supply of
health care should be private or public. However, it may be argued that:
"... the imperfect information of consumers justifies regulation of
quality and that of insurance companies regulation of quantity.
Both forms of policing might be more effective if production itself
were public." Barr, 1989 (p. 75).
Regulation of the supply of health care relates to problems of consumer
sovereignty. The assumption of consumer sovereignty is fundamental to
economic theory; individuals are assumed to be capable of making rational
choices between different goods and services when maximizing their utility.
However, in order to make rational choices, individuals must both have
access to, and the ability to comprehend the necessary information. In the
case of health, and health care demand, the assumptions of rationality and
consumer sovereignty may not be fulfilled for several reasons. For instance,
23Alternatively, the insurance premium is set so high that individuals are not able to
enter the market.
24For a textbook exposition of Pareto improving compulsory insurance, see Zweifel and
Breyer (1997), chapter 5.
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sick individuals may indeed not be able to fully apprehend (i) whether they
are in need of care, (ii) which services are appropriate, and to what extent,
(iii) what is the efficiency of treatment, and (iv) what is the quality of the
services provided. This is information that usually suppliers of health care
(at least to some extent) possess. The lack of information consequently
makes the individuals (patients) 'dependent' on the suppliers of care in that
they must assist them in defining their medical needs and making decisions.
Hence, there are arguments in favour of public regulations of quality and
quantity of care; indirectly in the form of licensing of health personnel and
prosecution of malpractice, or directly in the form of a public supply.
Also, there are efficiency arguments in favour of integrating the financ-
ing and supply of health care. This is because of the so called ' third-party
payment problem': by merging the supply side and the financing side, then
suppliers of care will face the full marginal costs of their decisions. While
in the Scandinavian countries health care is publicly provided, private in-
surers and suppliers in the USA are increasingly forming parts of Health
Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) in order to contain costs.
Moreover, ex post moral hazard may be reduced if insurees are reim-
bursed in the form of health care services, i.e., in kind, rather than cash.
Indeed, indemnity insurance, that is; insurance that provides cash com-
pensation if the insured against event occurs, is seldom observed in health
insurance. More often, insurance benefits are stated in physical terms, e.g.,
payments for consultations with physicians, treatment, etc. Intuitively, com-
pensation in kind will strengthen individuals' incentives to take precaution-
ary actions. Moreover, it seems reasonable to assume that individuals take
less pleasure from unnecessary treatment than from cash payments, hence,
their incentive to exaggerate loss is lower.
1.6.2 Redistribution
Promotion of equality may be considered one of the major tasks of a gov-
ernment. Redistributional considerations are particularly prevalent in the
case of health care. In economic theory, it is often distinguished between
general and specific egalitarianism, the first referring to equalization of in-
comes, the latter to the equalization of consumption or access to specific
resources (e.g., health care), Sandmo (1991). Here, focus is placed on a gen-
eral distributional ambition, namely that of income equality (i. e., ability to
pay for care).
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Distortionary Taxation
"..distortionary taxation need not be imposed as an exoge-
nous constraint on the problem; it arises naturally as an optimal
form of policy in a world of imperfect information." Boadway
and Keen, 2000 (p. 738).
In the literature on optimal income taxation it is well established that
asymmetric information about characteristics on which a tax is to be based,
restricts the range of policies available to the government and the design
of these.25 Moreover, it restricts the extent of redistribution possible. This
is so because taxes and transfers must be conditioned on observable char-
acteristics, characteristics that may indeed be endogenous to individuals.
Thus, individuals' may alter their behaviour as a response to the policy:
they may choose to reduce their labour supply in the formal labour market
when income taxes increases, and to not comply with the tax regulations
(for instance by misreporting earnings). The government thus face problems
of adverse selection and moral hazard. Consequently, redistribution implies
an efficiency loss.
Mirrlees (1971) is cited to have formalized the problem of optimal in-
come redistribution when information is private (Boadway, 1994). He de-
rives a scheme which provides individuals with incentives to behave in ac-
cordance with the governments's intentions. The government must balance
its ambition to achieve equity against the loss in efficiency imposed by the
policy. Taking into account the effect of the scheme on individuals' in-
centives, he characterizes a non-linear optimal tax scheme that takes this
equity-efficiency trade-off into account. A prerequisite is that individuals'
preferences are such that marginal rate of substitution between post- and
pre-tax income is decreasing in ability (productivity). This is referred to
as an agent-monotonicity property and implies that pre-tax income is in-
creasing in ability (Myles, 1995).26 Geometrically, this means that the slope
of an indifference curve through a given post- and pre-tax income point is
less steep the higher the level of ability. Thus, indifference curves entail a
single-crossing property.
25SeeSandmo (1999) for an excellent presentation of James Mirrlees' and William Vick-
rey's contribution to the literature on public policy under asymmetric information.
26In the literature on screening, this condition is referred to as the 'Spence-Mirrlees
condition' (Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo, 1997.)
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Stiglitz (1982, 1987) analyses Pareto efficient non-linear income taxation,
viewing the optimal tax problem as an adverse selection problem. Analo-
gously to an insurer's adverse selection problem, the set of contracts from
which individuals can choose, provides a screening device that induces indi-
viduals to reveal private information through their choice of contract. The
self-selection constraints facing the government amount to restricting the tax
schemes to those guaranteeing that individuals with certain characteristics
(i.e., skills) do not have an incentive to 'mimic', that is, to choose contracts
intended for individuals with different characteristics. The self-selection
constraints thus constitute an 'upper limit' to redistribution. Stiglitz (1987)
shows that the government may relax the self-selection constraints by intro-
ducing distortionary taxation. In particular, assuming that the government
pursues income redistribution towards low-ability individuals, and that in-
dividuals' labour supply are perfect substitutes, then the Pareto-efficient
non-linear tax scheme entails a. zero marginal tax rate on high ability indi-
viduals, and a positive marginal tax rate (ranging from l to 100 percent) on
low ability individuals. Thus, the efficiency conditions are distorted for only
one of the ability types; the one that others may wish to mimic.27 Stiglitz
(1987) refers to this as a property of Pareto-efficient tax structures in a
second-best world (often referred to as 'non distortion at the top'). More-
over, if the government raises taxes for distributional purposes only, then,
in this setting, the Pareto-efficient tax scheme is shown to be progressive.
Now, assuming that there exists only two types of individuals: those
with a high innate ability (H) and those with a low such ability (L), and
that the number of high-ability individuals equals the number of low-ability
individuals. The single-crossing property ensures that at most only one self-
selection constraint is binding. Following Boadway and Keen (2000), we
can then depict the self-selection constraint by means of a utility possibil-
ity frontier (up!). In Figure 1.1, the curve FF illustrates a. first-best upf
(assuming Pareto-efficiency). The initial situation without redistribution is
given by the laissez [aire point L on the curve FF. If individualized lump-
sum taxation would be possible, then a. government with a utilitarian social
welfare function would choose point U on the curve (where the slope of the
27Our finding resembles the results found in the literature on asymmetric information
in insurance markets where high- and low-risk individuals are offered different contracts
and where low-risk individuals are constrained in the extent of coverage offered, see for
example Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) who address the private market mechanism.
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Up! is -l), while a government pursuing a maxi-min welfare function would
choose point M (where the up! intersects the 45° line).
F
VH
Figure 1.1: First- and second-best utility possibilities frontier.
Now, the government is unable to issue such lump-sum taxes. Redistribution
can be carried out to some extent without self-selection being a problem.
This is illustrated by the segment ss on the FF curve. Further redistribution
cannot be accomplished without the self-selection constraint binding. Thus,
beyond ss, the utility possibilities are restricted to those illustrated by the
heavily drawn curve. This is the second-best up! and includes only points
such that high-ability individuals enjoy higher levels of utility than do low-
ability individuals. This is so because high-ability individuals will spend less
hours in the labour market in order to generate a certain level of earnings
than do low-ability individuals. Assuming a quasi-concave social welfare
function, the relevant part of the second-best up! is the segment sm. Indeed,
the second-best utilitarian optimum is now given by point u, whereas the
second-best maxi-min point is given by m. As shown, when information is
imperfect, the utilitarian optimum (u) entails less redistribution than does
the information constrained maxi-min (m), (while the opposite is the case
when information is perfect).
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Public Provision of Private Goods
«... viewing the failure of the Second Theorem as a problem
of asymmetric information turns out to have rather dramatic
consequences for the extent of redistribution that can be achieved
by the tax-transfer system. Not only that, it leads to some rather
surprising policy prescriptions." Boadway, 1994 (p. 2).
Generally, taxes and transfers are considered the most appropriate in-
struments for redistribution. Transfers in cash are, moreover, viewed as
superior to transfers in kind. Pu blic provision (i. e., financing and supply)
of private goods is traditionally justified on the grounds of market failures,
merit wants arguments and redistribution (Hare, 1988). However, in their
seminal article, Guesnerie and Roberts (1984) show that quantity constraint
are Pareto improving if the economy initially is in a second-best situation.
Indeed, transfers in kind may slacken the self-selection constraints facing
the government thus improving the redistributive efficiency of a non-linear
income tax scheme. In-kind transfers may thus, enhance welfare.28
In a world of asymmetric information, public supply of private goods
may serve as a means of redistribution, depending upon its effect on the
constraints facing the government when pursuing its distributional goals.
Indeed, the efficient scheme is contingent upon how the private good in
question is valued by individuals, and how it influences individuals' labour
supply. In particular: how is their marginal willingness to pay for the good
influenced by their earnings ability. The key idea is that different types of
individuals value the good in question differently (Besley and Coate, 1991).
It is well established that if the marginal valuation of the private good
is increasing in the number of hours spent in the labour market (implying
that the low-ability individuals value the increase in treatment more than
do high-skilled mimicker), then (more) public supply will slacken the self-
selection constraint, thus increasing the extent of redistribution possible.
Correspondingly, if the marginal valuation of the private good is decreasing
in the number of labour hours, (implying that low-ability individuals value
the increase in treatment less than do mimickers), then (more) public supply
28public provision may also be justified on the grounds that the the good in question,
e.g., health care and child care, may induce individuals to increase their labour supply,
thereby improving the tax base. See, e.g., the study by Bergstrom and Blomquist (1993)
on public provision of day care.
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tighten the self-selection constraint, Christiansen (1998). Blomquist and
Christiansen (1998) show that if the self-selectionconstraint is binding, then
a public provision of private goods may strictly Pareto dominate the optimal
income tax optimum. The private good in question should, however, not
be re-tradable or supplementable, and it should be a substitute for leisure
(Blomquist and Christiansen, 1995). Balestrino (1999) provides an excellent
survey of the different arguments raised in favour of in-kind transfers in a
second-best world. He distinguishes between papers that makes an argument
for public provision without taking the tax system into account, and those
that do take the tax system into consideration.
1.7 Synopsis
The preceding overview provides a background against which the essays
included in this thesis can be viewed. Although the overview spans a large
number of topics, the fundamental problem underlying the questions at issue
is the same; namely that of asymmetric information and contract design.
Indeed, this is at the core of the essays included in this thesis.
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Essay 2
Health Insurance: Treatment
vs. Compensation
Abstract
In this paper, we view health insurance as a combined hedge against
the two consequences of falling ill: treatment expenditures and loss in
income. We discuss how an individual's ability when healthy affects her
decision on whether to buy health insurance with treatment to full re-
covery if ill or with partial treatment combined with cash compensation
for the resulting loss in income. We find that a high-ability individual
demands full recovery and equalise utility across states, while a low-
ability individual demands partial treatment and cash compensation
and suffers a loss in utility if ill.
2.1 Introduction
Who are the individuals choosing to be partially disabled and to live from
disability payments if ill, and who are the individuals choosing to fully re-
store ability if ill? This is the focus of our paper. In particular, we study
how different types of individuals prefer to be compensated if illness occurs.
The novelty of our paper lies in the integration of individuals' demand for
insurance against medical expenditures, i.e., medical insurance, and their
demand for insurance against (permanent) loss in earnings due to impaired
health, i.e., disability insurance. Medical insurance and disability insurance
provide coverage against different consequences of the same risk, namely
that of falling ill. Integrating the two and solving for the optimal design
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of insurance, we show that individuals may indeed trade off health for con-
sumption.
Our paper is motivated by the empirical fact that health insurance and
disability insurance are integrated in a number of real-life health care sys-
tems. This is particularly prevalent in European countries where health
insurance with in kind compensation, and disability insurance with cash
compensation typically form parts of a public tax-financed (social) insur-
ance system. Also in the United States, public programs include medical in-
surance and disability payments: low-income (poor) individuals are insured
through a public program against both medical expenditures (e.g., Medicare
or Medicaid) and against loss in income due to disability (e.g., through pub-
lic disability programs, or income support programs toward disabled such as
Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI), Supplementary Security Income
(SSI), or state-based Workers' Compensation systems). High-income indi-
viduals in the US are, on the other hand, typically (privately) insured against
medical expenditures but only few have private disability insurance. More-
over, whereas low-income individuals falling into the Medicare or Medicaid
program are usually considered to be restrained in the level (and quality) of
health care provided, high-income individuals with private health insurance
have access to high-quality care. Thus, we observe that different income
groups are compensated differently if ill. It is an empirical fact, both in
the US and in Europe, that individuals with less schooling are more likely
to be disabled than those with more schooling, see for instance Haveman
and Wolfe (2000). Naturally, there are many explanations to why this is
so: different proneness to illness and thus different educational 'carriers',
different types of work and thus different exposure to health risks, etc. The
causal effects are also not readily apparent. We do not aspire to provide
a definite answer to this challenging question, but hope to shed some light
on the question by studying how individuals' inherent earnings capabilities
influence their decision regarding how to be compensated if ill.
Generally, individuals face an inevitable risk of falling ill. Illness entails
both monetary and non-monetary consequences. Firstly, ill individuals pur-
chase health care services in order to alleviate the health consequences of the
illness, i.e., they incur medical expenditures. Secondly, during the period
of illness, individuals suffer a (temporarily) loss in earnings due to reduced
productivity in the labour market. Thirdly, if the illness cannot be cured,
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or if the quantity and quality of care undertaken is insufficient, then indi-
viduals suffer a permanent loss in health, i.e., they are disabled. Impaired
health reduces productivity in the labour market and, subsequently, reduces
earnings. (Naturally, the magnitude of the loss in earnings depends on the
severity of the disability, e.g., whether it is total or partial.) Fourthly, ill-
ness implies a non-monetary loss to the individuals. To be in 'good' health
is of value in itself and, moreover, influences the utility derived from other
activities, e.g., from consumption.
Illness hence entails diverse and quite substantiallosses, all of which the
individuals would like to hedge against ex ante. In the literature on health
insurance, focus is mainly placed on insurance against medical expenditures,
assuming that illness entails only monetary losses (e.g., medical expenditures
and temporary loss in earnings). The desire to restore health is, by and
large, taken for granted.! When non-monetary consequences of illness are
taken into account, it is assumed that utility is state dependent and that
health is either not restorable or irreplaceable.f In this paper, we allow for
both monetary and non-monetary consequences of illness without imposing
the assumption that health is irreplaceable. Rather, we assume that health
if ill is endogenous: health if ill is improved if individuals receive medical
treatment. We assume that treatment is divisible, and that individuals can
choose to which extent their health is to be restored (with certainty) if
ill. Health is thus insurable and, the non-monetary consequences of illness
endogenous. Our model may thus provide a bridge between models taking
only monetary consequences of illness into account, and models postulating
that health is irreplaceable. A recent paper by Flochel and Rey (2002)
supplements our analysis in that they study individuals' ex post demand for
health care and, given the level of health care demanded, derive their optimal
level of insurance against medical expenditures. Like us, they assume that
utility is a function of both consumption and health. However, they do not
allow labour earnings to depend on health state, and so their analysis does
IThe only exceptions we know of are Byrne and Thompson (2000) and Graboyes (2000),
who argue that, when the probability of successful treatment is small, the insured may be
better off with cash compensation if ill, rather than going through the treatment.
2Analysis based on health being non-restorable include Zeckhauser (1970), Arrow
(1974), Viscusi and Evans (1990), Evans and Viscusi (1991), and Frech (1994). Health is
irreplaceable if individuals value restored health lower than pre-illness health; see Cook
and Graham (1977) and Schlesinger (1984).
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not encompass disability insurance.
To our knowledge, the health-insurance literature does not discuss com-
pensation of (permanent) income loss due to illness, i.e., a disability pay-
ment. Little is thus known about individuals' choice between different types
of compensation in the case of illness. Indeed, Pauly (1986) recognizes the
absence of studies of the relationship between individuals' demand for med-
ical insurance and their demand for insurance that pays cash if illness oc-
curs. ' Our model facilitates an integrated analysis of what are traditionally
considered a medical insurance and a disability insurance. It allows individ-
uals to choose from different types of compensation; whether to receive (i)
medical treatment (and thereby improve health), (ii) cash compensation of
permanent income loss (i.e., no health improvement), or (iii) a combination
of both. We do not discuss contracts providing compensation against tem-
porarily loss in earnings as our model is atemporal (i. e., we assume instant
recovery if treatment is received). We show that individuals with low ability
(productivity) will choose type (iii) compensation whereas individuals with
high ability choose type (i).
Our main analysis takes place in a world of symmetric information about
health risks and health states. However, we show that our findings are ro-
bust, even in a situation where health state is not verifiable, i.e., when in-
surers face problems of ex-post moral hazard, since the integration of in-kind
provision of medical treatment and cash compensation reduces an insured
individual's incentive to falsely claim to be ill when in good health. Hence,
integrating medical treatment, i.e., medical insurance, and cash compensa-
tion, i.e., disability insurance, is not intrinsic to a public health-care system,
but may also grow out of a totally unregulated system. Indeed, this possi-
bility may be viewed in light of the increasing importance in the US during
the last decades of Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) where fi-
nancing and supply of medical treatment are integrated (mainly) in order
to reduce moral-hazard problems.f Our findings suggest that also financing
3As examples of the latter, Pauly (1986) mentions, among others, salary continuation
insurance, disability insurance and life insurance (see his note 4).
4More than 70 percent of the insured in US were enrolled in some form of managed
care plan in 1993 (Glied, 2000). The term managed care organizations comprises organi-
zations that mediate between the insured and the providers of care,e.g., by regulating the
services available, as in HMOs, or that restrict the insured's choice of providers,e.g., as
in independent practice associations (IPAs) and preferred provider organizations (PPOs),
Glied (2000).
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of income loss due to illness could form part of such schemes. In fact, if
ex-post moral hazard is a problem, then integrating medical insurance (with
in kind provision) and disability insurance (with cash compensation) may
induce self-selection. Integrating the two may indeed incite a larger private
provision of disability insurance.
The outline of this paper is as follows. The model is presented in Section
2.2 and a preliminary analysis is provided in Section 2.3. Our main findings
are derived in Section 2.4. In Section 2.5, we consider a special case where
the individual has Cobb-Douglas preferences. In Section 2.6, we discuss the
case where health state is not verifiable, i.e., ex-post moral hazard. Our
results are discussed in a concluding Section 2.7.
2.2 The Model
Consider an individual who has preferences over consumption, c, and health,
h. The individual faces exogenous uncertainty with respect to her state of
health. She may either be healthy, which corresponds to state l, or she
may fall ill, which corresponds to state 2. The two states are mutually
exclusive, jointly exhaustive, and verifiable. In state l, the level of health
is normalized to l: hl = l. In state 2, the individual is ill and suffers a
complete loss in health: h2 = O. Health if ill may, however, be partially or
fully restored (with certainty) if the individual receives medical treatment:
t E [0,1], i.e., treatment is assumed to be a continuous variable. Medical
treatment leading to full recovery is available at cost e, while treatment at
cost te leads to partial recovery.P It follows that if an individual receives
treatment at a levelleading to complete recovery, i. e., if t = 1, then her level
of health if ill is equal to l: ba = 1. If no treatment is received, then t = O
and health equals zero: ba = O. Health in state 2 is henceforth measured by
the fraction of e spent on treatment, that is, b.z = t. Consumption in the
two states are denoted Cl and C2, respectively.
The objective probability of falling ill is known to the individual and
given by tt , where 0< 7r < 1. The individual seeks to maximize the
5The cost of curing an illness is assumed to depend on the characteristics of the illness,
rather than the characteristics of the individual suffering from it. Since all individuals
face the same health risk, the cost of treatment is constant across individuals.
35
von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility:
where u( c, h) is a Bernoulli utility function. We assume that u : lR~ ----+ lR
is twice continuously differentiable, strictly concave, and satisfies: V(c, h) E
lR~+, Uc > Oand Uh > O,where partial derivatives are denoted by subscripts.
In particular, a strictly concave u implies that the individual is risk averse.
Moreover, health and consumption are assumed to be complements in utility:
Uch > O. This implies that individuals take more pleasure in consumption
when health is good than if poor. We also assume that uc(c, h) ----+ 00 as
c l Owhenever h > O, and Uh( c, h) ----+ 00 as h lOwhenever c > O. Finally,
uc( c, h) ----+ 00 or Uh (c, h) ----+ 00 as c lOand h l O. Note that our assumptions
on u imply normality. As specified in the above expected utility function,
utility from treatment is positive and decreasing (Uh> Oand Uhh < O). This
implies that marginal utility from treatment is higher at a low treatment
ratio, than at a high such ratio. (Hence, if we would measure treatment in
terms of utility, then cost of treatment would be strictly convex.) Also, it
follows from the properties of u that the individual prefers to receive an
intermediate level of treatment to an uncertain prospect of receiving either
complete or zero treatment with the same expected cost.
There exists a competitive insurance market in which profit maximizing
insurers offer insurance at an actuarially fair premium. Information about
the individual's probability of falling ill (11), which disease she is suffering
from, and consequently, the associated costs of treatment, is symmetrically
distributed among the market participants. Moreover, health state is verifi-
able, thus insurance policies can be made contingent on it. We hence rule out
problems of ex-ante and ex-post moral hazard. (A situation where health
state is non-verifiable is, however, discussed in Section 2.6). The market for
health insurance will, therefore, be efficient.
The individual's inherent capacity to generate earnings is henceforth
referred to as 'ability', and is given by A. If well, the individual enjoys
her full ability, A. We choose our monetary unit so that total earnings
are equal to A when well. Since, by assumption, leisure is not included in
the utility function, we implicitly assume that leisure is constant (and thus,
labour supply is fixed) across states. We assume that the individual, by
spending tG on medical treatment, will generate earnings equal to tA when
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ill. Hence, labour earnings in state 2 are proportional to the rate of cost
spent on treatment (recalling that t gives the rate of total treatment cost
(G) spent on recovery). Note that the followinganalysis does not require
insurance companies to know the individual's ability when healthy; hence A
may be private information.
In this model, there are two types of consequencesof an illness. Firstly,
the individual suffersa loss in earnings due to reduced ability (productivity),
and entails medical expenditures due to illness, i.e., financial losses. Sec-
ondly, the individual suffers a direct loss in utility because of lower health
(since Uh > O), i.e., a non-financialloss. Since health if ill is endogenous,
the size of the non-financial loss is also endogenous. Indeed, if t = 1, then
she suffers a financial loss only, viz., the costs of treatment, while if t < 1,
then she suffers both a financial and a non-financial loss. Consequently, a
positive levelof treatment reduces the non-financialloss from illness relative
to a situation without treatment, in fact, if complete treatment is received,
the non-financial loss is eliminated.
The risk-averse individual wishes to insure against the consequences of
falling ill. Her insurance decision takes place prior to her knowing which
state has occurred. Her budget constraints in states 1 and 2 are respectively
given by:
cI+1rI=A,
and
C2 + 1r I + tG = tA + I,
where 7r I denotes the insurance premium to be paid in both states of the
world in order to receive compensation equal to I if ill. From this, it follows
that I = u: + C2 + (Cl - A) - tA, that is, the compensation consists of a
compensation of medical expenditures equal to: t.C, and a cash compensa-
tion equal to: (C2 + rrI - tA). 6 Insurance is the only way to transfer income
across the two states of the world. Combining the two budget constraints,
it followsthat the individual is constrained by:
A - Cl = 7r[tG + (C2 - tA + A - Cl)] (2.1)
when ex ante making her choice of Cl, C2, and t.
6Since the premium A - Cl must be paid in both states, disposable income net of
the premium equals tA - (A - ci ) if no cash compensation is received. Hence, the cash
compensation equals C2 - [tA - (A - ei l].
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\Ve make the additional assumption about the utility function u that
the marginal rate of substitution of consumption for health, Uh/Uc, is higher
at full than at partial recovery from illness, given that the expected cost of
treatment is subtracted:
uh(tA - Tite, t) Uh(A - Tite, 1)--~------~< .
uc(tA-Tite,t) - uc(A-Tite,l)
(2.2)
This assumption means that, for a fixed relative price of health in terms of
consumption across states, the individual wants to shift the expected cost of
treatment towards the healthy state if treatment does not lead to complete
recovery (i.e., if t < 1). A homothetic utility function satisfies this for any
non-negative expected cost of treatment, but the assumption is also satisfied
by other demand systems.
In the following, we characterize the individual's demand for insurance,
both with respect to level, and type of, coverage. In particular, we analyze
how the individual's level of inherent ability, A, influences her choice of
compensation: whether to be compensated in the form of health restoration,
i.e., medical treatment, and/or in the form of cash, i.e., compensation of
loss in income due to incomplete recovery.
2.3 Preliminary Analysis
As explained earlier, we assume that treatment leading to a health level t is
available at a cost te when ill. For the purpose of our analysis, however, let
us be more general and ask what is the maximum utility achievable if the
individual has to pay P (2: O) for treatment t:
U(t, P, A) := max {(l - Ti)U(Cl, l) + TiU(C2,t)}
(CJ,C2)
s.t. (1 - Ti)C1+ Ti(C2+ P) = (1 - Ti)A +. TitA,
where U : ~++ x [O,(l/Ti - (1 - t))A) x ~++ ---t ~. The individual is offered
a positive level of treatment that may, for the purpose of defining and ana-
lyzing the U function, exceed one. As specified, the maximum price she is
able to pay for this level of t is given by (l/Ti - (1 - t)) A, hence the price of
treatment, P, satisfies: O :S P < (l/Ti - (1 - t)) A. Naturally, the higher the
level of inherent ability (A), the higher the price she can pay for treatment.
Also, the higher the probability of falling ill, the less she is able to pay for
treatment.
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To investigate the optimization problem, form the corresponding La-
grangian:
£(Cl, C2,A; t, P, A) (l - 7r)U(Cl, l) + 7rU(C2, t)
+ A[(l - (l - t)7r)A - (l - 7r)Cl - 7r(C2 + P)].
Given our assumptions on u, the first-order necessary conditions (FOes)
give the consumption demand function in each of the two states of the world:
(Cl(t,P,A),C2(t,P,A)) E ~~+ ,
satisfying
(2.3)
and the constraint (cf equation (2.1)). As shown above, optimal consump-
tion in each of the two states of the world is a function of treatment (i. e.,
the degree of recovery in state 2), price of treatment (P), and income (A).
Equation (2.3) implies that, in optimum, the individual's marginal utility of
consumption is equal in the two states.
The utility function U can now be written:
U(t, P, A) = (l - 7r)U(Cl(t, P, A), l) + 7rU(C2(t, P, A), t).
We have that U is strictly increasing in t, strictly decreasing in P, and
strictly increasing in A. Hence, we can define an indifference curve in (t, P)-
space, call it P(t, A; t,P), going through (f, P) and showing combinations
of t and P yielding a constant level of utility. Hence, U(t, P, A) is equal
to U(f, P, A) if and only if P = P(t, AJ, P). The slope of the indifference
curve is given by:
ap(t, AJ, P) = _ t~= _ gf = 7r(Uh(C2, t) + AA) = Uh(C2, t) + A, (2.4)
at ap OF 7rA Uc(C2,t)
where the second equality followsfrom the envelope theorem, and the fourth
equality is implied by equation (2.3). This means that the marginal will-
ingness to pay for treatment is equal to the marginal rate of substitution
of consumption for health plus the additional earnings capacity generated
by treatment. Since, by construction, P(t, A; f,P) is the indifference curve
going through (f,P), it follows that:
ap(f, A; f,P)
aA =0.
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Le., even though the indifference curve through (t,P) will shift when ability
increases, it will still go by (t, P). Since Ucc < 0, Uch > O, and åC2/åA > 0,
it follows that the shift will be an anti-clockwise rotation, with (l, P) as fixed
point, so that the slope at (l, P), åP(l, Ai I,P)/åt, increases:
or«. Ai l, P) å [Uh(C2(l, P, A), l) AJ
-~....,...,:..-'-":,,,= - + > 1.
åAåt åA uc(c2(t,P,A),l)
Hence, the slope of an indifference curve through any point (l, P) is increas-
ing in ability A. We will refer to this as the single-crossing property. The
single-crossing property is illustrated in Figure 2.1 for two different values
of ability, Al < Ah, where l and h denote low and high ability, respectively.
As illustrated, the slope of the indifference curve going through (l, p) in
(t, P)-space is steeper if ability is high than if it is low.
p
i
i
i
i i = 1
Figure 2.1: The single-crossing property.
It remains to show that P( t, A; l, P) is a strictly concave function of i, so
that an individual being faced with the possibility of purchasing treatment
t at cost P = tG constrained by t ::::1, will have a unique level of treatment
maximizing U(t, tG, A). This will be shown by demonstrating that, if (t', P')
and (til, Pli) are different combinations yielding the same utility level given
A, then any interior convex combination
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(t, P) = (at' + (1 - a)t", aP' + (1 - a)pll), O< a < 1,
will yield a strictly higher utility level. Accordingly, assume U(t', P', A)
= U(t",P",A) = U(f,P,A), and introduce some notation:
, (t' p' A) c" = C (til pli A)cl = Cl " I l , ,
, (t' p' A) c" = C (til pli A)c2 = C2 " 2 2 , , .
Also, let (CJ,C2) = (ac~+ (1- a)cr,ac; + (1- a)c~). Since (c~,c~) satisfies
the ex-ante budget constraint (2.1) given (t', P', A) and (cr,c~) satisfies con-
straint (2.1) given (til, pli, A), it follows that also (Cl, C2)satisfies constraint
(2.1) given (t, P, A), implying that (CI, C2)is feasible. Hence,
U(t,P,A) > (1-n)u(cI,I)+nu(c2,t)
> (1 - n)[au(c~, 1)+ (1- a)u(cr, 1)]
+ n[au(c~, t') + (1 - a)u(~, til)]
aU(t',P',A) + (1- a)U(t",PII,A) = U(f,P,A)
where the first inequality follows since (Cl, C2) is feasible, and the second
inequality follows since u is strictly concave. This means that P( t, Ai f, P)
is a strictly concave function of t. We will henceforth refer to this property
as diminishing willingness to pay fOT treatment.
2.4 Main Results
Due to the diminishing willingness to pay for treatment, an individual be-
ing faced with the possibility of purchasing treatment t at cost P = tG,
constrained by t s: 1, will have a unique level of treatment t(A) maximiz-
ing U(t, tG, A). Furthermore, due to the single-crossing property, t(A) will
(weakly) increase with A. In fact, whenever O < t(A) < 1, t(A) is deter-
mined by
åP(t(A), A; t(A), t(A)G) = G
åt .
I. e., marginal willingness to pay for treatment equals marginal cost of treat-
ment (note that marginal cost equals total cost). It follows that t(A) is a
strictly increasing function of A when O< t(A) < 1.
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We have that t(A) = 1 for all A ~ A*, where A* satisfies that the
indifference curve through (1, C) has slope C, so that unconstrained maxi-
mization of U(t, tC, A*) leads to t = 1. By the single-crossing property, A*
is unique. Hence, we can define A* by
åP(I, A*; 1,C) = C
åt .
Since åP(t, A; i,P)jåt > A for all values oft, i, and P, we have that A* < C.
Moreover, it follows from equation (2.3) and constraint (2.1) that Cl = C2 =
A - KC when t = 1 and P = C, implying that t = 1 is not feasible when
A < KC. Finally, since uc(c, h) -; 00 as C !Owhenever h > O, it follows
that åP(I, A; 1,C)jåt -; O as A ! KC. This means that A* > KC. Note
that the individual may choose a level of treatment that enables her to fully
recover (i. e., h2 = h1) even if A < C, provided that A is greater than, or
equal to, the insurance premium.
c
p
1='1
Figure 2.2: The optimal level of treatment.
The individual's optimallevel of treatment is illustrated in Figure 2.2 for
two different values of ability: Al < A * and Ah = A ", where l and h denotes
low and high ability, respectively. As illustrated, a high-ability individual's
indifference curve in (t,P)-space is tangent to the marginal-cost line for t = 1,
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while that of a low-ability individual is tangent to the marginal-cost line for
some t « (O,l).
These observations partially prove the proposition below. The proposi-
tion states that the individual's utility is constant across states if she chooses
full treatment: u(cI,hl) = u(c2,h2). Her utility if ill is lower than that if
well if she chooses less than full treatment (i.e., t < l), even though she
receives an insurance indemnity: u(q, hl) > U(C2,h2). Moreover, with full
treatment, she will not receive any cash payment in addition to what is
required to pay for treatment, while in the case of partial treatment, her
compensation will exceed the amount spent on medical treatment.
Proposition 1. There exists a level of inherent ability if healthy, A *, where
7fC < A* < C, such that:
1. If the individual's ability when healthy, A, is high, in particular, if
A :2 A *, then her optimal level of treatment is equal to one and does
not vary with A: t(A) = 1. Moreover, her level of consumption is
identical in the two states: cI(l,C,A) = c2(1,C,A) = A - 7fC, as
is her utility: u(cI,hl) = u(c2,h2) = u(A -7fC,l). Her insurance
coverage is in the form of medical treatment only.
2. If, however, the individual's ability when healthy, A, is low, in partic-
ular, if O < A < A *, then her optimal level of treatment is positive but
less than one, O < t(A) < l, and increasing in A: åt(A)/åA > o.
Moreover, her level of consumption if ill is lower than if healthy:
c2(t(A), t(A)C, A) < Cl (t(A), t(A)C, A), and her utility if ill is lower
than if healthy: U(C2,h2) < u(c}, hl). Her insurance coverage is partly
in the form of medical treatment and partly in the form of cash.
Proof. Part (l). Given the observations prior to the Proposition, it remains
to show that the individual's utility is constant across states, and that she
has insurance coverage in the form of medical treatment only. Constant
utility across states follows since Cl = C2 = A - 7fC and hl = h2 = l,
implying that u(c}, hl) = U(C2,h2) = u(A - 7fC,l). Since cash payment
equals C2 - tA + A - Cl (cf footnote 6), it followsthat cash payment is zero.
Part (2). By the definition of A*, Os: t(A) < 1 whenever O< A < A*.
Moreover,sinceUh(C,h) ~ 00 as h 1Owhenever C > 0, and uc(c, h) ~ 00 or
uh (C, h) ~ 00 as C 1° and h 10, it followsfrom A > Oand equation (2.4)
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that åP(t,A;t,tC)/åt > C if t is sufficiently small; hence, teA) > O. Now,
the single-crossing property implies that dt(A)/dA > O. From equation
(2.3) and the properties of u, it follows that Cl > C2, since hl = 1, and
h2 = teA) < 1. This in turn implies that U(CI, hl) > U(C2,h2). To show that
cash payment is positive, i.e., that C2 - tA + A - Cl > O,we start out with
the observation that teA) is determined by åP(t(A), A; teA), t(A)C)/åt = C
whenever O < t(A) < 1. Thus, marginal willingness to pay for treatment
equals cost of treatment: Uh(C2,t)/Uc(C2,t) + A = C. In the hypothetical
case where treatment were available also if healthy, or inversely, where health
could be sold at price C - A, the access to actuarially fair insurance would
imply the same level of health in both states. Since this is not the case, it
is a binding constraint that health if healthy cannot be sold at price C - A,
implying that marginal willingness to pay for health if healthy is less than
C - A: Uh(Cl, 1)/uc( cj , 1) < C - A = Uh(C2,t )/uc( C2,t). Hence, effectively,
the relative price of health in terms of consumption is lower if healthy than
if ill. Combining this finding with constraint (2.1) and condition (2.2), and
recalling that Ucc< O and Uch > O, we have that Cl < A - 'ITtC, and C2 >
tA - ttt.C, This in turn means that Cl - A < C2 - tA, or C2 - tA + A - Cl > O.
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2.5 A Special Case
The following Cobb-Douglas function is a Bernoulli utility function that
satisfies all assumptions listed in Section 2.2:
U(C,h) = crhs, with r > O, s > Oand r + s < l.
With this function, it is possible explicitly to calculate A *. We have that
ap(LA;I,C) _ Uh(C2,l) + A
at - uc(c2.1)
= uh(A-7rC,l) + A = '!.(A - 'ITe) + A
uc(A-7rC,l) r '
where the second equality follows since C2 = A - 'Tre when t = 1 and P = C,
and the third equality follows since
Uh(C, h) s C
uc(c, h) r h
when u is given by the Cobb-Douglas function above. Since A* is defined
by åP(I, A*; 1,C)/åt = C, we can find A* by solving
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~(A* - 'lrC) + A* = C,
r
which implies that
A*=r+'lrsC.
r+s
Thus, A* is increasing in the probability of falling ill, 'Ir, and in the cost of
treatment, C.
2.6 Ex-Post Moral Hazard
We have, in Proposition I, shown that an ill individual with ability A lower
than the criticallevel A* receives partial treatment, t(A) < I, and, in addi-
tion, a positive cash compensation:
c2(A) - t(A)A + A - cI(A),
where we from now on write cI(A) = Cl (1,C,A) and c2(A) = c2(t(A), C, A).
If, contrary to what we have assumed in the formal analysis, the two states
(healthy lill) are not observable, the availability of such a disability insurance
will tempt the individual to claim that she has fallen ill, although she is in
fact in good health. In this section, we show that our analysis goes through
even if we allow for such ex-post moral hazard," provided that:
• the cash compensation is paid only in combination with treatment,
and
• the disutility of receiving treatment while healthy is sufficiently great.
Consequently, in order to prevent the individual from falsely claiming to
be ill, she should suffer a loss in expected utility from undergoing redundant
medical treatment. Moreover, the disutility should at least balance the gains
in expected utility from masquerading as ill.
Denote by v( c, t) the (direct) disutility of receiving treatment twhile
healthy and consuming c. Assume that v satisfies, V(c, t) E 3i~+, v(c, t) > O
7Ex-post moral hazard refers to the effect of insurance on insured individuals' incentives
to reveal their true health state (i.e., the insured individual knows the state of the world,
while the insurer does not, or verification of health state is too costly for the insurer). The
analysis of ex-post moral hazard was pioneered by Spence and Zeckhauser (1971). For a
textbook exposition, see Zweifel and Breyer (1997, Chapter 6.5).
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and Vt 2: 0.8 To ensure that a healthy individual with ability A will not
falsely claim to be ill, the following inequality must hold:
(1 - 7r)u(cl(A), 1)+ 7ru(c2(A), t(A)) 2:
(2.5)
(1- 7r)(u(c~, 1)- v(c~, t(A'))) + 7ru(c2(A') + t(A')(A - A'), t(A')),
where c~ = c2(A') + (A - t(AI)A') is the consumption that a healthy indi-
vidual with ability A will receive having purchased the optimal insurance
contract of an individual with ability A' and masquerading as ill, while
c2(A') + t(A')(A - A') is the consumption that an ill individual with ability
A will receive having purchased the optimal insurance contract of ability
A' and truly claiming to be ill. An individual with ability A higher (lower)
than A' generates higher (lower) earnings and can, therefore, sustain a higher
(lower) level of consumption than can an individual with ability A'.
In condition (2.5), we must consider that the individual with ability A
may not only misrepresent her health state but also her ability, in order to
receive the higher cash compensation designed to be paid to an individual
with a different ability A'. However, we know that an individual with ability
A will not misrepresent her ability unless she intends to misrepresent her
health state, since (cl(A),C2(A), t(A)) maximizes expected utility over all
triples (Q,c2,t) satisfying the constraint in equation (2.1); i.e.,
(1- 7r)u(cl(A), 1) + 7ru(c2(A), t(A)) 2:
(1 - 7r)u(c~, 1) + 7ru(c2(A') + t(A')(A - A'), t(A')),
(2.6)
where c~ = cl(A') + (A - A') is the consumption that a healthy individual
with ability A will receive having purchased the optimal insurance contract
of ability A' and not masquerading as ill.
Notice that the increase in consumption that an individual with ability
A, having purchased the optimal insurance contract of ability A', attains by
masquerading as ill, c~ - c~, is equal to the cash compensation designed to
be paid to an individual with ability A':
~ - c~ = c2(A') - t(AI)A' - cl(A') + A'.
8The disutility v(c, t) is to be subtracted from the utility derived from consumptionc
when healthy and not receiving unnecessary treatment. Since this utility is a function of
both consumption and treatment, so is also the disutility.
46
Hence, since, byequation (2.6), it is a sufficient condition for equation (2.5)
to be satisfied that
u(c~, l) - u(c~, l) :s: v(c~, t(A')), (2.7)
the ex-post moral hazard of an healthy individual masquerading as ill in
order to obtain cash compensation does not constitute an incentive problem
if the additional utility obtained from the cash compensation does not exceed
the disutility from undergoing redundant treatment when healthy.
The ex-post moral hazard problem associated with cash compensation
is solved through the integration of treatment for illness and payments for
disability. Hence, our analysis presents an argument in favor of such integra-
tion. Furthermore, the lack of such integration can help explain why private
markets for disability insurance are of little empirical significance.
In reality, the true health state is simple to verify for some medical
conditions, while difficult for others; moreover, the disutility from receiv-
ing unnecessary treatment is significant for some types of conditions, while
insignificant for others. Hence, the severity of the ex-post moral hazard
problem discussed in this section varies according to the medical conditions.
2.7 Discussion
Our focus of attention has been on how an individual's inherent ability
at full functionality (i.e., when healthy) influences her ex ante choice of
insurance contract and her optimal level of coverage. Insurance allows the
individual to allocate income between the two states of the world prior to
knowingwhich state has occurred. Moreover, it enables her to achieve her
optimal distribution of income on consumption and health when ill. Since
the individual is assumed to have perfect foresight, her optimal allocation
ex ante will be optimal also ex post.
The novelty of this paper is the integration of what is usually thought to
be different types of insurance, namely insurance against the risk of losing
income due to (permanently) reduced health (ability) and insurance against
the risk of incurring medical expenditures. We argue that a health insurance
should offer a hedge against both potential loss in income due to reduced
health and potential expenditures on medical treatment. Contrary to what is
assumed in most of the health insurance literature, weallow the individual to
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choose whether or not to restore health if ill. We show that the individual's
marginal willingness to pay for treatment is increasing in ability, and we
derive a criticallevel of ability at which an individual prefers to fully restore
health if ill. If the individual's inherent level of ability is sufficiently low,
then she chooses to restore health only partly, thus suffering a loss in ability.
In order to obtain the preferred level of consumption if ill, she will hold a
contract that in addition entitles her to a cash transfer in the event of
illness. She will, however, suffer a loss in utility if ill. If, on the other
hand, the individual has a sufficiently high level of inherent ability, then she
prefers a contract that provides for complete medical treatment and thus
full restoration of health.
It is of no importance, in a world of symmetric information, whether the
coverage for medical costs is paid in cash intended to cover medical bills, or
directly in the form of medical treatment. The individual's ex-ante decision
concerning what level of treatment to choose is unaffected by the way she
is compensated; the fundamental decision concerns to what extent health
is to be restored.? However, as discussed in Section 2.6, if health state
is not easily verifiable, then, due to the ex-post moral hazard problem, it
becomes essential whether medical expenditures are compensated in cash or
in kind. When information about health state is asymmetric, integration of
a cash compensation of income loss and an in-kind compensation of medical
expenditures reduces the individual's incentive to falsely claim to be ill.
Our findings are driven by the fact that the potential loss in income is
larger, the higher the ability at full functionality. This implies that the prices
of the two types of contracts differ depending on the individual's ability. The
higher the potential income loss due to reduced ability, the cheaper is the
contract offering indemnity in kind (i. e., treatment), compared to a contract
offering cash compensation of income loss. Thus, the cost-benefit ratio on
medical treatment is lower the higher the level of ability at full functionality.
The preceding analysis is based on a highly stylized model. We largely
disregard any informational constraints causing the familiar problems of
9Arrow (1963) mentions three different ways in which costs of medical care can be
covered in an insurance contract: payment directly in medical services, a fixed cash pay-
ment, and a cash payment that covers the actual costs involved in providing the necessary
medical treatment. In a perfect market, individuals wishing to receive medical treatment
would be indifferent between a payment directly in the form of medical treatment and its
cash equivalent.
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adverse selection.l" Furthermore, the individual is assumed to be fully
informed ex ante about health consequences of illness as well as about
treatment options. The insurers need not, however, know the individual's
ability at full functionality, since, even without such knowledge, first-best,
zero-profit insurance contracts lead in an undistorted way to self-selection.
Transaction costs associated with gathering of information about relevant
treatment options and treatment costs for all types of diseases are ignored.
Moreover,we make a somewhat strong assumption regarding the treatment
technology: the individual recovers instantly and proportionally.to the level
of treatment received, and treatment is effective with respect to health.
However, in spite of these limitations, our model still provides interesting
findings that may be subject to further studies.
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Essay 3
Deductibles in Health
Insurance: Payor Pain?
Abstract
We study a health-insurance market where individuals are offered
coverage against both medical expenditures and losses in income due to
illness. Individuals vary in their level of innate abilit.y and their proba-
bility of falling ill. If there is private information about the probability
of illness and an individual's innate ability is sufficiently low, we find
that competitive insurance contracts yield screening partly in the form
of co-payment, i.e., a deductible in pay, and partly in the form of
reduced medical treatment, i.e., a deductible in pain.
3.1 Introduction
Individuals face an inevitable risk of falling ill. Illness causes individuals
to suffer a loss in income earnings and to entail expenditures on medical
treatment, moreover, it causes a loss in utility per se. Illness thus encom-
passes both monetary and non-monetary losses. Traditionally, individuals
are thought to hedge against potential loss in income due to permanently
impaired health by holding a disability insurance, and to hedge against
potential medical expenditures by holding a medical insurance. We argue,
however, that disability insurance and medical insurance offer different types
of coverage against the same fundamental risk, namely the risk of falling ill.
Hence, the concept of health insurance should be expanded so as to include
both types of coverage, i.e., coverage against medical expenditures and cov-
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erage against loss in earnings due to impaired health. One consequence of
taking this wider view of health insurance is that insurees may prefer insur-
ance contracts offering cash compensation in part, rather than full restora-
tion of health, if ill. l In this paper, we discuss how this expanded concept of
health insurance affects the performance of a private health-insurance mar-
ket with asymmetric information. In particular: if information about the
probability of falling ill is private to the individuals, will low-risk individuals
get both less medical treatment and less cash compensation (i. e., disability
payment) than they would in a world of symmetric information?
In the literature on health insurance, focus is mainly placed on insurance
against medical expenditures, assuming that illness entails only monetary
losses (e.g., medical expenditures and temporary loss in earnings). The
desire to restore health is, by and large, taken for granted.f When non-
monetary consequences of illness are taken into account, it is assumed that
utility is state dependent and that health is either not restorable or irre-
placeable.f In this paper, we allow for both monetary and non-monetary
consequences of illness without imposing the assumption that health is irre-
placeable. Rather, we assume that health if ill is endogenous: poor health is
improved with certainty if individuals receive medical treatment, and treat-
ment is assumed to be divisible. Health is thus insurable, and the non-
monetary consequences of illness endogenous. Our model may thus provide
a bridge between models taking only monetary consequences of illness into
account, and models postulating that health is irreplaceable. Flochel and
Rey (2002) supplement our analysis in that they, too, study individuals'
demand for health insurance when utility is a function of both consumption
and health. However, they do not allow labour earnings to depend on health
state, hence their analysis does not include disability insurance. Moreover,
their analysis takes place in a world of symmetric information about the
probability of illness.
Our study is motivated by the empirical fact that health insurance and
lSee our companion paper, Asheim et al. (2003).
2This view has been contested by authors like Byrne and Thompson (2000) and
Graboyes (2000) who argue that, when the probability of successful treatment is small,
the insured may be better off with cash compensation if ill, rather than going through
with the treatment.
3For more on irreplaceable commodities, see Cook and Graham (1977) and Schlesinger
(1984).
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disability insurance are integrated in a number of real-life health care sys-
tems. This is particularly prevalent in European countries where health
insurance with in-kind compensation and disability insurance with cash com-
pensation typically form parts of a public tax-financed insurance system. It
seems, moreover, to be a fact that high-income individuals hold insurance
contracts entitling them to more extensive and higher quality health care
services than do low-income individuals. Also, disability insurance seems to
be of greater importance for low-income individuals than for high-income
individuals. We do not aspire to provide a definite answer to why this is
so, but hope to shed some light on the question by studying how individu-
als with different levels of earning capabilities and different probabilities of
falling ill will choose to be compensated if ill. Our analysis takes place un-
der the assumption that insurance is supplied in a private insurance market.
However, if individuals' entitlements are commensurate with their contribu-
tions, i.e., no redistribution, then our findings would apply also to the design
of information-constrained Pareto efficient social-insurance contracts.
In our model, individuals differ along two dimensions: ability and risk.
Information about ability is assumed to be symmetrically distributed, while
information about risk (i.e., the probability offalling ill) is private to the in-
dividual. Some individuals are robust: they have a low probability of falling
ill. Others are frail: they have a high such probability. They have identical
preferences over consumption and health. Individuals can recover partially
or completely from an illness if they receive partial or complete medical
treatment, respectively. Their problem is to decide ex ante how much in-
come to transfer between the two possible states of the world, healthy or
ill, and if ill, how to allocate income between consumption and health (i. e.,
medical treatment). The insurance contracts are thus allowed to be specified
along three dimensions: (i) consumption if healthy, (ii) consumption if ill,
and (iii) treatment if ill. A proper analysis of the market for health insurance
will have to take this feature of the contracts involved into account. Our
analysis thus contrasts with the text-book setting where insurance usually
covers medical expenditures only and individuals differ with respect to their
risk of falling ill only.
When there is asymmetric information on risk, it follows from the anal-
ysis of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) that contracts can be differentiated in
terms of the premium paid by the insured and the level of coverage provided;
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see, e.g., Zweifel and Breyer (1997, chs. 5 and 6) for a health-insurance ex-
position. Rothschild and Stiglitz show that, under certain conditions, a
separating equilibrium exists in which each insurer offers a menu of insur-
ance contracts. Frail individuals (i. e., those with a high probability of falling
ill) are offered full insurance coverage, while robust individuals (with a low
such probability) are offered partial coverage only. In this standard set-up,
partial coverage means a reduction in the compensation paid for medical ex-
penditures, i.e., a monetary deductible. As argued above, health insurance
involves three-dimensional contracts and it is, therefore, necessary to ex-
tend the Rothschild-Stiglitz analysis to such a three-dimensional case. This
is what we set out to do in the subsequent analysis.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we outline the model
and characterize insurance contracts satisfying the self-selection constraints.
Individuals' choice between consumption and medical treatment if ill is
shown not to change relative to a situation with symmetric information. In-
surers consequently do not have to place any restrictions on how individuals
allocate the insurance indemnity if ill. Our three-dimensional problem there-
fore reduces to one of only two dimensions: (i) consumption if healthy, and
(ii) consumption if ill. In Section 3.3, analogously to Rothschild and Stiglitz
(1976), we find separating contracts in which frail individuals obtain their
first-best level of coverage, while robust individuals are constrained in order
for insurers to induce self-selection. In Section 3.4, we study the compara-
tive statics with respect to individuals' level of innate ability and investigate
what level of medical treatment and consumption these separating contracts
lead to if illness occurs. Insurers screen individuals through deductibles, and
we show that robust individuals face a deductible in their level of insurance
coverage. In particular, robust individuals with a sufficiently high level of
innate ability will have a deductible in the form of co-payment only, i.e.,
deductible in pay. Robust individuals with a sufficiently low level of innate
ability, on the other hand, will have part of the deductible in the form of
reduced treatment, i. e., deductible in pain. In contrast, frail individuals are
offered their first-best optimallevel of insurance coverage. In particular, frail
individuals with a sufficiently high level of ability obtain complete treatment
if ill, while those with a sufficiently low ability obtain their optimal level of
(partial) treatment and their optimal level of disability payment if ill. Our
findings and their implications are discussed in Section 3.5.
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3.2 The Model
We model a setting where individuals have preferences over consumption (c)
and health (h). Each individual faces uncertainty with respect to her state
of health. There are two such (jointly exhaustive and verifiable) states.
In state 1, the individual is healthy and has a level of health normalized
to 1: hl = 1. In state 2, she is ill and suffers a complete loss in health:
h2 = O. Health if ill may, however, be partly or fully restored with certainty
through medical treatment t E [O,1], and health improves instantly. Medical
treatment leading to full recovery (i. e., t = 1) costs G, while treatment at
rate t costs tG. Treatment is thus measured as the fraction of total cost
(G) spent on treatment.? Consequently, if the individual receives complete
medical treatment, i. e., t = 1, health if ill is fully restored: h2 = 1. If no
treatment is received, i.e., t = O, then health equals zero: h2 = o. Health if
ill is thus given by h2 = t. Consumption in the two states are denoted Cl
and C2, respectively.
The individuals know their objective probability of falling ill, which is
either high or low: The probability of falling ill is Hj for type-j individuals,
where j = F, R denotes frail (high-risk) and robust (low-risk) individuals,
respectively, and O< HR < HF < 1. Individuals maximize the von Neumann-
Morgenstern expected utility function:
(3.1)
where u( c, h) is a Bernoulli utility function. Vve assume that u R~--t
R is twice continuously differentiable and strictly concave, and satisfies:
V(c, h) E R~+, UC > O, and Uh > O,where partial derivatives are denoted by
subscripts. A strictly concave utility function implies that individuals are
risk averse. We also assume that Uch > o. Hence, in addition to being an
important factor of well-being in its own right, health affects an individual's
ability to enjoy consumption. Moreover, uc( c, h) --t 00 as c l Owhenever
h > O, and Uh(C, h) --t 00 as h l O whenever c > O, and uc(c, h) --t 00 or
Uh (c, h) --t 00 as c l O and h l o. Note that aur assumptions on U imply
normality.'
4We assume that cost of curing an illness depends on characteristics of the illness,
rather than characteristics of the individuals suffering from it.
5\\<'bat is more, if we were to measure treatment in terms of utility, then it follows from
the properties of u (i. e., Uh > Oand Uhh < O) that the cost of treatment would be strictly
convex.
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Introducing health as an argument in the utility function bears resem-
blance to the literature on insurance with state-dependent utility; see, e.g.,
Zeckhauser (1970), Arrow (1974), Cook and Graham (1977), Viscusi and
Evans (1990), Evans and Viscusi (1991), and Frech (1994). In these discus-
sions, health is an unalterable characteristic of the state and they therefore
fit well with the insurance being purelya disability insurance. Our formula-
tion can be seen as filling the gap between a pure disability insurance, where
the reduced health following illness is inevitable and irreversible (and thus
a formulation where a state-dependent utility is appropriate), and a pure
medical insurance, where the insurance coverage is used to its full extent
on medical treatment in order to restore health as much as possible to its
pre- illness level.6
Individuals' innate capacity to generate income is henceforth referred to
as 'ability' and denoted by A. We choose our monetary unity so that total
earnings are equal to A when in good health. Since leisure is not included
in the utility function (cf. equation (3.1)), we implicitly assume that leisure
(and thus labour supply) is constant across individuals and states. In addi-
tion, we assume that individuals, by spending tG on treatment, will generate
earnings equal to tA when ill. Hence, labour earnings in state 2 are propor-
tional to treatment t. Information about an individual's A is symmetrically
distributed.
Individuals are risk averse and, consequently, willing to insure against the
uncertainty they face. Buying insurance is the only way that an individual
can transfer income across the two states. Her budget constraints in states
l and 2 are respectively given by:
Cl + p = A (3.2)
and
C2 + p + tG = tA + I, (3.3)
where P is the total insurance premium and I the insurance benefit.
The insurance market is competitive, with risk-neutral, profit-maximizing
insurers earning zero expected profits. Insurance is thus offered at an actu-
arially fair premium:
p = 7rjI, j = F,R. (3.4)
6See also the above-mentioned contribution by Flochel and Rey (2002).
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As is standard in the insurance literature, we assume that individuals cannot
buy more than one insurance contract." We assume that information about
which disease an individual suffers from and, consequently, the associated
costs of treatment, is known by both insurer and insuree. The insurers know
the proportions of frail and robust individuals, while information about each
individual's risk type is asymmetric. To simplify, we assume that individuals
can influence neither the probability of falling ill nor the costs associated
with the illness, i.e., there is no moral hazard.
Combining equations (3.2)-(3.4), we get:
(1 - 'ifj) (A - Cl) + 'ifj (tA - tG - C2) = 0, j = F, R, (3.5)
which gives the insurers' zero-profit condition.
3.3 Separating Equilibrium
For reasons similar to those in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), a (pure-
strategy) Nash equilibrium, if it exists, is separating.f The insurers face
informational constraints in the design of insurance contracts. Indeed, they
face a self-selection constraint in that frail individuals may masquerade as
robust individuals in order to get insurance at a lower premium. In order
to induce individuals to reveal their probabilities of falling ill, insurers of-
fer a menu of insurance contracts from which individuals can choose. Each
contract is designed with a particular type of individual in mind and, since
there are two risk types, only two types of contracts are offered. Individ-
uals can be characterized by their ex-ante choices of consumption in the
two states, as well as their levels of medical treatment if ill. Insurers thus
have to design contracts in three dimensions, i.e., a contract for type j is:
{Clj, C2j, tj}, j = F,R. In order to ensure that a pure-strategy equilibrium
exists, we assume that there are relatively few robust individuals.
We first characterize the contract intended for frail individuals. As
shown in the appendix, robust individuals do not wish to masquerade as
frail individuals and we can, therefore, ignore the self-selection constraint
7For a discussion of an asymmetric-information market where consumers are allowed
to have transactions with more than one firm, see Beaudry and Poitevin (1995).
8Rothschild and Stiglitz (1975) show that, if a Nash equilibrium exists, it is never a
pooling equilibrium since pooling contracts are not robust to competition.
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on robust individuals. The contract offered frail individuals constitutes the
solution to the following program:
max (1 - 1fF )U(Cl, 1) + 1fFU(C2, t)
Q,C2,t
subject to:
(1- 1fF) (A - Cl) + 1fF (tA - tG - C2) O,
t < 1.
The first constraint is the insurers' zero-profit condition. The second con-
straint reflects that individuals cannot more than fully restore health. (In
addition, there is a non-negativity constraint on t that never binds because
of the assumptions we have made on u.) Let the multipliers associated with
the constraints be respectively J.LF and </JF, and write the Lagrangian as
follows:
E = (I-1fF)U(CI,1)+1fFU(C2,t)
+J.LF ((1 - 1fF)A + 1fFtA - (1 - 1fF)Cl - 1fF(C2 + tG)) + </JF (1 - t).
The Lagrangian first-order necessary conditions are:
(3.6)
(3.7)
(3.8)
Since Cl, C2, and t are positive (by the properties of u), it follows from the
complementary-slackness conditions that the marginal conditions will hold
as equalities. From equations (3.6) and (3.7), we get:
(3.9)
z, e., frail individuals' marginal utility from consumption is equal across
states. Combining equations (3.7) and (3.8), we find:
Uh(C2, tF) + A = G + </JF 2...
Uc(C2, tF) J.LF1fF
(3.10)
The left-hand side here is the marginal willingness to pay for treatment and
is given by the sum of the marginal rate of substitution of consumption for
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health, Uh(C2, tF )/uc( C2, tF), and the additional earnings capacity generated
by a marginal increase in treatment, A. Hence, frail individuals choose
consumption and treatment if ill such that marginal willingness to pay for
treatment equals the marginal cost of treatment plus the marginal imputed
costs associated with the treatment constraint. The insurers' zero-profit
condition obviously binds, hence f..LF > O. The marginal imputed costs
incurred by restraining the individuals' level of treatment, t.r. is given by
<PF. According to the complementary-slackness condition, this Lagrange
multiplier may take a positive or zero value. If tr < 1, then <PF = 0, and it
follows that:
Note that there are no distortions in the contract designed for frail individu-
als, since self-selection constraints have no effect. The equilibrium insurance
contract offered to frail individuals is, therefore, first-best efficient.9
Next, we identify the contract intended for robust individuals. In this
case, the introduction of a self-selection constraint on frail individuals is
necessary since they have an incentive to masquerade as robust individuals
in order to obtain lower premium. The equilibrium contract for robust
individuals solves the following program:
max (1- 1rR)U(CI, l) + 1rRU(C2, t)
CI,C2,t
subject to:
(l - 1rR) (A - Cl) + 1rR (tA - tG - C2) 0,
(l - 1rF)U(CI, l) + 1rFU(C2,t) < (1- 1rF)U(CIF, l) + 1rFU(C2F, tF)
t < 1.
The first and third constraint are as above. The second one is the self-
selection constraint: Frail individuals should not wish to pretend being ro-
bust. Thus, the contract intended for robust individuals must ensure that
frail individuals do not derive higher utility from choosing this contract
rather than the contract intended for them. The self-selection constraint
will always bind.
9For more on first-best contracts, see Asheim, et al. (2003), where the probability of
falling ill is assumed to be public information.
61
With Lagrangian multipliers for the three constraints being denoted /-LR,
AR, and <PR, the Lagrangian is:
L = (l - 7rR)U(CI, l) + 7rRU(C2, t)
+/-LR ((l - 7rR)A + 7rRtA - (l - 7rR)CI - 7rR(C2 + te))
+AR ((l - 7rF)U(CIF, l) + 7rFU(C2F, tF) - (1- 7rF)U(CI, l) - 7rFU(C2, t))
+<PR (l - t).
Again, since Cl, C2, and t are positive, it follows from the complementary-
slackness conditions that the marginal conditions will hold as equalities.
Thus, the first-order necessary conditions are:
(l - 7rR)Uc(CIR, l) - /-LR(l - 7rR)
AR(l - 7rF)Uc(CIR, l) = O
7rRUc(C2R,tR) - /-LR7rR - AR7rFUc(C2R,tR) = O
(3.11)
(3.12)
7rRUh(C2R, tR) + /-LR (7rRA - 7rRe)
AR7rFUh(C2R, tR) - <PR= O. (3.13)
Rearranging equations (3.11) - (3.13), we get:
/-LR (l - TlF) \
1- - AR = O
uc( CIR, l) (l - 7rR)
(3.14)
l - /-LR _ TlF AR = O
Uc(C2R, tR) ToR
l + /-LR(A - e) _ TlF AR _ <PR = O.
Uh(C2R, tR) ToR 7rRUh(C2R, tR)
From equations (3.14) and (3.15), we have:
l l AR 7rF - ToR
Uc(CIR, l) Uc(C2R, tR) /-LR 7rR(l - 7rR)'
(3.15)
(3.16)
(3.17)
which implies that marginal utility of consumption differs across states for
robust individuals. In particular,
(3.18)
In addition, from equations (3.15) and (3.16), we get:
Uh(C2, tR) + A = e + <PR_!_.
Uc(C2, tR) /-LR 7rR
(3.19)
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Thus, marginal willingness to pay for treatment equals marginal costs of
treatment plus marginal imputed costs associated with the treatment con-
straint. The insurers' zero-profit condition binds, hence /LR > o. The
marginal imputed costs incurred from restraining the individuals' level of
treatment, tR, is <PR. Again, according to the complementary-slackness con-
dition, this Lagrange multiplier may take a positive or zero value. If tn < I,
then <PR = O:
Uh(C2, tR) + A = C if tR < l.
Uc(C2,tR)
We note that the allocation of income between consumption and health if
(3.20)
ill is first-best efficient. The allocation of income between consumption if
well and consumption if ill is, however, not first-best efficient (cf equation
(3.18)) and, subsequently, nor is the allocation of income on consumption if
healthy and treatment if ill. Thus, robust individuals are restrained in their
level of insurance coverage in order to induce self-selection by the frailones.
It follows from the above discussion that neither frail nor robust individ-
uals' choice between consumption and treatment if ill is changed compared
to the case of symmetric information. Consequently, our three-dimensional
problem, i.e., (i) consumption if healthy, (ii) consumption if ill, and (iii)
treatment if ill, reduces to one of only two dimensions, namely that of (i)
and (ii): how to allocate consumption across states. This implies that the
level of medical treatment if ill does not have to be specified in the insurance
contract.
Rationing of robust (low-risk) individuals as a way of separating risk-
groups is, of course, in line with Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). Frail in-
dividuals obtain their first-best allocation of consumption between the two
states of the world. Robust individuals, on the other hand, are restrained
in their level of insurance coverage compared to a situation with symmetric
information and will have to accept a strictly positive deductible. The in-
triguing question is whether this deductible is in payor in pain, i.e., does the
self-selection constraint restrict robust individuals' consumption if ill, their
treatment if ill, or a bit of both? This is the topic of the next section.
3.4 Payor Pain?
Individuals' decisions regarding the appropriate level of insurance coverage
and the allocation of insurance indemnity if ill depend on their levels of
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innate ability. In a world of symmetric information, Asheim et al. (2003)
show that individuals may ex ante prefer not to equalize utility across states
so that u(cJ,l) > U(C2,t). In particular, individuals with a sufficiently
low level of innate ability prefer to not fully recover from an illness, but
rather spend some of the indemnity on consumption. The implications of
an individual's level of innate ability on her choice of insurance contract,
in the present context of asymmetric information about the probability of
falling ill, is discussed more closely in the following.
Proposition 1. (i) If individuals have a high level of innate ability, in
particular, if A ::::C, then, for a given positive level of insurance cov-
erage, both robust and [rail individuals choose complete treatment if
ill: tR = tF = 1.
(ii) If individuals have a low level of innate ability, in particular, if A ::;
'TrRC, then, for a given positive level of insurance coverage, both robust
and [rail individuals choose less than complete treatment if ill: O <
tn, tF < 1.
Proof. (i) It follows from our assumptions on u that Uh(C2, h2)/uc(C2, h2) >
o. Hence, equations (3.10) and (3.19) can hold in the case when A ::::C only
if if> > O,which implies t = l.
(ii) Note that A ::; 'TrRC implies A ::; 'TrFC. Rewriting equation (3.5) as:
(3.21 )
we see that the right-hand side is decreasing in t when A ::; 1fjC. It follows
from the properties of u that Cl, C2, and t are positive. Suppose that t = 1.
Now, the right-hand side of equation (3.21) reduces to: A -'TrjC. Thus, with
A::; 1fjC, there is nothing left for consumption, and the right-hand side will
have to be increased through a reduction in t, that is, t < 1. •
In light of this result, we assume in the subsequent analysis that indi-
viduals have one of two levels of ability: low (AL) and high (AH), such that
AL::; 1fRC and AH ::::C. It follows that AL!'TrF < AL/1fR < C::; AH, since
O::; 1fR < 'TrF< 1.10
IOAt intermediate levels of ability, i.e., where A E (7rRC,C), there is a possibility for
cases where the constraint on treatment (t::; 1) is binding for one of the risk types only. No
extra insight would be gained from incorporating such hybrid situations into the analysis.
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The implications of the ability level for the insurance contracts when
there is asymmetric information on risk can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 2. Equilibrium insurance contracts under asymmetric infor-
mation are characterized as follows.
(a) Among high-ability individuals (AH 2 C):
(i) Fmil individuals face no deductibles, and receive their first-best level
of insumnce coverage. Their level of utility is constant across states,
just like in the case of symmetric information.
(ii) Robust individuals are restrained in their level of insurance coverage
and have to make a co-payment. Their deductible is in pay only.
(iii) In particular, frail individuals' marginal utility from consumption is
equal across states, while that of robust individuals is not: 0= Uc(C2F,tF)
- Uc(CIF, 1) < Uc(C2R,tR) - Uc(CIR,1). Both risk types choose complete
medical treatment: tn, tF = 1. Hence, O = CIF - C2F< CIR - C2R.
(b) Among low-ability individuals (AL :S 7rRC):
(i) Fmil individuals face no deductibles and achieve their first-best levels
of consumption and medical treatment. However, even though not con-
strained in their level of insurance coverage, their utility is not equal
across states; this corresponds to the case of symmetric information.
(ii) Robust individuals are restrained in their level of insumnce coverage.
They have pari of the deductible in pain. Consequently, the indemnity
provides for lower level of consumption and medical treatment if ill rel-
ative to a situation with symmetric information. Utility is, moreover,
not equal across states.
(iii) In particular, both risk-types choose a lower level of consumption if
ill than if healthy, O < CIF - C2F < CIR - C2R, and choose less than
complete treatment, O < tR < tF < 1.
Proof. We start out by establishing parts (a) and (b)(i). From the first-
order conditions of the optimization problem in Section 3.2, we see that
frail individuals' marginal utility from consumption is equal across states
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(cf equation (3.9)), whereas robust individuals' marginal utility from con-
sumption is not (cf. equation (3.17)). Frail individuals consequently receive
their first-best level of insurance coverage, as stated in (a)(i) and (b)(i) of
the Proposition, while robust individuals do not. For high-ability individu-
als, t = l by Proposition 1. Thus, by equation (3.18), for robust high-ability
individuals, Uc(CIR, l) < Uc(C2R, tR) = Uc(C2R, l) and CIR > C2R. Moreover,
by part (a)(i) and Proposition l, Uc(CIF, l) = Uc(C2F, tF) = Uc(C2F, l) and
CIF = C2F· This completes the proof of parts (a) and (b)(i).
Parts (b )(ii) and (b )(iii) remain to be established. For low-ability in-
dividuals (both robust and frail), t < l and Cl > C2 by Proposition 1.
For robust low-ability individuals, Uc(CI, l) = Uc(C2, t) in first best and
Uc(CI, l) < Uc(C2, t) under asymmetric information (cf. equation (3.18)).
Since u is strictly concave, it follows from the zero-profit condition that CIR
is higher and U(C2R, tR) is lower than they would have been in first-best.
It now follows from the normality of C and h that both C2R and tR are
lower than they would have been in first best. The consumption of frail
low-ability individuals, CIF, is, due to their higher cost of insurance, smaller
than what robust low-ability individuals would have got in first-best, which
in turn is smaller than CIR, i.e., CIF < CIR. It now follows from the frail
low-ability individuals' self-selection constraint that u( C2R, tR) < u( C2F, tF).
By normality, this implies that C2R < C2F and tR < tF .•
We briefly restate the main results derived in the above analysis. Ro-
bust individuals are constrained in their level of insurance coverage because
of the problem of self-selection. As a consequence, their allocation of in-
come on consumption across states is not first-best efficient. Their level of
consumption if ill is, indeed, distorted downwards causing consumption if
ill to be less than consumption if healthy: C2R < CIR. Since robust high-
ability individuals' marginal willingness to pay for treatment always exceeds
marginal cost of treatment, we have that t = l for this group, entailing that
their level of treatment is not altered relative to the situation of symmetric
information. Indeed, health if ill is fully restored: hl = tiz = 1. The de-
ductible imposed on robust high-ability individuals is consequently in the
form of reduced consumption if ill, i.e., deductible in pay. Low-ability in-
dividuals' marginal willingness to pay for treatment, on the other hand, is
shown to equal marginal cost of treatment only for levels of treatment less
than one: t < 1. Hence, when faced with a reduction in the insurance in-
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demnity, they will reduce both their level of consumption and their level
of treatment, since both consumption and health are normal goods. The
deductible imposed on robust low-ability individuals consequently takes the
form ofreduced consumption and reduced health, i.e., deductible in pay and
pain.
Considering the outcome for low-ability individuals, we note a sharp
contrast between the cases of symmetric and asymmetric information. When
insurers know each insuree's probability of illness, robust (i.e. low-risk)
individuals get higher consumption and more medical treatment than frail
individuals. This is turned around when information about this probability
is private: In order to obtain self-selection, insurers offer robust individuals
a contract that provides for lower consumption and less treatment if ill than
do the contract offered frail individuals.
Note that the contracts described are information-constrained Pareto-
efficient. Like in the Rothschild-Stiglitz model (see Crocker and Snow,
1985), the pure-strategy separating equilibrium is efficient whenever it ex-
ists.
3.5 Discussion
Analyzing a competitive health-insurance market under asymmetric infor-
mation, we have identified separating insurance contracts that induce indi-
viduals to reveal information by means of deductibles. Our analysis takes
place in a standard adverse-selection situation in which the insuree has more
information about risk than does the insurer, the insurer offers a menu of
contracts, and the insuree is restricted to buy all her insurance from the
same insurer. However, the analysis deviates from the standard adverse se-
lection situation in two related ways. Firstly, we assume that consumption
and health are complements in utility. This implies that individuals may
choose not to equalize utility across states in a world of symmetric informa-
tion, and thus, that their optimal level of insurance coverage is even lower
in a world of asymmetric information. Secondly, the consequences of the
insured-against event are made endogenous: individuals can choose their
level of recovery, and thus also their loss in income (i. e., monetary loss) and
utility (i.e., non-monetary loss), if ill.
The novelty of this paper lies in the integration of medical insurance
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and disability insurance in a setting where adverse selection is a problem.
By integrating the two types of insurance, we show that the separating
scheme may involve two types of deductibles: a deductible in the form of
reduced medical treatment and a monetary deductible. In fact, we find that
low-ability robust individuals will have insurance contracts with both these
types of deductibles, i.e., deductibles in both pay (i.e., in cash) and pain
(i.e., in kind).
Our findings may be of relevance to the practical design of health-
insurance contracts. Indeed, one may observe empirically that insurance
contracts specify both quantity and quality of care, rather than providing
a cash compensation. Individuals will consequently have access to a pre-
determined level (or quality) of treatment, rather than just a cash payment.
There are obviously many reasons for this, one of which being transaction
costs associated with having to search for the appropriate supplier of med-
ical treatment when ill. Thus, it is not counter-intuitive that individuals
ex ante may find it optimal to specify their preferred level of treatment if
ill, thus restricting the allocation of income when ill between consumption
and health. If so, our analysis suggests that, under asymmetric information,
robust individuals with low ability will achieve less treatment and less cash
compensation than they would have achieved under symmetric information.
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Appendix
We show here that robust individuals do not wish to masquerade as frail in-
dividuals, i. e., that they will suffer a loss in expected utility if masquerading
as frail:
We know from Section 3.2 that contracts for robust individuals are designed
so that frail individuals are indifferent between masquerading or not:
Rewriting equation (3.23) such that:
and observing that:
(l - TIR) (l - TlF)-,--_..:..:c.:_ > ,
TIR TlF
it follows that:
(l - TIR)
";__--'-(U(CIR, l) - U(CIF, l) > U(C2F, tF) - U(C2R, tR).
TIR
Hence, inequality (3.22) holds.
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Essay 4
Redistribution at the
Hospital
Abstract
This paper studies redistribution by means of a public supply of
medical treatment. We show that the government can redistribute in-
come towards low-ability individuals in a world of asymmetric informa-
tion by offering bundles of medical treatment and redistributive pay-
ment. If self-selection is a problem, then the separating scheme offers
high-ability individuals complete treatment against a high payment,
and low-ability individuals partial treatment against a low payment.
In particular, the level of treatment offered low-ability individuals is
distorted downwards.
4.1 Introduction
Medical treatment is but one example of a private good which in a number
of countries is publicly supplied. Redistribution, along with paternalism,
has been, and probably still is, a major reason why this is so. Public sup-
ply of treatment is usually financed by individuals contributing according to
their (gross) income, either through general taxation or through earmarked
contributions. The supply of treatment, on the other hand, is often pro-
vided according to individuals' need for treatment, rather than their con-
tributions. Traditionally, this way of organising the financing and supply
of medical treatment is thought to facilitate some kind of income redistri-
bution towards low-income individuals. Underlying this way of reasoning is
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the assumption that individuals with identical medical needs prefer identical
levels of medical treatment. We will, however, show that individuals with
identical medical need for treatment may indeed prefer different levels of
treatment and, consequently, different levels of recovery. In particular, indi-
viduals' preferred level of treatment is shown to be higher the higher their
level of innate ability. This suggests that those contributing the most to the
public health sector (i.e., high-income individuals) are also those utilising
the services provided the most. The extent of redistribution may, therefore,
not be as large as one would think.
The purpose of this paper is to identify Pareto-efficient bundles of med-
ical treatment and payment that facilitate income redistribution towards
low-ability individuals when information about individuals' level of ability
(income) is private to the individuals. To simplify the analysis, we assume
that this is the government's only means ofredistribution, moreover, there is
no private supply of medical treatment. We postulate that the government
does not pursue a particular distribution of medical treatment (health) per
se. l
There exists a fairly extensive literature on public provision of private
goods as a means of redistribution in a second best world, some of which are:
Blackorby and Donaldson (1988), Ireland (1990), Besley and Coate (1991),
Epple and Romano (1996), Blomquist and Christiansen (1995, 1998), and
Boadway, Marchand and Sato (1998).2 The present paper is most closely
related to that of Blackorby and Donaldson (1988, hereafter B-D) in that we
use bundles of transfers and medical treatment as a means of redistribution.
Whereas B-D study redistribution between ill and healthy individuals, i.e.,
redistribution ex post, we study redistribution between income groups ex
ante, i.e., prior to knowing whether individuals are ill or not. Consequently,
B-D study adverse selection problem in health types (i.e., whether ill or not),
whereas we study adverse selection problem in ability types (i.e., whether
high or low ability). B-D show that in a second-best world, publicly provided
lOne may argue that health is a particular commodity for which the society has dis-
tinct egalitarian ambitions, i.e. that health is subject to what Tobin (1970) calls specific
egalitarianism. The society may, for instance, aspire to achieve equality in health (e.g.
as measured as quality adjusted life years over individuals' lifetime), or somewhat less
ambitious: to reduce inequalities in health.
2Balestrino (1999) provides a survey of the literature on in-kind transfers in the presence
of distortionary taxes.
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medical treatment to the ill is 'overprovided' in the sense that their marginal
willingness to pay for treatment is less than marginal cost of treatment.
Here, we will show that subsidised treatment to the ill is 'underprovided,' i.e.,
their marginal willingness to pay is higher than marginal cost of treatment,
if their level of innate ability is low. Our findings thus run counter to those
of B-D, due to different informational assumptions.
The substance of our model is outlined as follows. Individuals may fall
ill thus suffering a loss both in utility directly, and in ability to earn in-
come. They can, however, buy medical treatment that restores health, and
thus also ability, with certainty. Medical treatment at a given level is as-
sumed to restore ability in the same proportion for all individuals. Benefits
from treatment, and subsequently willingness to pay for treatment, is conse-
quently higher the higher the level of innate ability. Since medical treatment
is more valuable to high-ability individuals than to low-ability individuals,
the government can separate the two types of individuals by offering two
bundles, each specifying level of treatment and level of payment: one con-
taining complete treatment and a high payment; type (i), and one containing
partial treatment and a low payment; type (ii). If redistribution leads to a
binding self-selection constraint, bundle (i) will not be distortionary, while
bundle (ii) will be. In particular, the level of treatment provided in bundle
(ii) will be distorted downwards, as this will be more costly to high-ability
individuals than to low-ability individuals. The subsidised medical treat-
ment allows low-ability individuals to have a higher level of consumption in
the two possible states of the world (healthy or ill), and are, consequently,
better off relatively to a situation without redistribution.
This paper is organised as follows. In Section 4.2 we derive the model and
undertake a preliminary analysis, and in Section 4.3 we derive the govern-
ment's Pareto-efficient menu of contracts facilitating redistribution towards
low-ability individuals. Finally, we discuss our findings in Section 4.4.
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4.2 Preliminary Analysis: Allocation of Income
Across States of the World.3
In the subsequent analysis, we describe a representative individual's ex ante
optimisation problem. The individual has preferences over consumption (c)
and health (h): u(c, h). There are two possible states of health: she may
with probability (1 - 7r) be in good health: state 1, or with probability 7r
(O < 7r :S 0,5) be ill: state 2.4 The two states are jointly exhaustive and
verifiable. Information on risk is symmetrically distributed. Health in state
1 is normalised to l: hl = 1, while health in state 2 is assumed to be zero:
h2 = o. Health if ill can (with certainty) be partly or fully restored if medical
treatment t (O :S t :S 1) is utilised. Treatment leading to complete recovery,
i.e., t = 1, has a cost of production equal to C, while treatment leading to
partial recovery has a cost tC. Health if ill is henceforth represented by t:
h2 = t. Consumption in state l and 2 is denoted Cl and C2, respectively.
The individual is an expected utility maximiser. Hence, her preferences
are represented by the following von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function:
(4.1)
\Ve assume that u is twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing and
strictly concave. Also, Uch 2': O, where the partial derivative is denoted by
subscript. Health is thus not only an important factor of well-being in its
own right, but may also affect the individual's ability to enjoy consumption.
It follows that C and h are normal goods. Furthermore, uc( c, h) -+ 00 as
c 10 whenever h > Oand Uh(C, h) -+ 00 as h lOwhenever c > O. Moreover,
uc(c, h) -+ 00 or Uh (c, h) -+ 00 as c 10 and h l o. Hence, she strictly desires
a positive level of consumption and health.
The individual's level of innate ability (productivity) is given by A. In-
formation about innate ability is private to the individual. If in good health,
her level of ability is equal to A, while if ill, her level of ability is equal to
tA. Earnings are assumed to be proportional to ability.
By the properties of u (strict concavity) it follows that the individual is
risk averse. There exists a perfectly competitive private insurance market
3The analysis in this section is based on a somewhat modified version of a model
developed in Asheim, Emblem and Nilssen (2000).
4We assume that the individual can neither influence the probability of falling ill, nor
the costs associated with the illness, i.e. no moral hazard.
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offering cash compensation if illness occurs. The compensation can be used
to cover medical expenditures and partly compensate for (permanent) loss
in income due to reduced ability, e.g. in the form of a disability payment.
Insurance is offered at an actuarially fair premium 111, so that 111 must be
paid in both states in order to have coverage equal to I if ill. To insure is the
only way the individual can transfer income across the two possible states
of the world. Let P represent payment for treatment. Then her budget
constraint in state 1 and 2 is: Cl + 111 = A and C2 + 111 + P = tA + I,
respectively. Her ex ante choice of Cl and C2 when the budget constraint is
binding in both states of the world, is thus constrained by:
(1 - (1- t)1I) A = (1- 1I)CI + 1I(C2 + P). (4.2)
The individual's expected utility maximising choice of consumption in
the two states of the world is derived by maximising equation (4.1) subject
to equation (4.2). The Lagrangian is given by:
(1 - 1I)U(CI, 1)+ 1IU(C2, t)
+A [(1- (1- t)1I)A - (1 - 1I)CI - 1I(C2 + P)].
It follows from the fust-order conditions that:
Uc(CI (t, P, A), 1) = Uc(C2(t, P, A), t) = A, (4.3)
that is; marginal utility of consumption is equal across states. The consump-
tion demand function in each state is given by: cI(t,P,A) and c2(t,P,A).
The private insurance market consequently allows her to attain her optimal
distribution of consumption across states. In the subsequent analysis, we
will therefore concentrate on characterising her preferences if ill; in particu-
lar, her marginal willingness to pay for medical treatment at the expense of
consumption if ill.
The individual's indirect utility function is given by:
V(t, P, A) = (1 - 1I)U( Cl (t, P, A), 1) + 1IU(C2(t, P, A), t). (4.4)
V is strictly increasing in t, strictly decreasing in P, and strictly increasing in
A. We can therefore define a curve, call it P(t, A; L,P), going through (t, P)
in (t, P)-space and showing combinations of t and P yielding a constant level
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of utility. Accordingly, the utility, Vet, P, A), of an individual with ability
A facing (t, P) is equal to Vet, P, A) if and only if P = pet, A;t, P). The
indifference curve is upward sloping both in t and A. Moreover,
åP( t, A; l, P)
åt
7r(Uh(C2, t) + AA)
7rA
= Uh(C2, t) + A
Uc(C2, t) ,
where the second equality follows from the envelope theorem, and the fourth
(4.5)
equality is implied by the first-order condition in equation (4.3). This means
that the marginal willingness to pay for treatment equals the sum of con-
sumption and production values of health.
The indifference curve pet, A; I, P) can be shown to be a strictly concave
function of t. If follows that the marginal willingness to pay for treatment
is positive and decreasing in t. Moreover, since Ucc < 0, Uch ? ° and
åC2/ åA > 0, then equation (4.5) implies that:
åP(t,A;I,P) = ~ [uh(C2(I,P,A),l) +AJ > 1, (4.6)
åtåA åA Uc(C2(t, P, A), l)
i.e., marginal willingness to pay for treatment is increasing in her level of
innate ability. Graphically, this implies that the slope of an indifference
curve through any point (I, P) is increasing in A. Indifference curves are
consequently steeper the higher the level of innate ability and they cross
only once, i.e., single-crossing.6 The single-crossing property is illustrated
in Figure 4.1 for two different values of ability: AL < AH, where L and H
denotes low and high ability, respectively.
Holding t and A constant, then a higher payment for treatment implies
that she will have to reduce her level of consumption in state 2. Marginal
willingness to pay for treatment is consequently decreasing in P:
åP(I, A; l, P) = å [Uh(C2(l, P, A), l) + AJ < O. (4.7)
åtåP åP Uc(C2(t, P, A), l) .
5As measured by the additional earnings capacity generated by treatment.
6The single-crossing property corresponds to the 'Agent Monotonicity condition' in
the literature on income taxation (Seade, 1982) and the 'Spence-Mirrlees condition' in the
literature on screening (Macho-Stadler & Perez-Castrillo, 1997).
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Figure 4.1: The single-crossing property.
hence, the income effect of a higher P is negative, as would be expected. It
follows that the slope of the indifference curve through any point (t,P) is
decreasing in payment.
The following result is useful for the main analysis. It shows that if
innate ability is sufficiently high, then marginal willingness to pay for treat-
ment exceeds cost of treatment, independently of payment. Moreover, if
innate ability is sufficiently low, and payment equals cost of treatment, then
marginal willingness to pay for treatment equals marginal cost only if treat-
ment is partial,
Lemma. If A ~ C, then åP(t, A; t, P)jåt > C for all t and P. If A ::; TiC,
then åP(t, A; t, tC)jåt = C only if O< t < L
Proof. Recalling that C is the production cost of complete treatment, then
if A ~ C, it follows from equation (4.5) that the individual's marginal will-
ingness to pay for treatment: åP(t, Aj t, P)/åt, is greater than C. Assume
now that A ::; TiC. If t = 1 and P = C, then we see from equation(4.2)
and (4.3) that Cl = C2 = A - TiC, implying that t = l is not feasible when
A ::; TiC. Moreover, if A !TiC and t = l, then it follows from equation (4.2)
that: C2 = (A - TiC+ Cl (Ti- 1)) ~ ::; (A - TiC)~ !O. By the properties of
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u7, ap(l, A; 1, tC)jat ---+ KC < C when A l KC. Consequently, if A::; KC,
then ap(t,A;t,tC)jat = C only ifO < t < 1. •
4.3 Main Analysis: Health vs. Subsidy
We now expand the analysis to include two types of individuals who are
identical in all respects save their individual level of innate ability: they
may either have a high ability: AH 2: C, or a low ability: AL ::; KC.8 The
number of individuals of each type is given by Ni, i = H, L. The government
knows the proportion of each type of individuals, but cannot observe their
identity. The individuals' indirect utility function is given by equation( 4.4).
The government designs a menu of Pareto-efficient contracts specifying
bundles of payment and treatment: {(tL, PL), (tH, PHn, where (tL, PL) and
(tH, PH) denotes the contract intended for low- and high-ability individu-
als, respectively. Contracts cannot be traded once they have been signed,
moreover, medical treatment can not be supplemented. Contracts specifying
combinations of treatment and payment are derived by:
subject to:
v < V(tH,PH,AH)
V(tH,PH,AL) < V(tL,PL,AL)
V(tL, PL, AH) < V(tH,PH,AH)
NL(PL - tLC) + NH(PH - tHC) O
O < ti:::; 1, i = H, L.
The first constraint ensures high ability individuals a certain level of util-
ity. The second and the third constraints are the self-selection constraints.
The fourth constraint is the government's balanced budget constraint, while
the fifth constraint is the restriction that individuals cannot obtain more
7Uc{c,h) --+ 00 as c 10 whenever h > O.
8By assuming that they face identical risk of falling ill, we disregard questions regarding
the relationship between ability and health (e.g. whether the likelihood of falling ill is
correlated with the individuals' ability). Obviously, there is a relationship between health
and socio-economic status, a fact that is of importance to the discussion of redistribution,
yet the direction (and the strength) of causation is not straightforward.
80
than complete treatment (i.e., t ~ 1), nor 'sell' treatment (i.e., t ~ O). As
can be checked, the self-selection constraint and the constraint on the level
of treatment are both satisfied for low-ability individuals in the subsequent
analysis. It also holds that the non-negativity constraint on treatment is
satisfied for high-ability individuals. Forming the Lagrangian:
L V(tL, PL,AL) + >. [V(tH, PH, AH) - V]
+ IL[V(tH,PH,AH) - V(tL,PL,AH)]
+ "t [NL(PL - tLC) + NH(PH - tHC)] + ¢ (1- iu),
The efficient ti and Pi satisfy the conditions:
aL aV(tL,PL,AL) _ aV(tL,PL,AH) _ N C - O (4.8)
atL at IL at "{L-
aL aV(tL, PL, AL) _ aV(tL,PL,AH) N - O (4.9)
aPL ap IL ap +"{ L-
aL >.aV(tH, PH, AH) aV(tH, PH, AH)
atH at +IL at
"{NHC-¢=O (4.10)
aL >.aV(tH, PH, AH) aV(tH,PH,AH) N =0 (4.11)
aPH ap + IL ap +"{ H
aL > O aL > o. aL > o. aL > o.
a>. - , alL - , a"{ - , a¢-
For the moment, we assume that the government has no redistribution
ambitions, and that payment reflects cost of production. In addition, we
assume that the self-selection constraint on high-ability individuals is not
binding (i.e., IL = O). Since, by assumption, the government has only one
means of redistribution, the following provides a benchmark against which
redistribution can be compared. Dividing equation (4.8) by equation (4.9)
and using equation (4.5) we find:
hence, low-ability individuals' marginal willingness to pay for treatment
equals cost of treatment. Since AL ~ 1fC, it follows from the Lemma that
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o < ii. < 1, thus: PL = tLC. Dividing equation (4.10) by equation (4.11)
and using equation (4.5) we get:
The government's zero-revenue constraint is assumed to hold, thus 'Y > o.
The marginal imputed cost incurred in restraining the individuals' level of
treatment (i.e., in S 1) is given by ¢. From the Lemma we know that
¢ > O,and thus tn = 1, implying that the treatment constraint is binding.
Moreover, PH = C. Consequently, V = V(I, C, AH).
The efficientbundles of treatment and payment when there is no redis-
tribution: {(tL, tLC), (1,C)}, are illustrated in Figure 4.2. As can be seen,
self-selectionwill not be a problem since high-ability individuals would suf-
fer a loss in utility if choosing low-ability individuals' bundle (and since
low-ability individuals can not afford high-ability individuals' bundle).
p
Figure 4.2: Efficient bundles of treatment and payment when there is no
redistribution.
Redistribution We now assume that the government has redistribu-
tion ambitions, in particular, it seeks to maximise the sum of utilities, i.e., a
utilitarian welfare function. This corresponds to ). = NH/ N L, entailing that
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the weight of high-ability individuals relative to low-ability individuals cor-
responds solely to the numbers of individuals in each group. Utilitarianism
leads to redistribution from high- to low-ability individuals if .A > N H / N L
in the situation without redistribution. In the subsequent, we will show that
.A is indeed greater than NH / NL when there is no redistribution.
Since fl = Owhen the government does not redistribute, it follows from
equations (4.9) and (4.11) that X> NH/NL corresponds to:
-åV(tL, tLC, AL)/åP > -åV(l, C, AH )/åP.
Since, byequation (4.3), -åV(t, P, A)/åP = -åf/åP = ?rUc(Cl, 1), it fol-
lows, as Ucc < 0, that .A in a situation without redistribution exceeds N H / N L
if and only if cl(l,C,AH) > C}(tL,tLC,AL). To show that this is the case,
note that it follows from the constraint in equation (4.2) and the fact that
consumption in state 2 is non-negative, that:
Hence, since AL :S «C, we obtain Cl (tL, tLC, AL) :S (1 - t)?rC. More-
over, it follows from equation (4.3) and the constraint in equation (4.2)
that high-ability individuals' level of consumption when tu = 1 is given by
cl(l, C, AH) = c2(1,C, AH) = AH - tcC. Recalling that ?r :S 0.5, we thus
see that cl(l,C,AH) > Cl(tL,tLC,AL). The level of consumption in state
1 is, in other words, higher for high-ability individuals than for low-ability
individuals. Consequently, we have established that the government under
utilitarianism wants to redistribute towards low-ability individuals.
Proposition 1. IJ the government has a utilitarian welJare Junction, then
income is redistributed [rom. high-ability individuals to low-ability individu-
als.
However, even if utilitarianism leads to redistribution from high- to
low-ability individuals, we cannot determine without further assumptions
whether redistribution is carried out to the extent that the self-selection
constraint on high-ability individuals is binding. Self-selection may in fact
not be a problem in the utilitarian optimum even if marginal utility of con-
sumption is equalised across individuals and states. This is because the
low-ability individuals' level of consumption and treatment in state 2 may
be sufficiently low to prevent high-ability individuals from wanting to mas-
querade. In the following, we will study the situation where the self-selection
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constraint binds, i.e., fL > O, using the same approach to the self-selection
problem as suggested by Stiglitz (1987).
The bundle intended for the low-ability individuals is found by dividing
equation (4.8) byequation (4.9):
aV(tL,PL,AL)
at
Defining v == fLaV(tLw,AH) /"fNL and using equation (4.5), we can rewrite
the condition as:
From Section 4.2 we know that high-ability individuals' marginal willingness
to pay for treatment is higher than that of low-ability individuals at any
treatment-payment combination, so also for (tL, PL):
Since v < 09, it follows that
in the self-selection equilibrium. Low-ability individuals are, in other words,
offered a level of treatment ti. at which their marginal willingness to pay ex-
ceeds the marginal cost of production. The level of treatment is consequently
distorted downwards. Graphically, the slope of both high- and low-ability
individuals' indifference curve through the point (tL, PL) exceeds the slope
of the isocost line.
The bundle intended for high-ability individuals is derived by diving
equation (4.10) by equation (4.11), and using equation (4.5):
åP(tH,AH;tH,PH) = C +_L.
åt "fNH
By assumption, "f > O. From the Lemma it follows that ¢ > Oand thus tn =
1. Hence, the marginal willingness to pay for treatment exceeds the marginal
cost of treatment for the non-distortionary reason that treatment cannot
9Because JL ~ 0,/ ~ Oand 8VH/8P < o.
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restore health beyond its original level. Therefore, the contract intended for
the high-ability individuals is not distorted at the margin. lO
Proposition 2. If the self-selection constraint binds, then the optimal sep-
arating scheme is such that:
(i) High-ability individuals' bundle of treatment and payment is not dis-
tortionary.
(ii) Low-ability individuals' bundle of treatment and payment is disior-
tionary. In particular, the level of medical treatment is distorted down-
wards since this is more costly to high-ability mimickers than to low-
ability individuals.
Consequently, if the self-selection constraint binds, the government in-
duces individuals to reveal information by offering two bundles:
where O < tL < 1.]] High-ability individuals are discouraged from mas-
querading as low-ability individuals by restricting the level of treatment
available to low-ability individuals. The attained self-selection equilibrium
is illustrated in Figure 4.3.
Relating our findings to those of B-D; we have shown that when informa-
tion on ability is asymmetric (and self-selection is a problem), then treatment
is 'underprovided' to ill low-ability individuals, whereas B-D show that when
information on health status (ill/healthy) is asymmetric, then treatment is
'overprovided' to ill individuals.
Extent of insurance coverage We apply the following terminology: by
full insurance, we mean that U(CI, hl) = U(C2' h2), i.e., that utility is constant
across the two states, and by partial insurance, we mean that u(c], hl) >
U(C2, h2), i.e., that utility is lower if ill than if healthy.
10This is analogous to the optimal taxation problem where the marginal tax rate faced by
high-ability individuals is zero, while the marginal tax rate faced by low-ability individuals
is positive (Stiglitz, 1987). This is often called a 'non-distortion at the top' property, where
'top' refers to individuals that no one would choose to masquerade as.
llpayment may in fact be negative if the subsidy is large, that is; individuals may not
only receive medical treatment, but also a cash transfer from the hospital if ill (the cash
transfer then being contingent on the individual undergoing treatment).
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Figure 4.3: Efficient bundles of treatment and payment when self-selection
is a problem.
High-ability individuals are defined by AH ~ C. From the Lemma we
know that tu = l, hence, high-ability individuals' level of ability will be
equal across states: hl = h2 = 1. Moreover, their level of consumption in the
two states of the world will be identical: Cl (l, PH, AH) = c2(1, PH, AH) =
AH -nPH. It follows that u(cI,hl) = u(c2,h2) and, consequently, they are
fully insured.
Low-ability individuals are defined by AL ~ -sC, From the above analysis
we know that O< t t. < l, hence, hl = l and h2 = it. < 1. It follows from
equation (4.3) and the properties of u that CI(tL,PL,AL) ~ c2(tL,PL,AL).
Consequently, u(cI, hl) > U(C2,h2) and the individuals are partly insured.
When the government redistributes and self-selection is a problem, then
low-ability individuals' level of medical treatment is distorted downwards.
Their level of insurance coverage is hence reduced relatively to a situation
without redistribution. They will, however, receive a subsidy which enables
them to have a level of consumption in excess of their earnings minus the
cost of treatment, and which makes them better off.
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4.4 Discussion
So far, we have studied the individuals' ex ante decision regarding their
optimallevel of consumption in the two states of the world, as well as their
optimal level of medical treatment given the two bundles. If individuals
are rational and have perfect foresight, then their ex post preferred level of
medical treatment will also be preferred ex ante. Prior to knowing which
state of the world has occurred, they are therefore willing to sign a contract
with the public supplier, i.e., hospital, specifying both payment and level
of treatment that is to be made available if ill. Indeed, one would expect
that the individuals would prefer to do so as this would prevent them from
potential transaction costs associated with having to 'shop around' for the
appropriate contract when ill. Such a scheme would in fact also be more
in accordance with what may be observed empirically: Public supply of
medical treatment financed by individuals contributing through (earmarked)
contributions and supplied free at the point of delivery. The public supply
of treatment may thus be thought of as an insurance where individuals are
compensated in the form of medical treatment directly if illness occurs, i.e.,
indemnity in kind. The preceding analysis will still be valid in such a setting,
the only difference is that individuals ex ante determine their optimal level
of private and public insurance coverage.V
The preceding analysis is based on a highly stylised model. We assume
that individuals with certainty can recover completely by consuming the
appropriate level of medical treatment. Moreover, illness is presumed to
be observable, hence, the private insurers do not face problems of adverse
selection. We have also ignored differences in the risk of falling ill which
indeed is an important reason for having a (mandatory) public health insur-
ance (Breyer and Haufler, 2000). Possible commitment problems associated
with a re-optimising government aspiring to increase treatment above the
'announced' level, is not discussed. The perhaps most striking assumption
underlying this analysis is, however, the assumption that the government
cannot implement income taxation. Consequently, we cannot infer whether
redistribution through public pricing of contracts is more efficient than other
12Sucha setting would be more in line with the analysis in Asheim et al., (2000) where
individuals' demand for insurance against medical expenditures (i.e. in kind) and/or loss
in income due to disability (i.e. in cash) are integrated. Their analysis takes place in a
perfectly competitive private market with no public interference.
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means of redistribution. Extension of the analysis to include also individu-
als' labour supply and distortionary income taxation, will be the subject of
future research. We think still that our analysis provides interesting results,
results that run counter to what often seems to be implicitly underlying
many studies of public provision of health care; namely that individuals
wish to fully recover from an illness.
Lastly, our analysis follows the tradition of neo-classical economics in
that individuals' utility (or preferences) provide the foundation of the anal-
ysis. We study distribution of welfare, that is; well-being assessed in utility
terms, thus, we assume that the value of medical treatment to an individual
is represented by her willingness to pay for it.13 An alternative approach
would be the extra-welfarist framework in which health, and not utility, is
the primary outcome ofinterest (Hurley, 1998). According to this approach,
distributional equity (in the egalitarian concept) implies that medical treat-
ment should be provided according to need, and not according to ability or
willingness to pay.
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Essay 5
Able' or Disabled:
Optimal Income Taxation
and Public Provision of
Health Care
Abstract
This studyexamines how optimal non-linear income taxation and
differentiated public provision of health care may form part of a scheme
facilitating income redistribution between different ability types (high/
low), and across different health states (poor/good). Information about
ability and labour supply is private. The government offers contracts
in five dimension: pre- and post-tax income if in good health, and pre-
and post-tax income, as well as medical treatment, if in poor health.
The derived information constrained scheme facilitates income redistri-
bution towards low-ability individuals. In addition, it provides insur-
ance against medical expenditures and loss in income due to disability.
The scheme is shown to entail an downward distortion in low-ability
individuals' labour supply in both health states, and a downward dis-
tortion in their level of treatment if in poor health.
5.1 Introduction
Health care is in a number of countries publicly supplied and financed
through taxation, either in the form of general income taxation or spe-
cific (earmarked) contributions. For instance, in the United Kingdom and
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the Scandinavian countries, there exists a tax financed universal compulsory
public insurance against a wide range of health care expenditures, such as
primary care and hospital care. The motivation for, and justification of, a
public health care supply differs among countries, and over time. Often,
distributional (equity) concerns are put forward as the most important ra-
tionale, but also arguments of paternalism, externalities and market failure
may be advanced.'
In this paper, we do not aspire to explain why health care is publicly
supplied. Rather, we acknowledge that a public supply exists. We assume
that the government's ambition is (more) equal income distribution among
individuals. Hence, it pursues a general distributional motive and not a
particular distribution of health, or health care, per se. Redistribution by
means of individualized lump-sum taxation is not possible due to private
information about ability (productivity) and labour supply. Our objective
is to study how health care provision and non-linear income taxation may
form part of an information constrained Pareto-efficient income redistribu-
tion scheme. Integrating what is often considered to be two separate policy
instruments, i. e., non-linear income taxation and public health care provi-
sion, is motivated by the fact that the two are interrelated. Indeed, the tax
base (i.e., income) is dependent on individuals' health state, and the mone-
tary benefits from health improvements are dependent on the tax burden.
We assume that health is stochastic: individuals may either be healthy
or sick. If sick, health may be fully or partly restored (with certainty) if the
appropriate level of care is provided. Individuals' health, and thus produc-
tivity, is consequently endogenous to the modeL The government's problem
is to ex ante design contracts facilitating income redistribution between in-
dividuals with different levels of innate ability, and across different health
states. Hence, contracts are designed prior to knowing individuals' health
states (which is verifiable ex post). The similarity between the tax/provision
scheme and an optimal insurance scheme under asymmetric information will
be readily apparent. Indeed, the 'ex ante view' enables us to highlight the in-
1Indeed, paternalism was a central argument when introducing the Law of Health Insur-
ance (Sykeforsikringsloven) in Norway 1906/07: "Thi all Erfaring viser det, at Menneskene
iænker ikke- iallefald ikke alle... paa den Dag imorgen ... og da bliver det nødvændigt, at
Samfundet, udover hvilket tilslut Skaden qaar, sørger for, at Individet bliver forpligtet til
at sørge for den Dag imorgen." Gunnar Knudsen om sykeforsikringsloven, 1906/07 as
cited in Seip (1984).
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surance aspect of the tax/provision scheme: the non-linear income tax does
not only provide an instrument for achieving (more) equity, but also an in-
strument for insurance when health, and thus also earnings, are stochastic
(Mazur, 1989). The tax/provision scheme provides coverage against medi-
cal expenditures, i.e., a medical insurance with in-kind compensation, and
against (permanent) loss in income due to illness, i.e., a disability insurance
with cash compensation.f Indeed, we show that the provision of health care
constitutes a screening device, that is: it induces self-selection. The income
tax may, hence, constitute an 'insurance premium', nevertheless separated
from individual health risks or benefits.
In the literature on optimal income taxation, it is well established that
asymmetric information about characteristics on which the taxation is to
be based, restricts the range of policies available to the government and the
design of these. Stiglitz (1982, 1987) provides a comprehensive analysis of
the implications of informational constraints on income taxation. Nichols
and Zeckhauser (1982), Blackorby and Donaldson (1988), Besley and Coate
(1991), and Boadway and Marchand (1995) show that in-kind provision
may serve as a screening mechanism and thus enhance the target efficiency
of a distributional policy. Indeed, Blomquist and Christiansen (1998) show
that if the self-selection constraint is binding, then public provision of pri-
vate goods may strictly Pareto dominate the optimal income tax optimum.
The good in question should, though, not be re-tradeable or supplementable,
and it should be a substitute for leisure (Blomquist and Christiansen, 1995).
Health care is often mentioned as an example of a private good that may be
suitable for public provision. However, there are only few studies that actu-
ally scrutinize public provision of health care, some of which are Blackorby
and Donaldson (1988) and Anderberg (2001). Their adverse selection prob-
lem is in health status, i.e., whether individuals are sick (infirm) or healthy
(firm). Hence, their analysis takes place after health status, and thus ability
to work, is determined, i.e., ex post. They assume, moreover, that sick (in-
firm) individuals cannot work, hence they do not consider the consequences
of the tax/provision scheme on sick individuals' trade-off between consump-
tion and leisure.:' Our analysis is similar to that of Anderberg (2001) in
2Empirically, insurance against medical expenditures and loss in income due to per-
manent disability, i.e., a disability payment, form part of a social insurance in a number
of countries such as Norway and the United Kingdom.
3Blackorby and Donaldson (1988) assume that sick and healthy individuals have dif-
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that the government's provision of health care is contingent on earnings,
i.e., non-uniform provision. Also, there is no private supply of health care,
and neither resale nor supplementing is possible.f
Our model deviates from previous studies in several respects. First, we
characterize a policy of in-kind provision when the policy is to be designed
prior to knowing individuals' health status, i.e., prior to knowing whether
an individual is sick or not. Second, the government faces adverse selection
in ability (high/low) and not in health status (sick/well). Third, we allow
sick individuals to (partly or fully) restore their health, and thus also their
productivity in the labour market, by undergoing medical treatment. Hence,
productivity if ill is endogenous. Fourth, individuals can participate in the
labour market even if health is not fully restored. This allows us to study
the consequences of a tax/provision scheme on sick individuals' incentives
to participate in the labour market. Lastly, the government faces also a
moral hazard problem: since labour supply is assumed endogenous and not
observable, individuals can influence the potential loss in income due to
illness.f
The outline of this paper is as follows. In Section 5.2 we derive the
model and show that individuals with identical medical needs do not prefer
identicallevels of health care. Indeed, individuals with high levels of inherent
ability prefer to undergo more medical treatment than do individuals with
a low such ability. In Section 5.3 we describe an information constrained
efficient scheme in which public supply of health care and non-linear income
taxation are integrated. Since the benefit per euro of utilizing health care
services increases with productivity (ability), the government uses different
ferent preferences for health care, and that the government's ambition is to provide care
to the sick. Anderberg (2001) study income redistribution from healthy (firm) individuals
towards sick (infirm) individuals.
4In Norway, health care services are mainly publicly provided and only a few services
are supplied by private institutions (and then usually in agreement with the government).
sThis may be referred to as ex post moral hazard since we focus on individuals' behav-
ior after illness has occurred. In the literature on health insurance, ex post moral hazard
usually refers to a situation in which individuals may influence the cost of treatment, i.e.,
the financial consequences of illness. Here, we focus on a situation in which individu-
als influence the financial consequences of illness, not through their choice of treatment
(cheap/expensive), but through their choice of leisure (more/less). Also, we assume that
health state is verifiable, thereby ignoring another type of possible ex post moral hazard
problems: individuals having incentives to falsely claiming to be sick when indeed they
are not.
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levels of health care combined with different bundles of earnings and taxes to
separate high-ability individuals from low-ability individuals. The optimal
separating scheme entails a downward distortion in low-ability individuals'
level of treatment (i.e., health) and labour supply. High-ability individuals,
on the other hand, are provided with complete treatment if ill, and are
required to spend more time in the labour market in both states. In Section
5.4 we elaborate on the implications of a public provision of treatment with
respect to redistribution. Our findings are discussed in Section 5.5.
..
5.2 The Model
Individuals are assumed to have identical preferences over consumption (c),
health (h) and leisure (l). Moreover, preferences over consumption and
health are assumed to be additive separable from leisure:
U(c, h, l) = u(c, h) + v(l),
where U will provide input to individuals' von Neumann-Morgenstern ex-
pected utility function in the below. While health is a multidimensional
concept, we assume that health is represented by the variable h. Also,
consumption c is a vector of consumption goods. The utility function is
assumed to be continuously differentiable and it satisfies: uc; Uh; VI > O, and
Ucc; Uhh; Vil < O, where the subscripts denote the partial derivatives. The
utility function is, thus, strictly increasing and strictly concave. Also, we
assume that uc(O, h) = 00, Uh(C, O) = 00, uc(O, O) = 00, Uh(O, O) = 00, and
VI(O) = 00. From this it follows that individuals strictly desire a positive
level of consumption, health and leisure. Consumption, health and leisure
are, moreover, assumed to be normal goods. We make the additional as-
sumption that health and consumption are complements in utility: Uch > o.
Thus, individuals derive utility from health per se, in addition, health influ-
ences their marginal utility from consumption: Uch > 0.6 In the literature
on health economics, this assumption is often made about severe illnesses
(Evans and Viscusi, 1991).7
6Since the partial derivatives of the utility function with respect to health and con-
sumption are both assumed continuous, then according to Young's theorem: Uch = Uhc,
i.e., the cross partial derivatives are identical.
7Minor illnesses are, on the other hand, often argued to cause marginal utility from
income to increase (Evans and Viscusi, 1991).
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Individuals face an identical risk of falling ill thus suffering a loss in
health. There is a probability (l-Jf) that they are in good health, i.e., state
l, and a probability Jf that they are sick, i. e., state 2, where O :S Jf :S l.
The two states are mutually exhaustive and verifiable. Risk is identical and
stochastically independent, thus we disregard collective risk. Also, individu-
als can not influence the probability of illness, i.e., there is no ex ante moral
hazard. Health in state l is normalised to l: hl = l. If sick, individuals
are assumed to suffer a complete loss in health: h2 = O. Health if sick may,
however, be partly or fully restored with certainty if individuals undergo
medical treatment: t E [O,l]. Thus, treatment is assumed to be indefinitely
divisible. The cost of treatment leading to complete recovery is given by
e and is public information. Treatment t is measured as the rate of total
treatment cost spent on treatment. Thus, individuals will by spending te
on treatment recover by rate t. Health in state 2 is henceforth measured by
the fraction of e spent on treatment, i.e., h2 = t. We assume that medi-
cal treatment cannot be resold, and there is no supplementing in a private
market.
We assume that individuals maximize an expected utility function of the
von Neumann-Morgenstern type:
E {U} = (l - Jf) [U(CI, l) + V(ll)] + Jf [U(C2, t) + V(l2)]' (5.1)
As follows by the assumptions on U (c, h, l), individuals are risk averse to-
wards consumption, health and leisure. Moreover, as stated in the above,
for levels of health less than perfect (i. e., h2 < l), we do not regard health as
an income-equivalent. In the literature on health insurance, such as Zeck-
hauser (1970), Arrow (1974), Viscusi and Evans (1990), utility functions
may assume different shapes depending on the individuals' health state
(good/poor). Traditionally, health status is incorporated by indexing the
utility function by the state of the world (Evans and Viscusi, 1991). Under-
lying this is an implicit assumption that health is not restorable, or that
illness as such entails pain and suffering which cannot be compensated for.
In this paper, however, we let health if ill be an alterable and endogenous
characteristic, indeed, health if ill can be fully restored. Utility from con-
sumption and health if in state 2 may hence be identical to that if in state
l provided that health if sick is fully restored, i.e., t = 1.8 We assume that
8Geometrically, one can depict the traditional formulation of state-dependent prefer-
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treatment does not involve pain and suffering, hence, restitution for pain is
not necessary. Also, since health states are assumed to be verifiable, medical
treatment is provided to sick individuals only.
Individuals are assumed to ex ante be identical in all respects, save their
level of inherent ability. Moreover, we assume that production is linear in
labour supply and that individuals are perfect substitutes in production.
Labour units are normalized so that individuals' inherent level of ability
is reflected in their wage rate: w. If in good health, i.e., in state 1, then
individuals will by spending (1 - it) hours in the labour market generate
earnings equal to w(I - it). Labour supply is assumed strictly positive and
less than one: 0< (1 - Ii) < 1. If sick, i.e., in state 2, and receiving a level
of medical treatment equal to t, then they will by spending (l - 12) hours in
the labour market generate earnings equal to tw(1-12). Productivity if sick
is thus given by the product tw and is endogenous. Information about w
and Ii is private to the individuals. By assumption, health care is free at the
point of delivery, thus net benefits from treatment if ill is given by the total
productivity during the (l - 12) hours of work: tw(l - 12), Naturally, the
higher the level of innate ability (w), the higher the benefits from treatment.
Gross labour earnings, henceforth referred to as earnings, are defined as:
El == w(l - It),
if well and
if sick. In order to simplify, we assume that individuals are not able to
transfer income across states through a private insurance market.
ences as two curves in (c, u)-space: one depicting u(c, l) and one depicting u(c, O). The
two curves are two sections of the overall utility function u(c, h). (For more on this, see
Hirshleifer and Riley, 1992). Hence, it is easy to see that if health is not restorable (ie.,
h2 == O), then identical marginal utility from consumption across states is achieved at
different levels of consumption: C2 < Cl. Here, however, we allow health to be improvable.
Thus, we can depict a number of such curves between the 'lower' curve givingu(c, O)and
the 'upper' curve giving u( C, l), since h2 == t E (O,l J. Thus, if individuals choose at == l
if sick, then equal marginal utility from consumption across states implies equal level of
consumption: Cl == C2. Correspondingly, if O< t < l, then C2 < ei.
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Normalizing the price of consumption to 1, we can write individuals' after-
tax budget constraint in each of the two states as:
(5.2)
and
(5.3)
where T denotes earnings tax.
We elaborate somewhat on individuals' labour supply. Medical treat-
ment if ill improves productivity by a fraction t. Improved productivity has
both an income and substitution effect on labour supply; on the one hand,
it implies that leisure becomes relatively more expensive thus leading to a
decrease in the demand for leisure (i.e., the substitution effect on (1 - 12)
is positive), on the other hand, it causes earnings to increase, thus making
more leisure affordable (i.e., the income effect on (1-12) is negative). Since
leisure is assumed to be a normal good, then labour supply may increase
(decrease) in t (and w) if the substitution effect dominates (is inferior to)
the income effect. In order to simplify the subsequent analysis, we assume
that labour supply is strictly increasing in wand t, and strictly decreasing
in T. Thus, the labour supply function is upward sloping in both (( I-Ii), w)
and ((l - b), t)-space.9
We can now rewrite the von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility
function (cf equation (5.1)) of a representative individual in terms of ob-
servable variables:
V(E, c, t) = (1 - 7r) [U(CI, 1) + v(l - EI/w)] + rr [U(C2, t) + v(l - E2/tw)],
(5.4)
where V(E, c, t) will differ among individuals since ability (w) differs. As
follows from the budget constraints, individuals' level of consumption in each
of the two states of the world is equal to net income (i.e., earnings minus tax),
thus we let Ci, i = 1,2, represent net income in state l and 2, respectively.
The expected utility function V(E, c, t) is increasing in consumption (c) and
treatment (t) and decreasing in earnings (E).
9In the literature on income taxation, the basic model postulates that labour supply
at low wages increases if wage increases, whereas labour supply at high wages decreases if
wage increases (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1987). The labour supply curve is thus backward
bending at high wages.
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We now set out to characterize the utility function as given in equation
(5.4). First, the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and
earnings (mrsc;,E;) at a given level of health, is given by:
_ dCI gil l VI(l - ~)
mrsCj,El = dE lv= - åV = - ( l) > O,
I åC! W Uc Cl,
(5.5)
if healthy, and:
if sick. Consumption and leisure are assumed to be normal goods, thus
mrsC;,Ei is decreasing in ability (w). This is shown for state 2:
(5.7)
since, by the properties of u and v: Uc: VI > Oand Vu < o. This is an agent
monotonicity propertu which may be referred to as a 'Mirrlees-Spence' single-
crossing property.l" From this it follows that the slope of an indifference
curve through any point (Ei, Ci), i = 1,2, is steeper for individuals with
ability WL than that of individuals with ability WH, if WL < WHo This is
illustrated in Figure 5.1. The monotonicity property entails that any two
indifference curves of individuals with different ability cross only once, i. e.,
single-crossing.
Note that the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and
earnings (mrsc2,E2) is decreasing in treatment:
å
åt (mrsc2,E2) (5.8)
=2_ [_~ vI(l - ~) + ~Vll(l - ~)Uc(C2' t) - vI(l - f,t)Uch(C2' t)]
tw t Uc(C2, t) (Uc(C2, t))2 < O,
since, by the properties of u and v: Uc; Uch; VI > Oand Vu < O. From this it
follows that individuals are less concerned (in ordinal terms) about leisure
laThe intuition for this result is that low-ability individuals will spend relatively more
time in the labour market than do high-ability individuals in order to generate the given
level of earnings. Hence, low-ability individuals' marginal rate of substitution of leisure
for consumption is higher than that of high-ability individuals.
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Figure 5.1: Earnings and consumption.
than consumption when health is good. Geometrically, this implies that the
slope of an indifference curve through (E2, (2) in (E2, c2)-space is less steep
for health h2H than for h2L, when h2L < h2H.
Second, the slope of a curve through (t, E2) in (t, E2)-space showing
combinations of treatment and earnings yielding a constant level of utility
is given by:
mwpt == dE2 1_= _ a;; = Uh2(C2, t) tw + E2. (5.9)
di V g};2 v12(1 - E2/tW) t
This is the individuals' marginal willingness to pay for treatment (mwpt) and
is given by the sum of marginal willingness to pay for health: (Uh2 / Vl2)tw,
i.e., the consumption and leisure value of treatment, and marginal earnings:
E2/t, i.e., the production value of treatment. As follows from equation (5.9),
mwpt is increasing in ability:
(5.10)
Geometrically, this monotonicity property is illustrated by the slope of any
pair of two indifference curves in (t, E2)-space going through (t, E2) being
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steeper the higher the level of ability. This is illustrated in Figure 5.2 for
WL < WHo
E
E
-t t
Figure 5.2: Medical treatment and earnings.
Third, the slope of an indifference curve through (t, C2) in (t, c2)-space is
given by:
. = (_ dC2) 1_- ~~ _ Uh2(C2, t) vz2(1 - E2/tW) E2
mwptc2.t - v " av - ( ) + ) 2'. dt -a UC2 C2, t Uc2(C2, t t W
C2
(5.11)
Also this reflects the individuals' marginal willingness to pay for treatment,
this time in terms of foregone consumption. From equation (5.11) we see
that mwptc2,t is given by the sum of marginal willingness to pay for health
in terms of consumption (i.e., Uh2/UC2) and the 'returns' on labour, as mea-
sured by the marginal willingness to pay for leisure in terms of consumption
(VI2/Uc2) times the 'effective' labour hours (E2/t2w = (1 - 12)/t). We can
now identify a third monotoni city property: the slope of an indifference
curve through (t, C2) in (t, c2)-space is decreasing in ability:
å ( ) E2 [Vll(l - Ez/tw) E2 vz(l - E2/tW)] (5.12)- mwpt t = -- - - < Oåw C2, (tw)2 UC2(C2, t) tw Uc(C2, t) .
Naturally, if individualized lump-sum taxation had been possible, then margi-
nal willingness to pay for treatment as given by equations (5.9) and (5.11)
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would be identicaL This is so because in a first-best situation, the marginal
rate of substitution between consumption and leisure is set equal to the wage
rate, i.e., V12/Uc2 = tw, implying that (dE2/dt) 1 V = -(dc2/dt) 1 V·
Forth, we note that the slope of an curve in (El, E2)-space showing
combinations of gross earnings in state 1 and 2, yielding a constant level of
utility is given by:
BV (E )= (_ dE2) 1_= BEl = (1- 11) VI 1 - ~ t > O.
mrSE2,El dEl V BV 11 V (1 _ §)
BE2 I tw
(5.13)
Recall that, by assumption, labour supply is strictly increasing in abilityll,
thus:
(5.14)
We elaborate somewhat on the implications of this assumption in the sub-
sequent. If hl = h2 = 1, and El = E2, then leisure is constant across
states: h = 12• It thus follows that mrs E2,El is equal to the ratio of state
probabilities, i.e., mrsE2,El = (1~7T). For O< L < 1 (i.e., h2 < 1), then indi-
viduals will spend relatively more labour time if sick than if well in order to
generate the required level of earnings: El = E2. Hence, marginal utility
from leisure is lower if well than if sick and, subsequently, mrsE2,El < (1~7r)
when O < t < 1. We will now consider mrsE2,El for two levels of ability:
WL < WH, when treatment is given by: 0< t < 1. For a given level of El
and E2, then if E2 increases and El decreases so as to keep expected utility
constant, then a sick individual with ability WH will have to increase her
labour supply with less than do a sick individual with ability WL in order to
generate the required increase in earnings. Hence, the increase in marginal
utility from leisure if sick is less for the individual with ability WH. Cor-
respondingly, a decrease in El implies that a healthy individual will enjoy
more leisure, hence marginal utility from leisure decreases, and more so for
an individual with ability WH than for an individual with WL. Thus, the
increase in earnings if ill (E2) required to compensate for a decrease in earn-
ings if healthy (El) is less for individuals with low ability than for those
with high ability. Hence, the slope of an indifference curve in (EI,E2)-space
IIWithout this assumption the slope of the indifference curve would be indeterminate:
.2....(mrs ) - l!.::.!:l E]tvll(l-~)v,(l-*)-E2Vll(l-re-)1J,(I-~) ,,:::O
ow E2E] - " w2(Vl(1-~)t)2 ::> .
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through a given point (El,E2) is steeper for WH than for WL. (Correspond-
ingly, the slope of a curve in (hh)-space showing combinations of LI and l2
attainable at different combinations of (E1,E2) yielding a constant level of
utility, is less steep for individuals with ability WL than that of individuals
with ability WH .)
Note also that the marginal rate of substitution of earnings across states
is increasing in treatment:
å( ) (l-n) [Vl(l-~) tVI(l-~)Vll(l-fe)~l O
- mrSE E - - >
åt 2, l - n vl(l _ ~) (vl(l- ~))2 .
Finally, we note that the marginal rate of substitution between consump-
tion if sick for consumption if well is given by:
(5.15)
Moreover,
since, by assumption, Uch > O. Thus, the slope of an indifference curve in
(Cl,c2)-space through (Cl,C2)is less steep for a high level of treatment than
for a low such level.
Before we proceed with the main analysis, the following result is useful.
Lemma. If individuals' level of inherent ability (w) is such that they for any
level of labour supply, (I-b) > O, can generate earnings greater than or equal
to the marginal cost of treatment (G), then their marginal willingness to pay
for treatment exceeds marginal cost of treatment, i.e., (Uh2/VI2)tw + E2/t >
G, for all t and T(E2). Jf, however, individuals' level of inherent ability (w)
is such that they for any level of labour supply, (1 - l2) > O, can generate
earnings less than or equal to the expected cost of treatment (nC], then
their marginal willingness to pay for treatment is equal to marginal cost of
treatment, i.e., (Uh2/VI2)tw + E2/t = G, only ifO < t < 1.
Proof. Recall that 0< l2 < 1, and that G is the production cost of complete
treatment. If E2 = tw(1-l2) 2': G for any levelof labour supply, (1-l2) > O,
it followsfrom equation (5.9) that marginal willingness to pay for treatment
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is greater than C. Now, assume that t = I, E2 = w(l - 12) :s 7rC, and
T(E2) = 7rC. It then follows from the budget constraint in state 2 (cf.
equation (5.3)) that C2 = E2 - 7rC. By the properties of u, C2 is positive,
but in order for C2 to be positive, treatment will have to be reduced below
l, i.e., O < t < 1. •
Henceforth, healthy individuals with a level of inherent ability (earnings
capacity) enabling them to generate earnings higher than, or equal to, cost
of treatment at any level of labour supply, i.e., w(1-1i) > C where i = 1,2,
are referred to as high-ability individuals. Healthy individuals with a level
of inherent ability enabling them to generate earnings less than, or equal to,
expected cost of treatment at any level oflabour supply, i.e., w( 1-12) :s 'TrC,
are referred to as low-ability individuals. High- and low-ability individuals
are denoted by subscripts H and L, respectively.
5.3 Optimal Non-Linear Income Taxation and Pub-
lic Supply of Medical 'Treatment
We confine our analysis to that of characterising information constrained
Pareto-efficient contracts. Indeed, we do not explicitly formulate the redis-
tributional ambitions of the government, but assume that the government
has a concave social welfare function reflecting its non-negative aversion to
inequality.
The government pursues a policy of ex ante income redistribution to-
wards low-ability individuals. As stated earlier, information on earnings
and probability of illness (7r) is public, while information on inherent abil-
ity and labour supply is private. The government knows, however, that a
fraction (l - p) of the individuals has a high level of inherent ability: WH,
and that a fraction p has a low level of ability: WL. The government's prob-
lem is to design mechanisms that induce individuals to reveal their private
information. It has two policy instruments at its disposal: income taxation
and health care provision.
In order to induce individuals to self-select, the government specifies
two types of contracts, each contract offering specific bundles of earnings:
E = (Elj) E2j), consumption: c = (Clj, C2j), and medical treatment if ill:
tj, where j = H, L. Hence, individuals can choose from contacts in five
dimensions. The contracts intended for low- and high-ability individuals are
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respectively given by: {ElL, E2L, elL, e2L, td, and {EIH, E2H, eIH, e2H, tH}.
The contracts are designed so as to facilitate redistribution and to induce
individuals to self-select.
Individuals' expected utility function in terms of observable variables is
given in equation (5.4). In order to simplify, we do not specify the expected
utility function, but simply write Y](Elj,E2j,elj,e2j,tj), j = H,L. Natu-
rally, the first-order partial derivatives of the utility function follow directly
from equation (5.4).
The government's problem is to:
subject to:
VH < VH(EIH, E2H, CIH, e2H, tH)
VH(ElL, E2L, ciz., e2L, tL) < VH(EIH, E2H, eIH, C2H,tH)
VL(EIH, E2H, eIH, e2H, tH) < VL(ElL, E2L, ciz., c2L, tL)
O < tj ::;l, j = H, L
and
(l - p) [(l - K)(EIH - eIH) + K(E2H - e2H - tHC)]
+p [(l - K)(ElL - cu.) + K(E2L - e2L - tLC)] = O.
The first constraint ensures high-ability individuals a minimum level of util-
ity. The second and third constraints are the self-selection constraints: in-
dividuals should not derive higher utility from choosing a different contract
than that intended for them. The fourth constraint reflects the fact that in-
dividuals cannot more than fully recover from illness and the fifth constraint
gives the government's budget constraint.
We assume that the government has no revenue requirements exceeding
the sum of expected cost of treatment (i. e., KC (t L + tH)) and expected in-
come transfers between the different types of individuals and between health
states. Moreover, we focus on what in the literature is considered to be the
'normal' case, namely that there is redistribution towards low-ability indi-
viduals, and, thus, that high-ability individuals are the potential mimickers.
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Thus, the self-selection constraint and the constraint on the level of treat-
ment are both satisfied for low-ability individuals.V As is standard in the
literature on optimal taxation, we assume that the maximization problem
has a solution and that the bundles derived from the first-order conditions
are globally optimal.
Writing the Lagrangian:
L VL(ElL, E2L, cu., e2L, tL) + ,\[VH(ElH, E2H, cui, e2H, tH) - V H]
+f..L[VH(ElH, E2H, cui, e2H, tH) - VH(ElL, E2L, ciz., e2L, tL)]
+y [ (l - p) [(l - 7r)(ElH - csn) + 7r(E2H - e2H - tHC)] l
+p [(l - 7r)(ElL - cir.) + 7r(E2L - e2L - tLC)]
+4>[1- tH]'
Since Elj, E2j, elj, e2j, and tj are all positive, it follows from the com-
plementary slackness conditions+' that the marginal conditions will hold as
equalities.
The first-order conditions (FOes) for the low-ability individuals' con-
tract are:
åL åVL åVH (5.16)ee« -- - f..L-- +,p(l-7r) = OåElL åElL
åL åVL åVH (5.17)
åE2L
-- - f..L-- +,p7r = O
åE2L åE2L
åL åVL åVH (5.18)
bcu.
- -f..L--,p(l-7r)=O
åcu. åelL
åL åVL åVH (5.19)
åe2L
-- - f..L-- - ,pTI = O
åcu. åe2L
åL åVL åVH (5.20)
åtL
-- - f..L-- - ,PTlC = O
åtL åtL
12Indeed, the two self-selection constraints can not both be binding because of the
single-crossing property.
13t ac. . E . ac. . E . ac.. . ac. . c . ac. - O ad)" at:.. at:.. at:.. A. at:. - OJ atj , IJ aElj' 2J aE2j , CIJ aCIJ' 2J ile2j - ,n a>. ' J1. al' ' 'Y a-, , Y' a<l>- .
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and the FOCs for high-ability individuals:
8C 8VR 8VR (5.21)
8E1R
),-- + J1-- + ,(1- p)(l- 11") = O
8E1R 8ElH
8C 8VR 8VH (5.22)
8E2H
),8E2H + J18E2H + ,(1- p)1I" = O
8C 8VR 8VH
(5.23)
8ClH
),- + J1- - ,(1- p)(l- 11") = O
8CIH 8ClH
8C 8VR 8VH (5.24)
8C2H
),-- + J1-- - ,(1- p)1I" = O
8C2R 8C2H
8C 8VH 8VH (5.25)
8tH
),- + J1- - ,(1- p)1I"C -1> = O.
8tH 8tH
As in Stiglitz (1982, 1987), we define the implicit marginal tax rate
for individual j = H, L in state 1 by T'(E1j) = 1 - =«. El.' where
J' J
-j - 8\)/8Elj _ 1 (Vl(l-Elj/Wj)) f . (5) C dmn,c· . E . = 8V/8 . - --:- (.1)' c. equation .5. orrespon -
lJ' IJ J CIJ WJ Uc ClJ'
ingly, the marginal tax rate in state 2 is defined by: T' (E2j) = 1-mr sJc·. E .,2J' 2J
where mrsj . == _1_. (Vl(1-E21j/tiWj)), cf. equation (5.6). The marginal
c2]'E2j tJwJ Uc(C2j,tJ)
tax rate hence differs across health states.
5.3.1 Self-Selectionis not a Problem
For now, we assume that redistribution is not carried out to an extent at
which the self-selection constraint on high-ability individuals is binding, i.e.,
J1= O. The following hence constitutes a benchmark.
We start out by identifying the contract intended for low-ability individ-
uals. The bundle of earnings and consumption to be made available if well
is derived by dividing equation (5.16) by equation (5.18), and substituting
in from equation (5.5):
8VL (1 b)
_ 88~L = 1¢=> _l_vhL - W = 1.
~ WL Uc1L(Cl,l)
8CIL
Correspondingly, the bundle of earnings and consumption to be made avail-
able if sick is found by dividing equation (5.17) by equation (5.19) and
substituting in from equation (5.6):
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Hence, the bundle of earnings and consumption intended for low-ability
individuals entails a zero marginal tax rate in both states of the world, i.e.,
T'(EiL) = O. (If, however, they generate earnings exceeding EiL, they face
a 100 percent marginal tax rate, i = 1,2.) The marginal rate of substitution
between consumption and leisure in each of the two states is, consequently,
equal to the wage rate in that state, i.e., VllL/UClL = WL and VI2L/Ucn
= tLWL·
The level of medical treatment to be made available if ill, is found by
dividing equation (5.20) by equation (5.17). Substituting for mwpt, cf. equa-
tion (5.9), gives:
Uhn (C2L, tL) E2L C
VI (l - lfu...)tLWL + t;: = .
2L tLWL
Hence, the contract specifies a level of medical treatment if ill such that
their marginal willingness to pay for treatment is equal to marginal cost of
(5.26)
treatment. Note that marginal cost is also total cost since we have defined
O < t ~ 1. As follows from the Lemma, low-ability individuals' marginal
... willingness to pay for treatment is equal to cost of treatment for O< iL < l
only. Thus, their health (productivity) if ill is partly restored.
The allocation of earnings across states is derived by dividing equation
(5.16) by equation (5.17). From this we see that the marginal rate of sub-
stitution between earnings in state l and 2 equals the ratio of state prob-
abilities, i.e., mrsE2.El = (1 - 7r)/7r. Substituting from equation (5.13) we
thus have that:
ElL 1 E2L
VI (l - -) = -VI (l - -), (5.27)
IL WL ti. 2L tLwL
i.e., marginal utility from leisure in state l is equal to marginal utility from
leisure in state 2 per unit of recovery in state 2. Since the contract entails
O < iL < 1, it follows from equation (5.27) that h < l2 , that is, leisure
is not equalized across states. Subsequently, earnings if healthy are higher
than if ill: ElL > E2L. Geometrically, this is illustrated in (E1,E2)-space
by an indifference curve with slope equal to the state proba.bilities through
(ElL) E2L). The bundle of earnings is located to the right of the 45° 'cer-
ta.inty line' .14
14Alternatively, we can illustrate this in (h, b)-space by an indifference with slope equal
to the state probabilities through the point if;L, In). The (11,12)bundle is located to the
left of the 'certainty line'. (Naturally, if t = l, then the optimal bundle of leisure across
states would be located at the 'certainty line').
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Lastly, dividing equation (5.18) by equation (5.19) and substituting from
equation (5.15), we find that the level of disposable income (i.e., consump-
tion) is set so as to equalize marginal utility from consumption across states:
UC1L = UC2L. Since ° < fL < 1 and, ~y assumption, Uch > 0, then the level
of consumption is higher if in good health than if sick, i.e., ClL > C2L.
We now describe the properties of the contract intended for high-ability
individuals. We start out by characterizing their bundle of earnings and
consumption. Dividing equation (5.21) by equation (5.23), and equation
(5.22) by equation (5.24), and substituting from equations (5.5) and (5.6),
we find that the bundle of earnings and consumption if well and if sick, are
respectively given by:
l VI (1 - !fuL)- IH WH l, (5.28)
WH UC1H (Cl, 1)
1 V (1 h.IL)12H - tHWH (5.29)= 1.
tnwn UC2H ( C2, tH)
Consequently, also high-ability individuals face a zero marginal tax rate:
T'(EiH) = 0, i = 1,2. Earnings in excess of EiH are, however, subject to a
100 percent marginal tax rate.
Next, dividing equation (5.25) by equation (5.22) and substituting from
equation (5.9), we find that the bundle of treatment and earnings intended
for high-ability individuals is such that:
Uh2(C2,tH) E2 C ¢-_....:.:.!'-'-_:_--'---tHwH + _ = + _.....:......_
v12(1 - E2H /tHWH) tn ,(l - p).
The government's budget constraint binds, i.e., , > O. The marginal im-
puted cost incurred in restraining high-ability individuals' level of treatment
is ¢. According to the complementary-slackness condition, the Lagrange
multiplier may take a positive or zero value. Since, by definition, high-ability
individuals for all levels of t generate earnings exceeding cost of treatment,
i. e., E2/t 2': C, it followsthat fH = 1 and ¢ > O.The contract thus entitles
high-ability individuals to complete medical treatment if ill.
Moreover, dividing equation (5.21) by equation (5.22) and substituting
from equation (5.13),we find that earnings are allocated across states so that
individuals' labour supply is not distorted, that is: VI1H = Vl2H t~. From this
it follows that since fH = 1, the level of earnings (and thus leisure) is con-
stant across states: ElH = E2H = wH(l - in). Geometrically, the bundle
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intended for high-ability individuals is located on the certainty line, reflect-
ing that E2H = ElH. Also, dividing equation (5.23) byequation (5.24) and
substituting from equation (5.15), gives: UC1H(CI, 1) = Uc2H(C2, tn). Thus,
marginal utility from consumption is equal across states and, since tH = 1,
the level of consumption (net income) is also constant across states: z.e.,
~ ~
CIH = C2H·
Our findings are summarized in the followingProposition.
Proposition 1. When self-selection is not a problem, the tax/provision
scheme does not induce any distortions in the allocation of income on con-
sumption, leisure or treatment, neither within, nor between, the two possible
states of the world. In particular:
l. The contract intended for low-ability individuals:
(a) entitles them to a cash transfer in both states of the world, i.e.,
eiL > EiL, and partial medical treatment if ill: O < tL < 1.
They are thus, partly disabled if in state 2. The cash transfers
allow them to enjoy a higher level of consumption, treatment and
leisure relatively to a situation without redistribution. Indeed, the
cash transfer if ill constitutes partly a compensation for loss in
earnings due to reduced productivity, i.e., a disability payment,
and partly a cash redistributive transfer.
(b) implies higher level of earnings and consumption if well than if
ill: ElL> E2L and elL > e2L. Consequently, they enjoy a higher
level of leisure if sick than if well: 12L> IlL. The transfer is thus
less in the form of consumption and more in the form of leisure
if ill than if well.
(c) allows them to enjoy a higher level of expected utility relative to
a situation without redistribution.
(d) provides insurance against both loss in income caused by illness
and medical expenditures (at the specified level of treatment: tL).
2. The contract. intended for high-ability individuals:
(a) entitles them to complete medical treatment if ill: tn = l. A
positive average tax is imposed in each state: eiH < EiH. Conse-
quently, they have to spend more time in the labour market than
they would in a situation without redistribution.
no
(b) provides for a constant level of earnings and consumption across
states.
(c) allows for a constant level of utility across states: U(ClH, l)
+ V(hH) = U(C2H,tH) + v(l2H).
(d) provides insurance against medical expenditures (at the specified
level of treatment: tH).
We illustrate the information constrained efficient bundles of treatment
and earnings in Figure 5.3. The bundle intended for high-ability individuals
implies a high level of earnings and complete treatment, while that of low-
ability individuals implies a low level of earnings and less than complete
treatment.
E
i -}H- t
Figure 5.3: Efficient bundles of treatment and earnings.
The efficient bundles of consumption and earnings provided to high-
and low-ability individuals are illustrated in Figure 5.4. Self-selection is
not a problem since high-ability individuals would suffer a loss in utility
by choosing the bundle intended for low-ability individuals (and low-ability
individuals would not wish to choose high-ability individuals' bundle since
they, in order to achieve the level of earnings (EiR), would have to supply an
insurmountable level of labour hours). As shown, at the designated bundles,
III
the slope of the indifference curve is equal to l for both ability types. The
bundles are, i. e., first- best efficient. Consequently, the government is able to
achieve first-best efficient redistribution by means of its integrated scheme
of non-linear income taxation and health care provision.
c
....•..
...•.....
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Figure 5.4: Efficient bundles of earnings and consumption.
So far, we have identified a pair of information constrained Pareto ef-
ficient bundles of earnings, consumption and treatment that facilitates re-
distribution towards low-ability individuals, at the given level of utility des-
ignated high-ability individuals: VH' Now, if we assume that the govern-
ment 's ambition is to not only construct a policy of Pareto-efficient income
redistribution, but in particular, to maximize a utilitarian welfare function,
i.e., A = (l - p)/p, then it would pursue an income distribution at which
expected marginal utility from income is equal among individuals.P Here,
individuals are assumed to be identical in all respects save their inherent
level of ability, and, moreover, marginal utility from consumption is increas-
ing in health (Uch > O). Then, even if marginal utility from consumption
would be equalized among high- and low-ability individuals, their level of
consumption would not be equal. This is so because their level of treat-
15Individual sovereignty is presumed not to be violated, hence willingness to pay has
relevance.
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ment (i. e., health) if ill is different. Moreover, the level of leisure induced by
low-ability individuals' contract is high, and may be conceived as excessive
by a potential mimicking high-ability individuals. (This is so because the
more productive individuals would spend even less labour time in order to
generate the required level of earnings.) Hence, we cannot exclude the pos-
sibility that the contracts maximizing a utilitarian welfare function indeed
prevent high-ability individuals from mimicking, i. e., that self-selection is
not a problem.
The government may, consequently, by means of its supply of treatment
achieve redistribution towards low-ability individuals without causing the
familiar efficiency loss. In particular, its supply of treatment enables it to
reduce the level of utility required by high-ability individuals in order not to
mimic (i. e., VH)' This is so since mr s~E is decreasing in treatment. Thus,
a differentiated provision of treatment allows the government to slacken the
self-selection constraint relative to a situation in which treatment is not used
as a redistributive instrument.
5.3.2 Self-Selection is a Problem
We now proceed to a situation in which the self-selection constraint is bind-
ing, i.e., /1 > O. Again, we start out by deriving the contract intended for
low-ability individuals.
The bundle of earnings and consumption in state 1 is found by dividing
equation (5.16) by equation (5.18):
/1~ - I'P(1 - 71)
/1 aavH+ I'p( 1- 71)
ClL
where mrsClL ElL follows from equation (5.5), mrscm E == (- aaEvH/gVH) >, IL,. IL IL err,
0, k == I'P(1 - 7I)//1g~~ > 0, and superscript m denotes 'mimicker'. From
equation (5.7) we know that the marginal rate of substitution between earn-
ings and consumption is decreasing in ability, hence mr S~L,ElL < mr Sq L,ElL'
Subsequently, as follows from the above condition, mrsm
c
E < 1 andIL, IL
mrSqL,ElL < 1, thus: mrs~L,ElL < mrsClL,ElL < 1. The contract thus
entails a positive marginal tax rate: T'(ElL) = 1 - mrsqL,ElL > O, imply-
ing that VllL/UClL < WL.
113
Analogously, we find that the designated bundle of earnings and con-
sumption if in state 2, entails a positive marginal tax rate: T'(E2L)
= 1 - mrSc2L,E2L > O, implying that VI2L/Uc2L < tLWL. Low-ability indi-
viduals are, therefore, faced with a positive marginal tax rate in both states.
Indeed, their (implicit) marginal tax rate is between zero and 100 percent.
The distortion originates from the problem of self-selection; the contract
intended for low-ability individuals is distorted so as to reduce high-ability
individuals' incentive to mimic.
Geometrically, this corresponds to a situation in which the slope of low-
ability individuals' indifference curve going through the allotted bundle of
(E2L,e2L) in (E2L, c2L)-space is less than 1. As illustrated in Figure 5.5,
the allotted bundle of (E2L, e2L) entails a negative total tax payment, i.e.,
E2L < e2L.
CZj
,,,,
TL < O ,;/
,,' ~-: I
Figure 5.5: Information-constrained efficient bundles of earnings and con-
sumption.
The bundle of earnings and treatment if ill is derived by dividing equation
(5.20) by equation (5.17):
£YL.
åtL- gVL
E2L f-l2YH.. -,p7fåEn
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The left hand side gives low-ability individuals' marginal willingness to pay
for treatment (mwptL), cf equation (5.9). We define mimicking high-ability
individuals' mwpt by: murpt» == - (~~f/gX~Jand f3 == -,p7f / 11gX:L• The
above condition can then be rewritten as:
murpt': = murpt'" - (mwptm - C)_f3_.
1+,6
(5.30)
From equation (5.10) we know that marginal willingness to pay for treat-
ment is increasing in the level of ability. Hence, muipt'" > mwptL. Since
f3 > 016, it follows from the above expression that C < mwptL < murpt":
(recalling that C denotes the marginal production cost of treatment). The
optimal level of treatment provided to low-ability individuals is such that
both mimickers' and low-ability individuals' mwpt exceeds cost of treatment.
Indeed, the level of treatment, oh, is distorted downwards in order to discour-
age mimicking. Restricting ti. induces a first-order effect on the utility of
high-ability individuals, while the effect on low-ability individuals is second-
order. Moreover, the level of earnings if ill (E2L) is distorted downwards,
implying that individuals' labour supply is reduced. The treatment/earnings
bundle intended for low-ability individuals thus entails 'under-provision' of
treatment and induces 'over-consumption' of leisure if ill. The information
constrained efficient bundle of treatment and earnings is illustrated in Fig-
ure 5.6. Of course, since individuals face a positive marginal tax rate, their
mwpt is reduced relatively to a situation without distortionary taxation.
The allocation of earnings across states is found by dividing equation
(5.16) by equation (5.17):
(5.31 )
Again, substituting from equation (5.13) and defining mrsE1E2 == g~~/ gX:L
and 9 == ,p/l1lizHL' we can rewrite this condition as:
L m (mrsE1E2 + 1)7f - 1
mrsEIE2 = mrsE1E2 + g( ).1 - g71
By assumption, mrsE2.El is increasing in ability (w), cf equation (5.14).
Hence, at the given level of treatment (tL) and at the specified level of
- - Learnings (ElL, E2L), then mrsEIE2 > mrsE1E2. Since marginal utility from
16Since J.L ~ O, ')' ~ O, and åVH fåE2L < O.
115
E~ =1 t
Figure 5.6: Information-constrained efficient bundles of treatment and earn-
ings.
earnings is negative, ceteris paribus, then 9 < o. It follows that in order for
mrsEIE2 > mrs1:1E2 then mrsE1E2 > (l - 7r)/7r > mrs1:1E2. Geometrically,
this means that the pair of earnings-points in (ElL, E2L)-space is below
the certainty line (at which mrs1:1E2 equals the ratio of state probabilities).
Hence, the contract provides less than complete smoothing of earnings across
states, i.e., E2L < ElL·
Additionally, as can be seen from equation (5.27), the bundle implies that
low-abilityindividuals' marginal rate of substitution of leisure if healthy for
leisure if ill, is greater than the rate or recovery (i.e., treatment): ~l > iL.
IL
The contract intended for low-ability individuals thus distorts the allocation
of leisure across states. Indeed, the level of earnings specified in the contract
entails excessive leisure time in both states.
The allocation of consumption across states is found by dividing equation
(5.18) by equation (5.19):
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Substituting from equation (5.15) and defining mrs:;-:C2
e == 'Plf.lg~~, we get:
aVH lavH and
aCIL aC2L
mrs:;-:C2 - (1 - n)e
1- ne
L _ m ((1+ mrs:;-:C2)n - 1)
mrsC)C2 - mrsqc2 + e .1- en
As follows from the first-order derivative of equation (5.4), mrs~lC2
= (1- n)uClLlnuc2L. Marginal utility from consumption is, byassumption,
independent of leisure, i.e., Ud = o. Thus, at the given level of treatment
h, low-ability and mimicking individuals' expected marginal utility from
consumption is identical: mrs~lC2 = mrs:;-:C2. Consequently, the bundle of
net income across states (C1£,(:2L), implies that mrs~lC2 = mrs:;-:C2
= (1 - n)/n. Geometrically, this corresponds to a situation in which an
indifference curve through (ClL,C2L) in (ClL,C2L)-space is tangent to a line
showing the ratio of state probabilities. As illustrated in Figure 5.7, the
bundle of net income is located to the right of the 'certainty line'. This is so
because h2L = h < l = b-u. and, since marginal utility from consumption
is increasing in t, (i. e.) Uch > O), then C2L < ClL.
Clj
Figure 5.7: Consumption across states.
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We now set out to characterize the contract intended for high-ability
individuals. Their bundle of earnings and medical treatment is found by
dividing equation (5.25) by equation (5.22):
8VH <fy
mwptE2 t == (- :~H ) = C + ( , ) .
, .!:!..!:.IL ,1-p7r
8E2H
High-ability individuals' marginal willingness to pay for treatment exceeds
cost of treatment by (Øh(l - p)7r) (indeed, they are constrained in their
level of treatment since, by definition, t ::; 1). High-ability individuals are
thus provided with complete treatment: tH = 1. This is first-best efficient.
(5.32)
Their bundle of earnings and consumption if in state 2 is found by divid-
ing equation (5.22) by equation (5.24). This gives that the marginal rate
of substitution of earnings and consumption in each state is equal to 1,
hence, VliH/UCiH = WH (as tH = 1). I.e., high-ability individuals face a zero
marginal tax rate: T'(EiH) = O, i = 1,2, and, thus, there is no distortion in
their assigned bundle of consumption and eamings.l"
Additionally, dividing equation (5.23) by equation (5.24), we find that
their level of consumption across states is not distorted: UClH/UC2H
= (l - 7r)/7r. By dividing equation (5.21) by equation (5.22), we find that- -
high-ability individuals' earnings are constant across states: E1H = E2H.
Consequently, their allocation of leisure across states is first-best efficient:
VllH = Vl2H for tH = 1.
Our findings are summarized in the following Proposition.
Proposition 2. Information constrained efficient contracts when self-selection
is a problem.
1. The contract intended for low-ability individuals:
(a) imposes a distortion in their allocation of income on consumption
and leisure across states, and in the allocation of income between
consumption and treatment if ill.
(b) entitles them to less than complete recovery if ill, i. e., O < h < 1.
Indeed, their level of treatment is distorted downwards. They are,
thus, partly 'disabled' if in state 2.
17Geometrically, the slope of the indifference curve in (EiH, CiH)-space going through
the bundle (EiR,"CiH) is equal to one.
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(c) implies a non-zero implicit marginal tax rate on earnings:
T'(EiL) i= O in both states. Their average tax payment is nega-
tive: EiL < ~L.
(d) entails a low level of earnings in both states. This implies a down-
ward distortion in their labour supply in both states.
(e) gross earnings and disposable income if sick are less than that if
healthy.
(f) implies that utility is not constant across states: u(elL, 1)
+ v(l- ElL/WL) > u(e2L,tL) +v(l- E2L;tLWL). Hence, despite
receiving a net transfer from the government, they will suffer a
loss in utility if ill.
2. The contract intended for high-ability individuals:
(a) does not introduce any distortions in the allocation of income
on consumption and leisure across states, or in the allocation of
income between consumption and treatment if ill.
(b) entitles them to complete recovery, i.e., tH = 1, and obliges them
to generate high earnings. Thus, if ill, they are still 'able '.
(c) implies a zero implicit marginal tax rate, i.e., T' (EiH) = O, but
a positive average tax, i.e., EiH > eiH. They are, thus, 'net
contributors' to the public sector.
(d) earnings are identical across states, EIH = E2H, as is net income,
CIH= C2H·
(e) provides for constant utility across states:
u(elH, 1)+ v(l- ElH/wH) = u(e2H, 1)+ v(l- E2H/wH).
Hence, the information constrained Pareto-efficient contracts are given
by {ElL, E2L, elL, e2L,TL} where E2L < ElL, e2L < elL, tL < 1, and
{ElH, E2H, elH, e2H, tH} where EIH = E2H, elH = e2H and tH = l.
It follows that the efficiency conditions are distorted for only one of the
ability types.l'' Stiglitz (1987) refers to this as a property of Pareto efficient
180ur finding resembles the results found in the literature on asymmetric information
in insurance markets where high- and low-risk individuals are offered different contracts
and where low-risk individuals are constrained in the extent of coverage offered, see for
example Rothschild and Stiglitz (1975) who address the private market mechanism.
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tax structures in a second best world. Notice that the efficient contracts
entail that high-ability individuals can fully restore their ability if ill, i.e.,
they are 'able', while low-ability individuals can restore health only partly,
thus they are (partly) 'disabled'.
The derived contracts induce individuals to self-select. Indeed, high-
ability individuals trade off leisure time to 'signal' their ability type in order
to receive complete medical treatment. Public provision of health care hence
provides an instrument for screening. What are the consequences of inte-
grating income taxation and differentiated public provision for the extent of
income redistribution possible, and how does this compare with alternative
redistributional schemes? This is the subject of the following.
5.4 Medical Treatment as a Screening Device
In the literature on optimal non-linear taxation under asymmetric infor-
mation, it is well established that public provision of private goods may
enhance redistribution. The good in question is traditionally assumed to
be a consumption good for which individuals' preferences are non-separable
from leisure. It is established that when the good in question enters the
utility function as a consumption good only, then separability implies that
in-kind transfers (or commodity taxation) is redundant. In this paper, we
have shown that public provision may still have a role to play even if pref-
erences are separable in consumption and leisure. This is so because the
publicly provided good, i.e., health, alters individuals' productivity in the
labour market if ill, moreover, it affects individuals' marginal utility from
consumption of other goods.l" We will in the following discuss more explic-
itly how public provision of treatment enhances redistribution when infor-
mation is asymmetric. In particular, we describe what will be the effect of
reducing the available level of medical treatment on the extent of redistri-
bution possible. The argument is along the lines of those of Boadway and
Keen (1993) and Edwards et al., (1994).
From equation (5.10) we know that marginal willingness to pay for treat-
19Provision of goods influencing individuals productivity has also been studied by Boad-
way and Marchand (1995). They analyze uniform public provision of education assuming
that individuals derive utility from education indirectly through its effect on individuals'
wage rate. Moreover, they assume that preferences are non-separable in consumption and
leisure.
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ment is higher for a mimicker than a low-ability individual:
If now the level of treatment intended for low-ability individuals (tL) is re-
duced infinitesimally below the efficient level as derived in Section 5.3.1,
then mimickers' earnings liability decreases by murpt'", which is less than
the reduction in murpt'"; i.e., their valuation of the loss in treatment. Thus,
reducing treatment has a first-order effect on high-ability individuals' mwpt
while the effect on low-ability individuals' mwpt is second-order. Mimicking
is consequently made less attractive, implying that the self-selection con-
straint is relaxed. Thus, it is possible to change the optimal income taxation
so as to improve the welfare of low-ability individuals, or in other words, re-
duce the reservation utility of high-ability individuals (V H). Analogously
to Boadway and Keen's (1993) analysis of public goods, the rule for optimal
provision involves 'under-provision' (relatively to the Samuelson rule) since
mimickers' mwpt is greater than that of low-ability individuals:
mwptL > C when mwptL < murpt'":
This is in fact what we derived in Section 5.3.2, cf equation (5.30), namely
that low-ability individuals are restrained in the level of treatment available.
Since, by assumption, high-ability individuals' mwpt exceeds cost of full
treatment (cf Lemma), then the government can subtract (some) of their
'consumer surplus' by restricting the level of treatment available to low-
ability individuals.
Proposition 3. Restraining the level of treatment available to sick low-
ability individuals enables the government to slacken the self-selection con-
straint. In particular, it:
• enables it to deduce higher tax revenues from high ability individuals
by compelling them to generate a high level of earnings and by con-
straining their level of consumption in both states.
• allows it to subtract more of high-ability individuals' 'consumer-surplus'
from treatment.
• facilitates larger transfers towards low-ability individuals in both states.
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We have established that the slope of an indifference curve in (C2,E2)-
space is decreasing in t, cf. equation (5.9). Hence, the slope of a mim-
icker's indifference curve in (C2, E2)-space changes relative to that of a 'non-
deceiving' high-ability individual. This is so because the bundle of earnings
and consumption intended for low-ability individuals is specified for a par-
ticular level of treatment, namely tL. Consequently, a mimicker will not
retrieve her full productivity if ill and will, ceteris paribus, have to spend
relatively more time in the labour market in order to generate earnings Eu
than she would for a higher ti.. Thus, her level of utility is lower. Also,low-
ability individuals' level of utility is higher when the level of treatment tt.
is reduced since more redistribution is carried out. Low-ability individuals'
designated earnings are lower, implying more leisure time and, thus, higher
V(liL). Their designated level of consumption if ill (C2L) is, however, lower
due to the reduction in treatment (recalling that Uch > O), thus u(C2L, tL) is
lower. The increase in utility from more leisure, v(l2L), more than compen-
sates for the loss in utility from lower health and consumption if ill. Indeed,
as follows from the utility function, individuals are more concerned (in ordi-
nal terms) about leisure than consumption when health is poor than when
health is good. In other words, the marginal rate of substitution of leisure
for consumption, årnrslc/åh, decreases if health decreases. Consequently,
low-ability individuals' expected utility VL increases.F''
As follows from the above, a scheme of uniform public provision of treat-
ment allows for less redistribution than does a scheme of differentiated pro-
vision, since the incentive to mimic is stronger. Consequently, V H is higher
when treatment is uniform than if treatment is differentiated (cf. Section
5.3.1) which again is higher than if treatment is restrained (cf. Section
5.3.2).
Proposition 4. Public provision of a uniform level of medical treatment
does not Pareto dominate a scheme with differentiated public provision.
Geometrically, this is illustrated by high-ability individuals' indifference
curve in (C2, E2 )-space showing the minimum level of utili ty required in order
200ur findings runs counter to those of Boadway and Marchand (1995) who show that
the self-selection constraint may be slacken by compelling individuals to 'over-consume'
education which is uniformly provided. In our model of health care provision, the self-
selection constraint is relaxed by forcing low-ability individuals to 'under-consume' treat-
ment.
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not to mimic, is more flat when the level of treatment intended for low-ability
individuals is restrained. Moreover, it is located above the corresponding
curve in a scheme with uniform provision. Low-ability individuals' level of
utility is, consequently, lower when treatment is uniformly provided. Thus,
low-ability individuals are relatively better off when they are constrained
in their level of treatment if ill. This finding may seem counterintuitive:
low-ability individuals' expected utility is higher in a scheme where health
is poorer. The reason for this result is as follows. The income transfer allows
low-ability individuals to reduce their labour supply and, thus, to increase
utility from leisure if ill to an extent at which the loss in utility due to lower
health and consumption is more than compensated for.
5.4.1 The Utility Possibilities Frontier
Individuals are assumed to have strictly concave utility functions. It may
thus be reasonable to infer that the (ex ante) utility possibilities frontier
(upI) is also concave. The up! may in a situation without asymmetric in-
formation, henceforth called first-best, be depicted as in Figure 5.8. The dis-
tribution of utility among the two types of individuals prior to redistribution
is indicated by point H on the frontier. In a world of symmetric information,
redistribution may take the form of lump sum transfers, hence, any point
on the up! is attainable. In the present context, however, the government
faces problems in identifying individuals. If the self-selection constraint on
high-ability individuals does not bind, then the government can through its
menu of contracts as described in Section 5.3.1, change the distribution of
utility from point H to point K on the first-best frontier. The second-best
efficient allocation consequently coincides with the first-best efficient alloca-
tion. If, on the other hand, the self-selection constraint does bind, then the
redistributional policy imposes a distortion. Indeed, low-ability individuals
are constrained in their level of treatment and earnings in order to restrain
high-ability individuals from mimicking. When self-selection is a problem,
we thus have the familiar equity-efficiency trade-off. For a small degree of
redistribution, the distortion, caused by the self-selection mechanism, will
have a second-order effect on low-ability individuals. Naturally, the larger
the extent of redistribution, the more 'severe' is the distortion.
Since, by assumption, individuals have smooth and convex indifference
curves, we can for different levels of VH (and for a given A) depict a smooth
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second-best frontier that coincides with the first-best frontier over a range
(from H to K), but then diverges from the first-best frontier and is located
inside the first-best frontier. The second-best up], illustrated by the heavily
drawn curve, will not intersect the 45° line, but rather be located to the
right of the 45° line. The intuition for this is that high-ability individuals in
a self-selection equilibrium will, by choosing the contract intended for low-
ability individuals, derive a higher level of utility in both states of the world,
than do low-ability individuals (since, at the given level of treatment and
earnings, they can enjoy a higher level of leisure in both states of the world).
The separating bundles (as illustrated by point S) can also be thought to
describe the maximum levelof redistribution achievable, that is; it represents
a 'maxi-min' solution.
Vu
Figure 5.8: The utility possibilities frontier.
5.5 Discussion
We have shown that a public supply of health care may be justified on
the grounds of efficiency. The derived contracts may also be justified on
the grounds of ex post redistributional justice. The argument is as follows.
Individuals may face uncertainty, not only with respect to their state of
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health, but also with respect to their inherent level of ability. If this is so,
then the preceding analysis can be considered to take place in the 'interim'.
Contracts would now be offered prior to individuals knowing their innate
ability, hence, they would have to make their decision behind a 'veil of
ignorance'. In this situation, individuals would prefer to maximize their ex
ante average utility, which is indeed the utilitarian objective.P
The government may pursue its redistributional ambitions without ref-
erence to the state of the world if insurance markets are complete. However,
perfect insurance markets do not exists. Reasons for this is asymmetric in-
formation leading to problems of adverse selection and moral hazard, trans-
action costs, etc. Redistribution may, hence, be motivated by a desire for
(social) insurance. As Varian (1980, p. 51) puts it:
"Indeed, the fact that redistributive taxation helps to insure against
individual risk is a common justification for redistributive programs."
In the literature on redistributive taxation focus may, according to Varian
(1980), be placed on (i) the equity effect of altering the income distribution,
(ii) the efficiency effects from reducing incentives, and (iii) the insurance
effects from reducing the variance in income streams. The insurance aspect
of redistribution of income has, however, received less attention than for
instance equity and efficiency aspects of taxation.
In this paper, we assume that private insurance markets do not exist and
we show that non-linear income taxes and public provision of health care
facilitates redistribution both between different income groups and across
different health states. The tax/provision scheme thus constitutes an in-
strument for insurance. Indeed, the derived redistributive insurance scheme
defines prices (taxes) and quantities (level of treatment).
Our analysis is based on a stylized model in which the government does
not pursue a particular distribution of health per se. However, one may
argue that health is a 'particular' commodity for which the society has spe-
cific egalitarian ambitions, i.e., that health is subject to what Tobin (1970)
21Utilitarianism may also be supported by a different set of arguments. According to
Roemer (1996), Harsanyi introduced in his 1955 paper on "Cardinal welfare, individualistic
ethics, and interpersonal comparisons of utility", three axioms for social choice under
uncertainty, and showed that the social welfare function is given by the sum of individuals'
expected utilities.
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calls specific egalitarianism. Furthermore, our analysis ignores possible cor-
relation between inherent ability and the probability of falling ill. It seems
natural to extend the analysis to include also differences in the probability
of illness. This will be the subject of future research. We still think that our
analysis may offer a contribution to the literature on the public provision of
private goods in which health care is perhaps the most outstanding example.
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